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The central motif of this work is prediction and optimization in presence of mul-
tiple interacting intelligent agents. We use the phrase ‘intelligent agents’ to imply in
some sense, a ‘bounded rationality’, the exact meaning of which varies depending on
the setting. Our agents may not be ‘rational’ in the classical game theoretic sense, in
that they don’t always optimize a global objective. Rather, they rely on heuristics, as is
natural for human agents or even software agents operating in the real-world. Within
this broad framework we study the problem of influence maximization in social net-
works where behavior of agents is myopic, but complication stems from the structure
of interaction networks. In this setting, we generalize two well-known models and
give new algorithms and hardness results for our models. Then we move on to models
where the agents reason strategically but are faced with considerable uncertainty. For
such games, we give a new solution concept and analyze a real-world game using out
techniques. Finally, the richest model we consider is that of Network Cournot Com-
petition which deals with strategic resource allocation in hypergraphs, where agents
reason strategically and their interaction is specified indirectly via player’s utility func-
tions. For this model, we give the first equilibrium computability results. In all of the
above problems, we assume that payoffs for the agents are known. However, for real-
world games, getting the payoffs can be quite challenging. To this end, we also study
the inverse problem of inferring payoffs, given game history. We propose and evaluate
a data analytic framework and we show that it is fast and performant.
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The goal of this work is the analysis and prediction of behavior of multiple interacting
intelligent agents in social and strategic settings. We use the phrase ‘intelligent agents’
to imply in some sense, a ‘bounded rationality’, the exact meaning of which varies
somewhat depending on the setting under consideration. However, we note that our
agents may not be ‘rational’ in the classical game theoretic sense, in that they don’t
always optimize a global objective. Rather, they rely on heuristics, as is natural for
human agents or even software agents operating in the real-world. We propose and
analyze theoretical models for behavior of such agents in social and strategic settings.
In addition, we develop data analytic frameworks for analysis of real-world strategic
games.
Consider the case of a product manufacturer trying to promote a product by leverag-
ing word-of-mouth publicity. It is reasonable to assume that perception of the product
for a person is influenced by reviews from her peers. Thus, the manufacturer wants to
distribute coupons among a community to increase the expected number of users. We
note that the optimal solution involves shaping behavior of intelligent agents whose be-
havior depends not only on the environment, but also on behavior of other agents. This
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theme of interacting agents is common to a great variety of scenarios. In the problems
we study, the models of agents and their interactions vary depending on details of the
problem. In the social network setting, the agents are influenced by their peers. In the
case of markets, the players influence each other by their influence on prices, whereas
in strategic settings, player’s actions have direct influence on payoffs of other players.
Thus, we study the problem of algorithm design for interacting intelligent agents.
1.1 Algorithms for Networked Agents
Social networks are the graph of relationships within a group of individuals. They play
a very important role in diffusion of influence among the interconnected individuals.
In social setting, we study the problem of influence maximization – the problem of
ensuring that an idea or product is adopted by maximum number of individuals, given
limited resources at disposal of the planner. We study two problems related to influence
maximization. They mainly differ in the aspects of diffusion the planner controls. In
the first case the planner can only control the order in which the diffusion happens in
the network and in the second case planner can only control the incentives for nodes to
adopt the product. We study the first and second cases in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively.
In Chapter 2, we study the propagation of influence in a social network with nega-
tive feedback. Adoption or rejection of ideas, products, and technologies in a society is
often governed by simultaneous propagation of positive and negative influences. Con-
sider a planner trying to introduce an idea in different parts of a society at different
times. How should the planner design a schedule considering this fact that positive
reaction to the idea in early areas has a positive impact on probability of success in
later areas, whereas a flopped reaction has exactly the opposite impact? We generalize
a well-known economic model which has been recently used by Chierichetti et al. [28].
In this model the reaction of each area is determined by its initial preference and the
reaction of early areas. We generalize previous works by studying the problem when
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people in different areas have various behaviors.
In Chapter 3, we study the power of fractional allocations of resources to maximize
influence in a network. This work extends in a natural way the well-studied model
by Kempe et al. [75], where a designer selects a (small) seed set of nodes in a social
network to influence directly, this influence cascades when other nodes reach certain
thresholds of neighbor influence, and the goal is to maximize the final number of influ-
enced nodes. Despite extensive study from both practical and theoretical viewpoints,
this model limits the designer to a binary choice for each node, with no way to apply
intermediate levels of influence. This model captures some settings precisely, e.g. ex-
posure to an idea or pathogen, but it fails to capture very relevant concerns in others,
for example, a manufacturer promoting a new product by distributing five “20% off”
coupons instead of giving away one free product.
From the relatively simple models of influence maximization, we move on to a
much richer model – that of strategic decision making in hypergraphs. In this setting,
the agents have a cost associated with resource allocation along hyperedges. In return,
the agents derive a reward from the hyperedges. The interaction among the agents is
implicitly specified by these cost and reward functions. In Chapter 4, We study such a
model, which can be viewed as a generalization of the well-known Cournot model from
economics. We give one of the first positive results on computability of equilibrium in
this setting. Efficient computability is an important prerequisite for solution concepts
[102]. Therefore, it is an important first step in analysis of such models. We give
a convex formulation for the problem. This opens the possibility that that various
dynamics, e.g. best-response, may converge to equilibrium. This is a direction of
further research. We also contribute the first combinatorial algorithm for computing an
equilibrium for the classical Cournot Oligopoly.
3
1.2 Real-world Strategic Games
We now move on to conceptually simple but computationally challenging strategic
setting – multiplayer simultaneous games and its application to a real-world strategic
game where interaction between players is explicitly specified by payoff matrices for
the players. Game theory has long been used to study the strategic interactions of ra-
tional players in such games. However, computational frameworks that use real-world
data to make meaningful inferences and predictions about these agents are a relatively
new development in this field. In this area, we make important contributions. In Chap-
ter 5, we develop a framework to analyze equilibria of games with multiple possible
payoff matrices with no priors on these matrices. The use of game theory to model
conflict has been studied by several researchers, spearheaded by Schelling. Most of
these efforts assume a single payoff matrix that captures players’ utilities under differ-
ent assumptions about what the players will do. Our experience in counter-terrorism
applications is that experts disagree on these payoffs. In order to effectively enumer-
ate large numbers of equilibria with payoffs provided by multiple experts, we propose
a novel combination of vector payoffs and well-supported ε-approximate equilibria.
We develop bounds related to computation of these equilibria for some special cases,
and give a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (QPTAS) for the general case
when the number of players is small (which is true in many real-world applications).
Leveraging this QPTAS, we give efficient algorithms to find such equilibria and experi-
mental results showing they work well on simulated data. We then present a real-world
application in which there are five parties including four governmental entities and
the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba1. The goal was to understand whether there were
any pure (or mixed) equilibria in which the group’s terrorist acts could be significantly
reduced.
1Lashkar-e-Taiba, translated variously from Urdu into “Army of the Pure” or “Army of the Pious”,
is a prominent south Asian terrorist organization responsible for attacks in India, Kashmir, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan, including the three days of attacks in 2008 in Mumbai, India, that resulted in the deaths of 166
innocent people [122, 124].
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1.3 Payoff Inference
Though, most game theory assumes that payoff functions are provided as input, get-
ting payoff matrices in strategic games (e.g. corporate negotiations, counter-terrorism
operations) has proven difficult. In Chapter 6, We develop a data analytic framework
for learning payoff functions of players from a given game history. The payoffs can
then be analyzed in manner similar to that in Chapter 5. Ng and Russell pioneered
inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) that studies the problem of learning payoffs in a
non-adversarial setting. Recently, Waugh showed how a maximum entropy-based ap-
proach learns a probability distribution function (pdf) over joint actions for each player
under the assumption that players are playing a correlated equilibrium. Unlike past
work, we study the case where histories of past actions are sparse and where players
are not fully rational. We set up a feasible system of inequalities on payoffs using
regret minimization and best response dynamics. Then we evaluate three solution se-
lection methods on this system of inequalities: (i) approximately compute a centroid
of the resulting polytope (ii) soft constraints approach where we penalize violation of
constraints in the objective and (iii) an SVM based approach. To test the effectiveness
of our approach, we run experiments on synthetic and real-world data. We show that





People’s opinions are usually formed by their friends’ opinions. Whenever a new con-
cept is introduced into a society, the high correlation between people’s reactions ini-
tiates an influence propagation. Under this propagation, the problem of promoting a
product or an opinion depends on the problem of directing the flow of influences. As
a result, a planner can develop a new idea by controlling the flow of influences in a
desired way. Although there have been many attempts to understand the behavior of
influence propagation in a social network, the topic is still controversial due to lack of
reliable information and complex behavior of this phenomenon.
For example, one compelling approach is “seeding” which was introduced by the
seminal work of Kempe, Kleinberg, and Trados [75] and is well-studied in the litera-
ture [75, 76, 77, 95]. The idea is to influence a group of people in the initial investment
period and spread the desired opinion in the ultimate exploitation phase. Another ap-
proach is to use time-varying and customer-specific prices to propagate the product
0This is a joint work with Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi and Hamid Mahini. A version of this work appeared
in Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory ’13 [61].
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(see e.g., [3, 4, 62]). All of these papers investigate the influence propagation problem
when only positive influences spread into the network. However, in many real world
applications people are affected by both positive and negative influences, e.g., when
both consenting and dissenting opinions broadcast simultaneously.
We generalize a well-known economic model introduced by Arthur [9]. This model
has been recently used by Chierichetti, Kleinberg, and Panconesi [28].
As Jon Kleinberg motivated the problem1, assume an organization is going to de-
velop a new idea in a society where the people in the society are grouped into n dif-
ferent areas. Each area consists of people living near each other with almost the same
preferences.
The planner schedules to introduce a new idea in different areas at different times.
Each area may accept or reject the original idea. Since areas are varied and effects of
early decisions boost during the diffusion, a schedule-based strategy affects the spread
of influences.
This framework closely matches to various applications from economics to social
science to public health where the original idea could be a new product, a new technol-
ogy, or a new belief.
Consider the spread of two opposing influences simultaneously. Both positive and
adverse reactions to a single idea originate different flows of influences simultaneously.
In this model, each area has an initial preference of Y or N . The initial preference of
Y (N ) means the area will accept (decline) the original idea when there are no network
externalities. Let ci be a non-negative number indicating how reaction of people in
area i depends on the others’. We call ci the threshold of area i. Assume the planner
introduced the idea in area i at time s. Let mY and mN be the number of areas which
accept or reject the idea before time s. If |mY − mN | ≥ ci the people in area i
decide based on the majority of previous adopters. It means they adopt the idea if
mY −mN ≥ ci and drop it if mN −mY ≥ ci. Otherwise, if |mY −mN | < ci the
1via personal communication.
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people in area i accept or reject the idea if the initial preference of area i is Y or N
respectively. The planner does not know exact initial preferences and has only prior
knowledge about them. Formally speaking, for area i the planner knows the initial
preference of area i will be Y with probability pi and will beN with probability 1−pi.
We call pi the initial acceptance probability of area i.
We consider the problem when the planner classifies different areas into various
types. The classification is based on the planner’s knowledge about the reaction of
people living in each area. Hence, the classification is based on different features,
e.g., preferences, beliefs, education, and age such that people in areas with the same
type react almost the same to the new idea. It means all areas of the same type have the
same threshold ci and the same initial acceptance probability pi. It is worth mentioning
previous works only consider the problem when all areas have the same type, i.e., all
pi’s and ci’s are the same [9, 28].
The planner wants to manage the flow of influences, and her spreading strategy is
a permutation π over different areas. Her goal is to find a spreading strategy π which
maximizes the expected number of adopters.
We consider both adaptive and non-adaptive spreading strategies in this chapter. In
the adaptive spreading strategy, the planner can see results of earlier areas for further
decisions. On the other hand, in the non-adaptive spreading strategy the planner decides
about the permutation in advance.
We show the effect of a spreading strategy on the number of adopters with an
example in Section 2.1.1.
2.1.1 Examples
Example 1. Consider a society with 3 areas and 3 types. The planner prior is as
follows. Initial acceptance probabilities of areas 1, 2, and 3 are 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8











Figure 2.1: A society with 3 areas. The expected number of adopters for spreading
strategy π = (1, 2, 3) is 1.5. The expected number of adopters for spreading strategy
π′ = (3, 1, 2) is 2.4.
2.1). Consider spreading strategy π = (1, 2, 3). People in area 1 accept the idea with
probability p1 = 0.2. Threshold of area 2 is 2. It means people in area 2 decide based
on initial rule and accept the idea with probability p2 = 0.5. Threshold of area 3
is 3. Thus, people in area 3 decide based on initial rule as well and accept the idea
with probability p3 = 0.8. Therefore, the expected number of adopters for spreading
strategy π is p1 + p2 + p3 = 1.5. In order to see the impact of an optimal spreading
strategy consider spreading strategy π′ = (3, 1, 2). People in area 3 accept the idea
with probability p3 = 0.8. Threshold of area 1 is 1. It means the decision of people
in area 1 is correlated to the decision of people in area 3. In other word, people in
area 1 follow the decision of people in area 3. Thus, there are two possible scenarios.
First, both areas 3 and 1 accept the idea. The probability of this scenario is p3 = 0.8.
The second scenario is that both areas 3 and 1 reject the idea. The probability of the
second scenario is 1−p3 = 0.2. In both scenario the threshold of area 2 is hit. Hence,
area 2 will accept the idea with probability p3 = 0.8. Therefore, the expected number
of adopters for spreading schedule π′ is 3p3 = 2.4.
Example 2. At the first glance, it seems a greedy approach leads us to find the best
non-adaptive spreading strategy. The greedy approach is to first schedule a node with
the highest probability of adopting. We find a counter-example for this greedy approach











Figure 2.2: A society with 3 areas. The expected number of adopters for spreading
strategy π = (1, 2, 3) is p1 +p2 +p1p2. The expected number of adopters for spreading
strategy π′ = (2, 1, 3) is 3p2.
Consider a society with 3 areas and 3 types. Area 1 has threshold 1 and areas 2
and 3 have threshold 2. Initial acceptance probabilities are p1 > p2 > p3 = 0 (See
Figure 2.2). The greedy approach leads us to spreading strategy π = (1, 2, 3). Assume
the planner uses spreading strategy π. The probability that people in area 1 accept the
idea is p1. The threshold for area 2 is 2. Hence, they decide based on initial rule. It
means the probability that people in area 2 accept the idea is p2. At last, if both area 1
and 2 accept the idea then people in area 3 accept the idea with probability p1p2 based
on threshold rules . Otherwise, they reject it because p3 = 0, i.e., area 3 has an initial
preference of N for sure. Thus, the expected number of adopter is p1 + p2 + p1p2.
Now, assume the planner uses spreading strategy π′ = (2, 1, 3). Area 2 accepts the
idea with probability p2. The threshold of area 1 is 1. It means area 1 is a follower
of area 2 under spreading strategy π′. Hence, there are two possibilities. Both areas
1 and 2 accept the idea with probability p2 or both areas 1 and 2 reject the idea with
probability 1−p2. In both cases area 3 decides based on the threshold rule. Therefore,
there are 3 adopters with probability p2 or all areas reject the idea with probability
1 − p2. Hence, the expected number of adopter is 3p2 for spreading strategy π′. One
can check spreading strategy π′ is better that π for various probabilities p1 and p2,
e.g., p1 = 0.4 and p2 = 0.3 or p1 = 0.8 and p2 = 0.7.
Example 3. The result of Theorem 2.1.3 leads us to the following conjecture for the
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partial propagation setting.
“Consider an arbitrary non-adaptive spreading strategy in the partial
propagation setting. If all initial acceptance probabilities are greater/less
than 12 , then adding an edge to the graph helps/hurts promoting the new
product.".
This conjecture has several consequences, e.g., a complete graph is the best graph
for spreading a new idea when initial acceptance probabilities are greater than 12 .
This eventuates directly Theorem 2.1.3. Surprisingly, this conjecture does not hold.
We present an example with the same initial acceptance probabilities of less than 12
such that adding a relationship between two areas increases the expected number of
adopters.
Consider a society with 4 areas and only one type. Initial acceptance probabilities
and thresholds for all areas are p and 1 respectively. Consider spreading strategy π =
(1, 2, 3, 4) and a society which is represented by graph G (See Figure 2.3). Areas 1, 2,
and 3 decide about the idea independently and accept it with probability p. Threshold
of area 4 is 1. Hence, people in area 4 accept the idea if there are at least two adopters
so far. Therefore, area 4 accept the idea with probability 3p2(1 − p) + p3 and the
expected number of adopters is 3p+3p2(1−p)+p3. Assume influences also propagate
between area 1 and 2. In this case the society is represented by graph G′ (See Figure
2.3). Threshold of area 2 is 1. Hence, area 2 is a follower of area 1 under spreading
strategy π. Thus, there are two possibilities when area 2 is scheduled. Both area 1 and
2 accept the idea with probability p or both reject it with probability 1 − p. Area 3
decide independently and accept the idea with probability p. Threshold of area 4 is 1.
Thus, area 4 is also a follower of both area 1 and 2. Therefore, the expected number of
adopter is 4p in this case. One can check 3p+3p2(1−p)+p3 is greater than 4p if and
only if 0.5 < p < 1. It means when p < 0.5 (resp., p > 0.5) the number of adopters











Figure 2.3: This figure represents a partial propagation setting with 4 areas. All Thresh-
olds are equal to 1 and all initial acceptance probabilities are p. The expected number
of adopters for spreading strategy π = (1, 2, 3, 4) is 3p + 3p2(1 − p) + p3 for a soci-
ety which is represented by graph G. The expected number of adopters for spreading
strategy π = (1, 2, 3, 4) is 4p for a society which is represented by graph G′. Note that
3p2(1− p) + p3 is greater than p if and only if 0.5 < p < 1
2.1.2 Related Work
We are motivated by a series of well-known studies in economics and politics literature
in order to model people’s behavior [9, 14, 17, 56]. Arthur first proposed a framework
to analyze people’s behavior in a scenario with two competing products [9]. In this
model people are going to decide about one of two competing products alternatively.
He studied the problem when people are affected by all previous customers, and the
planner has the same prior knowledge about people’s behavior, i.e., people have the
same types. He demonstrated that a cascade of influences is formed when products
have positive network externalities, and early decisions determine the ultimate out-
come of the market. It has been showed the same cascade arises when people look at
earlier decisions, not because of network externalities, but because they have limited
information themselves or even have bounded rationality to process all available data
[14, 17].
Chierichetti, Kleinberg, and Panconesi argued when relations between people form
an arbitrary network, the outcome of an influence propagation highly depends on the
order in which people make their decisions [28]. In this setting, a potential spread-
ing strategy is an ordering of decision makers. They studied the problem of finding
a spreading strategy which maximizes the expected number of adopters when people
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have the same type, i.e., people have the same threshold c and the same initial accep-
tance probability p. They proved for any n-node graph there is an adaptive spreading
strategy with at least O(npc) adopters. They also showed for any n-node graph all
adaptive spreading strategies result in at least (resp. at most) n2 if initial acceptance
probability is less (resp. greater) than 12 . They considered the problem on an arbitrary
graph when nodes have the same type. While we mainly study the problem on a com-
plete graph when nodes have various types, we improve their result in our setting and
show the expected number of adopters for all adaptive spreading strategies is at least
(resp. at most) np if initial acceptance probability is p ≥ 12 (resp. p ≤
1
2 ). We also
show the problem of designing the best spreading strategy is hard on an arbitrary graph
with several types of customers. We prove it is #P -complete to compute the expected
number of adopters for a given spreading strategy.
The problem of designing an appropriate marketing strategy based on network ex-
ternalities has been studied extensively in the computer science literature. For exam-
ple, Kempe, Kleinberg, and Trados [75] studied the following question in their seminal
work: How can we influence a group of people in an investment phase in order to prop-
agate an idea in the exploitation phase? This question was introduced by Domingos
and Richardson [45]. The answer to this question leads to a marketing strategy based
on seeding. There are several papers that study the same problem from an algorith-
mic point of view, e.g., [23, 76, 95]. Hartline, Mirrokni, and Sundararajan [62] also
proposed another marketing strategy based on scheduling for selling a product. Their
marketing strategy is a permutation π over customers and price pi for customer i. The
seller offers the product with price pi to customer i at time t where t = π−1(i). The
goal is to find a marketing strategy which maximizes the profit of the seller. This ap-
proach is followed by several works, e.g., [3, 4, 8]. These papers study the behavior
of an influence propagation when there is only one flow on influences in the network.
In this chapter, we study the problem of designing a spreading strategy when both
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negative and positive influences propagate simultaneously.
The propagation of competitive influences has been studied in the literature (See
[55] and its references). These works studied the influence propagation problem in
the presence of competing influences, i.e., when two or more competing firms try to
propagate their products at the same time. However we study the problem of influ-
ence propagation when there exist both positive and negative reactions to the same
idea. There are also studies which consider the influence propagation problem in the
presence of positive and negative influences [26, 83]. Che et al. [26] use a variant of
the independent cascade model introduced in [75]. They model negative influences by
allowing each person to flips her idea with a given probability q. Li et al. [83] model
the negative influences by negative edges in the graph. Although they study the same
problem, we use different models to capture behavior of people.
2.1.3 Our Results
We analyze an influence propagation phenomenon where two opposing flows of influ-
ences propagate through a social network. As a result, a mistake in the selection of
early areas may result in propagation of negative influences. Therefore a good under-
standing of influence propagation dynamics seems necessary to analyze the properties
of a spreading strategy. Besides the previous papers which have studied the problem
with just one type [9, 28], we consider the scheduling problem with various types.
Also, we mainly study the problem in a full propagation setting as it matches well to
our motivations. In the full propagation setting news and influences propagate between
every two areas. One can imagine how internet, media, and electronic devices broad-
cast news and influences from everywhere to everywhere. In the partial propagation
setting news and influences do not necessarily propagate between every two areas. In
the partial propagation setting the society can be modeled with a graph, where there is
an edge from area i to area j if and only if influences propagate from area i to area j.
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Our main focus is to analyze the problem when the planner chooses a non-adaptive
spreading strategy. Consider an arbitrary non-adaptive spreading strategy when initial
preferences of all areas are p. The expected number of adopters is exactly np if all areas
decide independently. We demonstrate that in the presence of network influences, the
expected number of adopters in greater/less than np if initial acceptance probability p
is greater/less than 12 . These results have a bold message: The influence propagation
is an amplifier for an appealing idea and an attenuator for an unappealing idea.
Chierichetti, Kleinberg, and Panconesi [28] studied the problem on an arbitrary graph
with only one type. They proved the number of adopters is greater/less than n2 if initial
acceptance probability p is greater/less than 12 . Theorem 2.1.3 improves their result
from n2 to np in our setting. Consider an arbitrary non-adaptive spreading strategy
π in the full propagation setting. Assume all initial acceptance probabilities are equal
to p. If p ≥ 12 , then the expected number of adopters is at least np. Furthermore, If
p ≤ 12 , then the expected number of adopters is at most np.
Chierichetti, Kleinberg, and Panconesi [28] studied the problem of designing an
optimum spreading strategy in the partial propagation setting. They design an approxi-
mation algorithm for the problem when the planner has the same prior knowledge about
all areas, i.e., all areas have the same type. We study the same problem with more than
one type. We first consider the problem in the full propagation setting. One approach
is to consider a non-adaptive spreading strategy with a constant number of switches
between different types. The planner has the same prior knowledge about areas with
the same type. It means areas with the same type are identical for the planner. Thus
any spreading strategy can be specified by types of areas rather than areas themselves.
Let τ(i) be the type of area i and τ(π) be the sequence of types for spreading strategy
π. For a give spreading strategy π a switch is a position k in the sequence such that
τ(π(k)) 6= τ(π(k+ 1)). As an example consider a society with 4 areas. Areas 1 and 2
are of type 1. Areas 3 and 4 are of type 2. Then spreading strategy π1 = (1, 2, 3, 4) with
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τ(π1) = (1, 1, 2, 2) has a switch at position 2 and spreading strategy π2 = (1, 3, 2, 4)
with τ(π2) = (1, 2, 1, 2) has switches at positions 1, 2, and 3. A σ-switch spreading
strategy is a spreading strategy with at most σ switches. For any constant σ, there exists
a society with areas of two types such that no σ-switch spreading strategy is optimal.
We construct a society with n areas with n2 areas of type 1 and
n
2 areas of type 2. We
demonstrate an optimal non-adaptive spreading strategy should switch at least Ω(n)
times. It means no switch-based non-adaptive spreading strategy can be optimal. We
prove Theorem 2.1.3 formally in Section 2.5.
On the positive side, we analyze the problem when thresholds are drawn indepen-
dently from an unknown distribution and initial acceptance probabilities are arbitrary
numbers. We characterize the optimal non-adaptive spreading strategy in this case.
Assume that the planner’s prior knowledge about all values of ci’s is the same, i.e.,
all ci’s are drawn independently from the same but unknown distribution. Let initial
acceptance probabilities be arbitrary numbers. Then, the best non-adaptive spreading
strategy is to order all areas in non-increasing order of their initial acceptance proba-
bilities.
We also study the problem of designing the optimum spreading strategy in the par-
tial propagation setting with more than one types. We show it is hard to determine the
expected number of adopters for a given spreading strategy. Formal speaking, we show
it is #P -complete to compute the expected number of adopters for a given spreading
strategy π in the partial propagation setting with more than one type. This is another
evidence to show the influence propagation is more complicated with more than one
type. We prove Theorem 2.1.3 based on a reduction from a variation of the network
reliability problem in Section 2.6.
In the partial propagation setting, it is #P -complete to compute the expected num-
ber of adopters for a given non-adaptive spreading strategy π.
We also present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the expected number of
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adopters for a given non-adaptive spreading strategy in a full propagation setting. We
design an algorithm in order to simulate the amount of propagation for a given spread-
ing strategy in Section 2.7. Consider a full propagation setting. The expected number
of adopter can be computed in polynomial time for a given non-adaptive spreading
strategy π.
At last we study the problem of designing the best adaptive spreading strategy.
We overcome the hardness of the problem and design a polynomial-time algorithm
to find the best adaptive marketing strategy in the following theorem. We describe
the algorithm precisely in Section 2.8. A polynomial-time algorithm finds the best
adaptive spreading strategy for a society with a constant number of types.
2.2 Notation and Preliminaries
In this section we define basic concepts and notation used throughout this chapter. We
first formally define the spread of influence through a network as a stochastic process
and then give the intuition behind the formal notation. We are given a graph G =
(V,E) with thresholds, cv ∈ Z>0,∀v ∈ V and initial acceptance probabilities pv ∈
[0, 1],∀v ∈ V . Let |V | = n. Let dv be the degree of vertex v. Let N(v) be the
set of neighboring vertices of v. Let c be the vector (c1, . . . , cn) and p be the vector
(p1, . . . , pn). Given a graph G = (V,E) and a permutation π : V 7→ V , we define a
discrete stochastic process, IS (Influence Spread) as an ordered set of random variables
(X1, X2, . . . , Xn), where Xt ∈ Ω = {−1, 0, 1}n,∀t ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The random
variable Xtv denotes decision of area v at time t. If it has not yet been scheduled,
Xtv = 0. If it accepts the idea then X
t
v = 1, and if it rejects the idea then X
t
v = −1.
Note that Xtv = 0 iff t < pi




u be the sum of
decision’s of v’s neighbors. For simplicity in notation, we denote Xnv by Xv .
We now briefly explain the intuition behind the notation. The input graph models
the influence network of areas on which we want to schedule a cascade, with each
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vertex representing an area. There is an edge between two vertices if two corresponding
areas influence each others decision. The influence spread process models the spread
of idea acceptance and rejection for a given spreading strategy. The permutation π
maps a position in spreading strategy to an area in V . For example, π(1) = v implies
that v is the first area to be scheduled. Once the area v is given a chance to accept or
reject the idea at time π−1(v), Xπ
−1(v)
v is assigned a value based on v’s decision and
at all times t after π−1(v), Xtv = X
π−1(v)
v . The random variable Xv denotes whether
an area v accepted or rejected the idea. We note that Xtv = Xv,∀t ≥ π−1(v). The
random variableXt is complete snapshot of the cascade process at time t. The variable
D(v) is the decision variable for v. It denotes the sum of decisions of v’s neighbors at
the time v is scheduled in the cascade and it determines whether v decides to follow the
majority decision or whether v decides based on its initial acceptance probability. The
random variable It is the sum of decisions of all areas at time t. Thus, In is the variable
we are interested in as it denotes the difference between number of people who accept
the idea and people who reject the idea.
Let v = π(t). Given Xt−1, Xt is defined as follows:
• Every area decides to accept or reject the idea exactly once when it is scheduled
and its decision remains the same at all later times. Therefore ∀i 6= π(t):
– Xti = X
t−1
i
• Decision of area v is based on decision of previous areas if its threshold is
reached.
– Xtv = 1 if D(v) ≥ cv
– Xtv = −1 if D(v) ≤ −cv
• If threshold of area v is not reached, then it decides to accept the idea with
probability pv , its initial acceptance probability, and decides to reject it with
probability 1− pv .
18
In partial propagation setting, we represent such a stochastic process by tuple IS =
(G, c,p, π). For full propagation setting, the underlying graph is a complete graph and
hence we can denote the process by (c,p, π). When c and p are clear from context,





v . We denote by qv = 1−pv the probability that v rejects the idea based
on initial preference. We denote by Pr(A; IS), the probability of event A occurring
under stochastic process IS. Similarly, we denote by E(z; IS), the expected value of
random variable z under the stochastic process IS.
2.3 A Bound on Spread of Appealing and Unappealing
Ideas
Lets call an idea unappealing if its initial acceptance probability for all areas is p for
some p ≤ 12 . We prove in this section, that for such ideas, no strategy can boost
the acceptance probability for any area above p. We note that exactly the opposite
argument can be made when p ≥ 12 is the initial acceptance probability of all areas,
i.e., any spreading strategy guarantees that every area accepts the idea with probability
of at least p. Consider an arbitrary non-adaptive spreading strategy π in the full
propagation setting. Assume all initial acceptance probabilities are equal to p. If p ≥ 12 ,
then the expected number of adopters is at least np. Furthermore, If p ≤ 12 , then the
expected number of adopters is at most np.




To avoid confusion, we let p0 = p and use p0 instead of the real number p through-
out this proof. If we prove that any given area accepts the idea with probability of at
most p0, then from linearity of expectation, we are done. Consider an area v scheduled
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at time t+ 1. The probability that the area accepts or rejects the idea is given by:
Pr(Xv = 1) =p0(1− Pr(It ≥ cv)− Pr(It ≤ −cv)) + Pr(It ≥ cv)
Pr(Xv = −1) =(1− p0)(1− Pr(It ≥ cv)− Pr(It ≤ −cv)) + Pr(It ≤ −cv)
Since Pr(Xv = 1) + Pr(Xv = −1) = 1, if we prove that Pr(Xv=1)Pr(Xv=−1) ≤
p0
1−p0 , then




p0(1− Pr(It ≥ cv)− Pr(It ≤ −cv)) + Pr(It ≥ cv)
(1− p0)(1− Pr(It ≥ cv)− Pr(It ≤ −cv)) + Pr(It ≤ −cv)
We have:
p0(1− Pr(It ≥ cv)− Pr(It ≤ −cv))




We know that for any a, b, c, d, e ∈ R>0, if ab ≤ e and
c




Therefore, if we prove that Pr(It≥cv)Pr(It≤−cv) ≤
p0
1−p0 , we are done. Thus, we can prove this
theorem by proving that Pr(Ik≥x)Pr(Ik≤−x) ≤
p0
1−p0 for all x ∈ {1 . . . k}, k ∈ {1 . . . n}. We
prove this by induction on number of areas. If there is just one area, then that area
decides to accept with probability p0 (as all initial acceptance probabilities are equal to





for all x ∈ {1 . . . k}, k ∈ {1 . . . n}. We prove the statement when there are n+1 areas.
Let par(n, x) : N × N 7→ {0, 1} be a function which is 0 if n and x have the same
parity, 1 otherwise. Let v be the area scheduled at time n+ 1. Let ν = par(n, x). We
now consider the following three cases.
Case 1: 1 ≤ x ≤ n − 2. The event In+1 ≥ x + 1 is the union of the following two
disjoint events:
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1. In ≥ x+ 2, and whatever the nth area decides, In+1 is at least x+ 1.
2. In = x+ ν and n+ 1th area decides to accept.
Similarly, the event In+1 ≤ −x − 1 is the union of the event In ≤ −x − 2 and the
event — In = −x−ν and the n+1th area rejects the idea. We note that we require the
par function because only one of the events In = x and In = x + 1 can occur w.p.p.
depending on parities of n and x. Thus:
Pr(In+1 ≥ x+ 1) =Pr(In ≥ x+ 2) + Pr(Xv = 1|In = x+ ν)Pr(In = x+ ν)
Pr(In+1 ≤ −x− 1) =Pr(In ≤ −x− 2) + Pr(Xv = −1|In = −x− ν)Pr(In = −x− ν)
Now, if x+ν ≥ cv , then Pr(Xv = 1|In = x+ν) = Pr(Xv = −1|In = −x−ν) = 1,
otherwise Pr(Xv = 1|In = x + ν) = p0 < 1 − p0 = Pr(Xv = −1|In = −x − ν).
Therefore, Pr(Xv = 1|In = x + ν) ≤ Pr(Xv = −1|In = −x − ν). Let β =
Pr(Xv = −1|In = −x− ν). Using the above, we have:
Pr(In+1 ≥ x+ 1) ≤Pr(In ≥ x+ 2) + βPr(In = x+ ν)
Pr(In+1 ≤ −x− 1) =Pr(In ≤ −x− 2) + βPr(In = −x− ν)
From above, we have:
f(β) =
Pr(In ≥ x+ 2) + βPr(In = x+ ν)
Pr(In ≤ −x− 2) + βPr(In = −x− ν)
≥ Pr(In+1 ≥ x+ 1)
Pr(In+1 ≥ −x− 1)
(2.2)
The function f(β) is either increasing or decreasing and hence has extrema at end
points of its range. The maxima is≤ max{ Pr(In≥x+2)Pr(In≤−x−2) ,
Pr(In≥x+2)+Pr(In=x+ν)
Pr(In≤−x−2)+Pr(In=−x−ν)}
because β ∈ [0, 1]. Now Pr(In ≥ x + 2) + Pr(In = x + 1) + Pr(In = x) =
Pr(In ≥ x) and Pr(In ≤ −x − 2) + Pr(In = −x − ν) = Pr(In ≤ −x). Thus




1−p0 (from induction hypothesis). From




Case 2: x = 0. If n is odd then Pr(In+1 ≥ 1) = Pr(In+1 ≥ 2) and Pr(In+1 ≤
−1) = Pr(In+1 ≤ −2) and this case is same as x = 1 and hence considered above.
Thus, assume that n is even.
Pr(In+1 ≥ 1) = Pr(In ≥ 2) + Pr(Xv = 1|In = 0)Pr(In = 0) (2.3)
Pr(In+1 ≤ −1) = Pr(In ≤ −2) + Pr(Xv = −1|In = 0)Pr(In = 0) (2.4)
Since, if In = 0, then areas decide based on the initial acceptance probability. We have
Pr(Xv = 1|In = 0) = p0 and Pr(Xv = −1|In = 0) = 1 − p0. Using this fact ,by
dividing (2.3) and (2.4), we have:
Pr(In+1 ≥ 1)
Pr(In+1 ≤ −1)
≤ Pr(In ≥ 2) + p0Pr(In = 0)
Pr(In ≤ −2) + (1− p0)Pr(In = 0)
From induction hypothesis, Pr(In≥2)Pr(In≤−2) ≤
p0




1−p0 based on (2.1).
Case 3: x ∈ {n − 1, n}. In this case Pr(In ≥ x + 2) = 0, since the number of
adopters can never be more than the number of total areas. Also, In+1 cannot be equal
to n because n and n + 1 don’t have the same parity. Therefore, Pr(In+1 ≥ n) =
Pr(In+1 ≥ n + 1) and Pr(In+1 ≤ −n) = Pr(In+1 ≤ −n − 1). Thus, it is enough
to analyze the case x = n. We have:
Pr(In+1 ≥ n+ 1) = Pr(Xv = 1|In = n)Pr(In = n)
Pr(In+1 ≤ n+ 1) = Pr(Xv = −1|In = −n)Pr(In = −n)
Since either both decisions are made based on thresholds with probability 1 or both
are made based on initial probabilities and initial acceptance probability is less than
the initial rejection probability, We know that Pr(Xv = 1|In = n) ≤ Pr(Xv =
−1|In = −n). Therefore Pr(In+1≥n+1)Pr(In+1≤n+1) ≤
Pr(In=n)
Pr(In=−n) . Now, since Pr(In = n) =
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1−p0 and we are done.
2.4 Non-adaptive Marketing Strategy with Random
Thresholds
We consider the problem of designing a non-adaptive spreading strategy when the
thresholds are drawn independently from the same but unknown distribution. We show
the best spreading strategy is to schedule areas in a non-increasing order of initial
acceptance probabilities. We prove the optimality of the algorithm using a coupling ar-
gument. First we state and prove the following lemma which will be useful in proving
Theorem 2.1.3.
Lemma 1. Let π and π′ be two spreading strategies. If ∃k ∈ Z>0, such that π(i) =
π′(i), ∀i ≥ k and Pr(Ik ≥ x;π) ≥ Pr(Ik ≥ x;π′), ∀x ∈ Z, then E(In;π) ≥
E(In;π
′).
Proof. We prove this lemma by proving that:
Pr(Ik+t ≥ x;π) ≥ Pr(Ik+t ≥ x;π′), ∀t ∈ {1 . . . n− k} (2.5)
We note that the above implies E(In;π) ≥ E(In;π′). We prove that if Pr(Ik ≥
x;π) ≥ Pr(Ik ≥ x;π′) then Pr(Ik+1 ≥ x;π) ≥ Pr(Ik+1 ≥ x;π′) for all x ∈ Z.
This argument can be successively applied to prove (2.5). Let π(k + 1) = v. Xv will
be 1 iff either Ik ≥ cv and v accepts idea based on threshold rule or −cv < Ik < cv
and v decides to accept the idea based on initial acceptance probability pv . Thus:
Pr(Xv = 1) =Pr(Ik ≥ cv) + Pr(−cv < Ik < cv)pv
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Substituting Pr(−cv < Ik < cv) = Pr(Ik ≥ −cv + 1)− Pr(Ik ≥ cv), we have:
Pr(Xv = 1) =Pr(Ik ≥ cv) + (Pr(Ik ≥ −cv + 1)− Pr(Ik ≥ cv))pv
By rearranging the terms, we get:
Pr(Xv = 1) =Pr(Ik ≥ cv)(1− pv) + Pr(Ik ≥ −cv + 1)pv (2.6)
We are given that Pr(Ik ≥ x;π) ≥ Pr(Ik ≥ x;π′), ∀x ∈ Z. From this and from
(2.6), we have, Pr(Xv = 1;π) ≥ Pr(Xv = 1;π′). Thus, Pr(Ik+1 ≥ x;π) ≥
Pr(Ik+1 ≥ x;π′), ∀x ∈ Z.
Assume that the planner’s prior knowledge about all values of ci’s is the same, i.e.,
all ci’s are drawn independently from the same but unknown distribution. Let initial
acceptance probabilities be arbitrary numbers. Then, the best non-adaptive spreading
strategy is to order all areas in non-increasing order of their initial acceptance proba-
bilities.
Proof. Let π′ be a spreading strategy where areas are scheduled in an order that is not
non-increasing. Thus, there exists k such that pπ′(k) < pπ′(k+1). We prove that if a new
spreading strategy π is created by exchanging position of areas π′(k) and π′(k + 1),
then the expected number of people who accept the idea cannot decrease. It means the
best spreading strategy is non-increasing in the initial acceptance probabilites.
To prove the theorem, we will prove that Pr(Ik+1 ≥ x;π) ≥ Pr(Ik+1 ≥ x;π′)
and the result then follows from Lemma 1. Since, the two spreading strategies are
identical till time k−1 and therefore the random variable Ik−1 has identical distribution
under both the strategies, we can prove the above by proving that Pr(Ik+1 ≥ Ik−1 +
y|Ik−1;π) ≥ Pr(Ik+1 ≥ Ik−1 + y|Ik−1;π′) for all y ∈ Z. We note that the only
feasible values for y are in {−2, 0, 2}. Hence, if y > 2 then both sides of the above
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inequality are equal to 1 and the inequality holds. Similarly, if y <= −2 both sides of
the inequality are equal to 1 and the inequality holds. Thus, we only need to analyze
the values y = 0 and y = 2.
Now we define some notation to help with rest of the proof. Let u = π′(k + 1),
v = π′(k), and qi = 1−pi. It means pv < pu. Let χ(i, j) be the event where i and j are
indicators of decision of areas scheduled at time k and k + 1 respectively, e.g., χ(1, 1)
means that areas scheduled at time k and k + 1 accepted the idea, whereas χ(1,−1)
implies that area scheduled at time k accepted the idea, while the area scheduled at time
k + 1 rejected the idea. Let B(y) be the event Ik+1 ≥ Ik−1 + y|Ik−1 = z for some
arbitrary z ∈ Z. We consider the cases Ik−1 > 0, Ik−1 < 0 and Ik−1 = 0 separately.
Case 1: Ik−1 = z, z > 0. We have, B(0) = χ(1, 1) ∪ χ(1,−1) ∪ χ(−1, 1) =
χ(−1,−1)c. Since we assume z > 0, the thresholds −cu and −cv cannot be hit.
Thus, χ(−1,−1) occurs only when both areas decide to reject the idea based on their
respective initial acceptance probabilities. Thus, from chain rule of probability, it is the
product of following four terms:
1. Pr(z < cu), i.e, the threshold rule does not apply and u decides based on initial
acceptance probabilities.
2. u rejects the idea based on initial probability of rejection, qu.
3. Pr(z − 1 < cv). Given u rejected the idea, D(v), the decision variable for v
becomes z − 1 and the threshold rule does not apply and v decides based on
initial acceptance probabilities.
4. v rejects the idea based on initial probability of rejection, qv .
Therefore, Pr(χ(−1,−1)) = Pr(z < cu)quPr(z−1 < cv)qv . Thus, Pr(B(0);π) =
1 − Pr(z < cu)quPr(z − 1 < cv)qv . Since, cu and cv are i.i.d random variables, we
can write any probability of form Pr(z R cu) or Pr(z R cv) as Pr(z R x), where x
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is an independent random variable with the same distribution as cu and cv . Thus,
Pr(B(0);π) = 1− Pr(z < x)quPr(z − 1 < x)qv (2.7)
Now, Pr(χ(1, 1)) = Pr(Xu = 1|Ik−1 = z)Pr(Xv = 1|Ik = z + 1). Event Xu = 1
is the union of following two non-overlapping events:
1. z ≥ cu; u accepts the idea because of the threshold rule.
2. z < cu and u accepts the idea based on initial acceptance probability, pu.
Thus, Pr(Xu = 1|Ik−1 = z) = Pr(z ≥ cu) + Pr(z < cu)pu. Similarly, Pr(Xv =
cv|Ik = z + 1) = Pr(z + 1 ≥ cv) + Pr(z + 1 < cv)pv . Therefore:
Pr(B(2);π) = (Pr(z ≥ x) + Pr(z < x)pu)(Pr(z + 1 ≥ x) + Pr(z + 1 < x)pv)
(2.8)
Where, we have replaced cu and cv by x because they are i.i.d. random variables. We
can obtain corresponding probabilities for process π′ by exchanging pu and pv . Thus,
Pr(B(0);π) = Pr(B(0);π′) = 1 − Pr(z < x)quPr(z − 1 < x)qv . We can write
Pr(B(2);π′) as follows:
Pr(B(2);π′) = (Pr(z ≥ x) + Pr(z < x)pv)(Pr(z + 1 ≥ x) + Pr(z + 1 < x)pu)
(2.9)
On the other hand Pr(z < x) ≥ Pr(z + 1 < x) and Pr(z + 1 ≥ x) ≥ Pr(z ≥ x).
Comparing (2.8) and (2.9) along with these facts that pv < pu and Pr(z < x)Pr(z +
1 ≥ x) ≥ Pr(z ≥ x)Pr(z + 1 < x), we get Pr(B(2);π) ≥ Pr(B(2);π′).
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Case 2: Ik−1 = −z, z > 0s. By a similar analysis, we have:
Pr(B(2);π) =Pr(z < x)Pr(z − 1 < x)pupv = Pr(B(2);π′) (2.10)
Pr(B(0);π) =1− (Pr(z ≥ x) + Pr(z < x)qu)(Pr(z + 1 ≥ x) + Pr(z + 1 < x)qv)
(2.11)
Pr(B(0);π′) =1− (Pr(z ≥ x) + Pr(z < x)qv)(Pr(z + 1 ≥ x) + Pr(z + 1 < x)qu)
(2.12)
Comparing (2.11) and (2.12), we have Pr(B(0);π) ≥ Pr(B(0);π′).
Case 3: Ik−1 = 0. We have:
Pr(B(2);π) =pu(Pr(x > 1)pv + Pr(x = 1)) (2.13)
Pr(B(0);π) =pu + quPr(x > 1)pv (2.14)
Pr(B(2);π′) =pv(Pr(x > 1)pu + Pr(x = 1)) (2.15)
Pr(B(0);π′) =pv + qvPr(x > 1)pu (2.16)
By comparing (2.13) with (2.15) and (2.14) with (2.16), we see that Pr(B(2);π) ≥
Pr(B(2);π′) and Pr(B(0);π) ≥ Pr(B(0);π′) respectively. Thus, Pr(Ik+1 ≥
Ik−1 + x|Ik−1;π) ≥ Pr(Ik+1 ≥ Ik−1 + x|Ik−1;π′),∀x ∈ Z.
2.5 Type Switching Approach
Consider a society with a constant number of types. One approach that might work
is an algorithm that finds an optimal spreading strategy allowing for only a constant
number of switches between types in a spreading strategy. We note that areas of the
same type are identical from point of view of scheduling a cascade. Thus, any non-
adaptive spreading strategy can be specified by specifying types of areas rather than
the areas themselves. Let τ be the mapping between an area and its type. That is
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τ(i) is the type of area i. Let λ be sequence of types for a given spreading strategy.
Specifically, λ is a vector whose kth component, λ(k) = τ(π(k)). A switch is any
position k in the sequence λ such that λ(k) 6= λ(k + 1). As an example, consider
a society with four areas with two areas of type 1 and two areas of type 2. Then the
type sequence λ = (1, 1, 2, 2) has a switch at position 2 whereas λ2 = (1, 2, 1, 2)
has switches at positions 1, 2 and 3. We define a σ-switch spreading strategy as a
non-adaptive spreading strategy that has at most σ switches, where σ is a constant
independent of input size. We now prove that no algorithm whose output is a σ-switch
spreading strategy can be optimal.
A σ-switch spreading strategy is a spreading strategy with at most σ switches. For
any constant σ, there exists a society with areas of two types such that no σ-switch
spreading strategy is optimal.
Proof. The proof outline is as follows. We construct an instance of problem with 2n
areas with two types, the number of areas of both types being n, for which an optimal
spreading strategy alternates between these types. Lets call this instance S and lets
call this strategy π. We prove that the expected number of adopters achieved by this
optimal strategy is upper bound on number of acceptors for any input instance with
areas of these two types, whatever be the number of areas of both types, given that total
number of areas is 2n, e.g., the number of areas of one type can be n1 and the other
type 2n − n1 for any integer n1 between 0 and 2n and no strategy for this instance
can exceed the expected number of adopters achieved by π for the instance of problem
with n areas of each type. We then show that any σ-switch strategy for instance S
of problem can be improved by changing type of one of the areas. Since, the optimal
value achieved by this new strategy cannot be greater than strategy π on instance S, no
σ-switch strategy can be optimal.
Consider an instance with two types γ1 = (P, 1) and γ2 = (P, 2) where P >
1
2 , the total number of areas is 2n and the number of areas of types γ1 and γ2 is n
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each. Let π be a spreading strategy for which the type sequence of areas is given by
λ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γ1, γ2), i.e., every area at odd position is of type γ1 and every area
at even position is of type γ2. Let the expected number of areas which accept the idea
for this spreading strategy be α. Now consider an instance where the total number
of areas is the same but the number of areas of type γ1 is n1 and number of areas of
type γ2 is 2n − n1 for some arbitrary natural number n1 such that 0 ≤ n1 ≤ n2. For
this instance, let the expeted number of areas which accept the idea given an optimal
spreading strategy be β. We now prove that α ≥ β. If we have no restriction on the
number of areas of each type, then for any t = 0 mod 2, the areas to be scheduled at
time t+1 and t+2 can be of types (γ1, γ1), (γ1, γ2), (γ2, γ1) or (γ2, γ2). We prove that
α ≥ β by proving that it is better to schedule areas of type γ1 and γ2 at times t+ 1 and
t+ 2 respectively. If |It| ≥ 2, then we are indifferent between all spreading strategies
because in this case all the areas will decide based on the threshold rule. Thus, if we
can prove that (γ1, γ2) is a best choice for types at times t+ 1 and t+ 2 when |It| < 2,
we are done. Since t is even, the only feasible value of |It| ≤ 2 is It = 0. Thus, this
is the only case we need to analyze. Let ρ be the tuple of types of areas scheduled at
times t+1 and t+2. Let χ be the tuple indicating decisions of areas scheduled at times
t + 1 and t + 2. Now we analyze the probabilties with which the four possible values
of χ are realized for each of the four possible values of ρ when It = 0. Let number of
areas to be scheduled after time t be m.
Case 1: ρ = (γ1, γ1) or (γ2, γ1)
In this case, the first area decides based on its initial acceptance probability and the
29
second area follows the decision of the first area.
Pr(χ = (1, 1)) = P
Pr(χ = (1,−1)) = 0
Pr(χ = (−1, 1)) = 0
Pr(χ = (−1,−1)) = 1− P
The expected number of areas which accept the idea after time t in this case is mP , as
all areas follow the decision of area scheduled at time t+ 1.
Case 2: ρ = (γ1, γ2) or (γ2, γ2)
In this case, both the areas decide based on their initial acceptance probability.
Pr(χ = (1, 1)) = P 2 (2.17)
Pr(χ = (1,−1)) = P (1− P ) (2.18)
Pr(χ = (−1, 1)) = P (1− P ) (2.19)
Pr(χ = (−1,−1)) = (1− P )2 (2.20)
From (2.17), with probability P 2, all areas after time t will accept the idea. If for
any time t′, we are given that It′ = 0, then we can treat the subsequent areas as the
starting point of a new spreading strategy. Thus, if It+2 = 0, then from Theorem 2.1.3
(given that P > 12 ), the expected number of adopters for any future spreading strategy
is at least (m − 2)P . Hence, from (2.18) and (2.19), with probability 2P (1 − P )
the expected number of areas that will accept after time t is at least 1 + (m − 2)P .
Therefore, in this case, the expected number of areas that accept after time t is at least
mP 2 +2P (1−P )(1+(m−2)P ). Thus, we are done if we prove thatmP 2 +2P (1−
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P )(1 + (m− 2)P ) is greater than mP .
mP 2 + 2P (1− P )(1 + (m− 2)P )−mP = P (1− P )(−m+ 2(1 + (m− 2)P ))
Thus, it is enough to prove that 2(1 + (m− 2)P )−m > 0. We have:
2(1 + (m− 2)P )−m = (2P − 1)(m− 2)
Since P > 12 , 2P − 1 > 0. Thus, for all m > 2, it is strictly better to schedule an
area of type γ2 at time t+ 2. If an area of type γ2 is scheduled at time t+ 2, then it is
equivalent to schedule an area of either type at time t + 1. Thus, given that there is at
least one more area to follow at time t + 3, it is best to schedule areas of type γ1 and
γ2 respectively at times t+ 1 and t+ 2 at any arbitrary time t = 0 mod 2. Also, such
a schedule is strictly better, all other things begin same, than the schedule where, areas
of type γ1 are scheduled at times t+ 1 and t+ 2. This fact is important as we use this
later in the proof. If there are no more areas to follow, then we are indifferent to all the
four options. Hence, the expected number of adopters achieved by π is an upper bound
on number of acceptors for any input instance with areas of these two types whatever
be the number of areas of both types
The final part of this proof is by contradiction. Let the the number of areas in the
input instance of problem be 2nwith n areas each of types γ1 = (P, 1) and γ2 = (P, 2).
Consider a σ-switch strategy. Choose n ≥ 4(σ + 1). Thus, every σ-switch strategy
will have at least four consecutive areas of type γ1. Let a σ-switch strategy, π′, be
an optimal one. Therefore, there will exist a time t in π′ such that t = 0 mod 2,
τ(π′(t + 1)) = γ1, τ(π′(t + 2)) = γ1 and at least one more area will be scheduled
after time t + 2. As explained earlier, the expected number of adopters in this case is
strictly less than expected number of adopters if we schedule an area of type γ2 at time
t+2, which, as proved above, is at most the expected number of adopters for a strategy
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with type sequence (γ1, γ2, . . . , γ1, γ2). Therefore, strategy π is not optimal. This is a
contradiction and no σ-switch strategy can be optimal for the given instance.
2.6 Hardness Result
We prove that problem of computing expected number of adopters for a given spreading
strategy in the partial propagation setting is #P -complete. This result applies even
when the input graphs are planer with a maximum degree of 3 and have only 4 different
types of vertices. We prove this by reduction from a version of the network reliability
problem that is known to be #P -complete ([110]). In the network reliability problem,
a directed graph G and probability 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 are given. Nodes fail independently
with probability 1− p. Therefore, each node is present in the surviving subgraph with
probability p. We achieve the reduction by simulating the s − t network reliability
problem by designing an instance of cascade scheduling problem where, probability of
an area v accepting an idea is exactly equal to a path existing in the surviving sub-graph
from the source to vertex v. Before proceeding to details of the proof, we give some
definitions below.
Definition 1. Given a directed graph G with source s, terminal t, and a probability
1− p, 0 ≤ p < 1 of nodes failing independently, the (s, t)-connectedness reliability of
G, R(G, s, t; p), is defined as the probability that there is at least one path from s to t
such that none of the vertices falling on the path have failed.
Definition 2. AST is the problem of computing R(G, s, t; p) when G is an acyclic
directed (s, t)-planar graph with each vertex having degree at most three. We denote
an instance of AST on graph G as AST (G, s, t, p).
Definition 3. Given an influence spread process, S = (G, c,p, π) on G with a source
node s and a target node t, IST is the problem of computing Pr(Xt = 1;S) given that
π(1) = s and Pr(Xs = 1) = 1. We denote an instance of IST by IST (G, c,p, π, s, t).
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We will reduce an instance of AST to an instance of IST (Probability of Influence
Spread to T).
Given an instance of AST, AST (G = (V,E), s, t, p) we now construct an instance
of IST, IST (G′ = (V ′, E′), c,p, π, s, t) for which R(G, s, t; p) = Pr(Xt = 1). Let
dinv be the indegree of v ∈ V inG. For every vertex v ∈ V −{s}, we add three vertices
to graphG′. Lets denote them by bv , the blocking vertex of v, fv , the forwarding vertex
for v and v′, which corresponds to the original vertex v. The rationale for nomenclature
will become apparent later. For every edge (u, v) in E, we add an edge {u′, bv} in E′.
In addition, we add edges {bv, v′} and {fv, v′} to E′. The acceptance probabilities
and thresholds are set as follows: pv′ = 0, pfv = p, pbv = 1 ∀v ∈ V − {s}, ps′ = p.
cv = 2, cbv = d
in
v ∀v ∈ V − {s}. Threshold cs′ is irrelevant and can be any arbitrary
value greater than 0 since it is the first vertex to be scheduled. Thresholds cfv can also
be any arbitrary value greater than 0 since no neighbor of fv is scheduled before fv .
Let π′ : V 7→ V be any topological ordering on V where, s is the first node and t is the
last node. Then π is constructed as follows:
π−1(s′) =1
π−1(v′) =3π′−1(v)− 2 ∀v ∈ V − {s}
π−1(bv) =3π
′−1(v)− 4 ∀v ∈ V − {s}
π−1(fv) =3π
′−1(t)− 3 ∀v ∈ V − {s}
The above construction of π can be interpreted as follows. Source remains the first
vertex to be scheduled. A vertex v is split into three vertices — v′, bv and fv . In place
of v, these three vertices are consecutively scheduled in order bv , fv and v′, e.g., if
π′ = (s, v, t), then π = (s′, bv, fv, v′, bt, ft, t′).
Let IS be the influence spread process (G′, c,p, π). Now, we prove the following


















Figure 2.4: Reduction from Network Reliability on a DAG to Computing Expected
Number of Influenced Nodes – The diagram on left is a part of DAG with probability
of failure of each node equal to (1 − p). The diagram on right is corresponding part
of graph that represents an influence spread stochastic process the models the given
network reliability problem where pbv = 1, cbv = d, pfv = p,pv′ = 0, and cv′ = 2.
s and v in G and the probability that area v accepts the idea in the influence spread
process IS.
We first prove that computing the expecte number of vertices in graph to which s
has a path with operating vertices is #P -complete. We then use this to prove the main
theorem.
Lemma 2. Consider an instance of AST, AST (G = (V,E), s, t, p). Then computing
the expected number of vertices in graph to which s has a path with operating vertices
is #P -complete.
Proof. Let a(G, s) be the expected number of vertices in the graph to which s has a
path with operating vertices in G. Let b(G, s, t) be probability that there is a path of
operating vertices from s to t in G. We note that t has no outgoing edges. Lets assume
that a(G, s) can be computed in time polynomial in |G|. Let G′ = G − {t}. Deletion
of t does not change probability of survival of any path whose destination is not t.
Therefore a(G′, s) =
∑
u∈V−{t} b(G, s, u). Thus, a(G, s) − a(G′, s) = b(G, s, t).
This is a contradiction because this implies that b(G, s, t) can be computed in time
polynomial in |G|.
The proof of the main theorem of this section is organized as follows. We first
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prove that the probability of an area v′ accepting an idea is exactly equal to probability
of a path existing from s to v. Then, we use this fact along with Lemma 2 to prove
the main result. In the partial propagation setting, it is #P -complete to compute the
expected number of adopters for a given non-adaptive spreading strategy π.
Proof. Let AST (G = (V,E), s, t, p) be an instance of AST problem. Let S(G′ =
(V ′, E′), c,p, π) be an influence spread process withG′, cv, pv and π as defined above.
Then an area v 6= s, t accepts the idea with probability p iff at least one of its prede-
cessors in G also accepts the idea.
Let P (v) be the set of predecessors of v in G. We note that in IS, by construction
of π and G′, vertices in P (v) are exactly the neighbors of bv that are scheduled before
bv . Area bv is immediately followed by fv and fv by v. Also, by construction of G′,
bv and fv are neighbors of v and v has no other neighbors. Area fv’s only neighbor is
v.
If no vertex in P (v) accepts the idea, then D(bv) = −dinv = −cbv and thus,
Pr(bv = −1| no vertex in P (v) accepts the idea ) = 1 and therefore, bv rejects the
idea. Since, threshold of v is cv = 2, v decides based on threshold if and only if both
its neighbors either accept or reject the idea. Therefore if bv rejects the idea, then if fv
accepts the idea, then v does not accept the idea because it decides to reject the idea
based on its initial acceptance probability as pv = 0. If Xfv = −1, then also v does
not accept the idea because it reject the idea based on threshold rule, because both its
neighbors rejected this idea. Thus, if none of the vertices in P (v) accept the idea then
v does not accept the idea.
If any area in P (v) accepts the idea then −cbv = −dinv < D(bv) < dinv = cbv
and bv accepts the idea because its initial acceptance probability, pbv = 1. Now, if fv
accepts the idea then v also accepts because cv = 2 and if fv rejects the idea, then v
does not accept the idea because it decides to reject it on basis of its initial acceptance
probability, pv = 0. Since, no neighbor of fv is scheduled before fv , fv accepts the idea
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independently at random with its initial acceptance probability pfv = p. Therefore,
given that at least one vertex in set P (v) accepts the idea, v accepts the idea with
probability p.
Now, by principal of deferred decisions, process of finding a path of operating ver-
tices from s to t in the network reliability problem, can be simulated as follows. Let π
be any topological ordering on vertices of G. Let L(i) be the ith layer (excluding layer
containing just the source vertex, s) in topologically sorted G. Then probability that a
path to u ∈ L(1) exists is p because we let each vertex in this layer fail independently
with probability 1−p. For vertex v in any subsequent layer, if there exists a path to any
of vertices in P (v), the set of predecessors of v, then we let v fail independently with
probability 1 − p. If no path to any of predecessors of v exists, then no path to v can
exist and it is immaterial whether v fails or not. Thus, we let v fail with probability 1.
As explained above, this is exactly the process simulated by IS(G′, cv, pv, π). Thus,
computing Pr(Xt = 1) is #P -complete.
However, we need to prove hardness of computing Λ =
∑
u∈V ′ Pr(Xu = 1). If
we can prove that from Λ we can compute the expected number of vertices in graph to
which s has a path, say α =
∑
v∈V Pr(Xv′ = 1), then from Lemma 2, we are done.
Since ∀v ∈ V, Pr(Xv′ = 1) = Pr(Xbv = 1) · Pr(Xfv = 1) = Pr(Xbv = 1) · p




(Pr(Xv′ = 1) + Pr(Xbv = 1) + Pr(Xfv = 1)) =
∑
v∈V




From above, we can easily compute α. Hence, the claim follows.
We note that AST is #P -complete even when degrees of vertices of the input graph
is constrained to be 3. Thus, indegree of a node (through which a path from s to t
can pass) has to be 1 or 2. If p is the survival probability of a vertex in the AST
problem instance, then the possible types of areas in the corresponding instance of IST
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are in {(1, 1), (1, 2), (p, 1), (0, 2)}, where the first two types correspond to blocking
nodes in G, the forwarding nodes are of type (p, 1) and the vertices corresponding to
original vertices are of type (0, 2). Thus, IST is hard on graphs with maximum degree
constrained to 3 and number of types constrained to 4.
2.7 Computing Expected Number of Adopters
Here we give an algorithm to computeE(In), given a spreading strategy π with thresh-
olds given by vector c and initial probabilities of acceptance given by vector p. Let
Yk be the number of 1 decisions among vertices in {π(1), π(2), . . . , π(k)}. We note
that Ik = 2Yk − k. Since E(In) =
∑
i∈{1...n} xPr(In = x), we are interested
in computing Pr(In = x), ∀x ∈ {−n . . . n}. Consider a full propagation set-
ting. The expected number of adopter can be computed in polynomial time for a
given non-adaptive spreading strategy π. Let A be a n × (2n + 1) matrix where
A[k, x] = Pr(Ik = x), k ∈ {1 . . . n}, x ∈ {−n . . . n}. Let v = π(k). The following
recurrence might be used to arrive at a dynamic programming formulation:
A[k, x]← Pr(Xkv = 1)A[k − 1, x− 1] + Pr(Xkv = −1)A[k − 1, x+ 1]
However, one needs to be careful when computing Pr(Xkv = 1) because it is depen-
dent of Ik−1. Thus, in the correct recurrence we must have Pr(Xkv = 1|Ik−1 = x−1)
and Pr(Xkv = −1|Ik+1 = x + 1) instead of Pr(Xkv = 1) and Pr(Xkv = −1) re-
spectively. Below we derive the dynamic program keeping this subtelty in mind. Let
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v = π(k + 1). We have:
Pr(Ik+1 = x+ 1|Ik = x) =

pv if − cv < x < cv
1 if x ≥ cv
0 otherwise
Pr(Ik+1 = x− 1|Ik = x) =1− Pr(Ik+1 = x+ 1|Ik = x)
We have:
Pr(Ik+1 = x) =Pr(Ik+1 = x|Ik = x− 1)Pr(Ik = x− 1)
+ Pr(Ik+1 = x|Ik = x+ 1)Pr(Ik = x+ 1)
The above relation suggests a dynamic program for computing E(In). The matrix A
is initialized with A[1, 1] = pπ(1), A[1,−1] = 1 − A[1, 1], A[1, 0] = 0, A[k, x] =
0, ∀x > k,A[k, x] = 0, ∀x < −k. When |x| < n, k > 1, then any A[k, x] depends
on A[k − 1, x+ 1] and A[k − 1, x+ 1] and we get the recurrence:
A[k, x]←Pr(Ik = x|Ik−1 = x− 1)A[k − 1, x− 1]
+ Pr(Ik = x|Ik−1 = x+ 1)A[k − 1, x+ 1]








2.8 Adaptive Marketing Strategy
In this section we propose a dynamic program for computing best adaptive spreading
strategy and thus, prove Theorem 2.1.3. Here we give dynamic program when there
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are two types of areas. This can be extended to any constant number of types. Let
B(n1, n2, k) be the expected number of areas that adopt the product for a best ordering
where n1 is number of areas of type 1 and n2 is the number of areas of type 2 in the
market k is sum of decisions of vertices that have been scheduled so far. We note
that deployment number k is equal to difference of number of yes decisions and no
decisions. Let thresholds and initial acceptance probabilities for vertices of type i be ci
and pi. At any given time in the strategy, let Bi be the best possible result if an area of
type i is scheduled next. Depending on value of k, we have the following cases (cases
2 and 4 will not occur if c1 = c2):
1. n1 = 0∨n2 = 0: If all areas are of the same type, then all spreading strategies are
equivalent and we can choose any arbitraty spreading strategy for the remaining
areas.
2. c1 ≤ k < c2: In this case, areas of type 1 will accept the idea w.p. 1. Areas
of type 2 will accept the idea with probability p2 and reject it with probability
1− p2.
B1 =1 +B(n1 − 1, n2, k + 1)
B2 =p2 + p2B(n1, n2 − 1, k + 1) + (1− p2)B(n1, n2 − 1, k − 1)
B(n1, n2, k) = max{B1, B2}
3. −c1 < k < c1: In this case, both types of areas will decide to accept or reject
the idea on basis of initial acceptance probabilities. Therefore:
B1 =p1 + p1B(n1 − 1, n2, k + 1) + (1− p1)B(n1 − 1, n2, k − 1)
B2 =p2 + p2B(n1, n2 − 1, k + 1) + (1− p2)B(n1, n2 − 1, k − 1)
B(n1, n2, k) = max{B1, B2}
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4. −c2 < k ≤ −c1: In this case, areas of type 1 will reject the idea with probability
1 and areas of type 2 will accept the idea with probability p2.
B1 =B(n1 − 1, n2, k + 1)
B2 =p2 + p2B(n1, n2 − 1, k + 1) + (1− p2)B(n1, n2 − 1, k − 1)
B(n1, n2, k) = max{B1, B2}
5. k ≤ −c2: In this case, both types of areas will reject the idea. Therefore:
B(n1, n2, k) = 0
6. k ≥ cc2: In this case, both types of areas will reject the idea. Therefore:
B(n1, n2, k) = n1 + n2
This can easily be extended to any constant number of types. The time complexity with






The ideas we are exposed to and the choices we make are significantly affected by our
social context. It has long been studied how social networks – i.e. who we interact with
in a variety of contexts – impact the choices we make, and how ideas and behaviors can
spread through such networks [17, 56, 118, 130]. With the advent of the Internet, and
websites such as Facebook and Google Plus devoted to the forming and maintaining of
social networks, this effect becomes ever more evident. Individuals are linked together
in ways that are more readily apparent and widespread than ever before, and accord-
ingly understanding how social networks affect the behaviors and actions that spread
through a society becomes ever more important.
A key question in this area is understanding how such a behavioral cascade can
start. For example, for a company that wishes to introduce a new product but has
0This is a joint work with E. D. Demaine, M. T. Hajiaghayi, H. Mahini, D. L. Malec, S. Raghavan and
M. Zadimoghadam. A version of this work appeared in WWW ’14 [39].
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a limited promotional budget, it becomes critical to understand how to target their
promotional efforts in order to generate awareness among as many people as possible.
A well-studied model of this is the Influence Maximization problem, as introduced by
Kempe et al. [75]. In the Influence Maximization problem, an optimizer wishes to find
a small set of individuals to influence, such that this influence will cascade and grow
through the social network to the maximum extent possible. For example, if a company
wants to introduce a new piece of software, and believes that friends of users are likely
to become users themselves, how should they allocate free copies of their software in
order to maximize the size of their eventual user base?
Since the introduction of the Influence Maximization problem by Kempe et al. [75],
there has been a great deal of interest and follow up work in the model. A particular
driving force for applying this model has been the growth of large-scale social networks
on the Internet. While Kempe et al. [75] give a greedy algorithm for approximating the
Influence Maximization problem, it requires costly simulation at every step; thus, while
their solution provides a good benchmark, a key area of research has been on finding
practical, fast algorithms that themselves provide good approximations to the greedy
algorithm [18, 23, 24, 25, 82]. The practical, applied nature of the motivating settings
means that even small gains in performance (either runtime or approximation factor)
are critical, especially on large, real-world instances.
We believe that the standard formulation of the Influence Maximization problem,
however, misses a critical aspect of practical applications. In particular, it forces a
binary choice upon the optimizer: when starting a cascade, an optimizer may choose
for each individual whether to apply no influence or maximal influence, but has no
choice in between. While this is reasonable for some settings – e.g. exposure to an idea
or pathogen – it is far less reasonable for others of practical importance. For example,
a company promoting a new product may find that giving away ten free copies is far
less effective than offering a discount of ten percent to a hundred people. We propose a
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fractional version of the problem where the optimizer has the freedom to split influence
across individuals as they see fit.
To make this concrete, consider the following problem an optimizer might face.
Say that an optimizer feels there is some small, well-connected group whose adoption
of their product is critical to success, but only has enough promotion budget remaining
to influence one third of the group directly. In the original version of Influence Max-
imization, the optimizer is forced to decide which third of the group to focus on. We
believe it is more natural to assume they have the flexibility to try applying uniform
influence to the group, say offering everyone a discount of one third on the price of
their product, or in fact any combination of these two approaches. While our results
are preliminary, we feel our proposed model addresses some very practical and very
real concerns with practical applications of Influence Maximization, and offers many
opportunities for important future research.
3.2 Results
In this work, our main goal is to understand how our proposed fractional version of the
Influence Maximization problem differs from the integral version proposed by Kempe
et al. [75]. We consider this question from both a theoretical and an empirical perspec-
tive. On the theoretical side, we shall see that unlike many problems, the fractional
version of Influence Maximization appears to retain essentially the same hardness as
the fractional version. Furthermore, we give examples where the objective values for
the fractional and integral versions can differ significantly. Nevertheless, we are able
to extend the main positive result for Influence Maximization to the fractional case,
namely submodularity results of Mossel and Roch [95] which give a very general ex-
tension of the results of Kempe et al. [75]. On the empirical side, we simulate the main
algorithms and heuristics on real-world social network data, and find that the computed
solutions are substantially more efficient in the fractional setting.
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Our main theoretical result shows that the positive results of Mossel and Roch
[95] extend to our proposed fractional model. Their result showed that in the integral
case, when influence between agents is submodular, so too is the objective function in
Influence Maximization. We show that for a continuous anolog of submodularity1 the
same results holds for our fractional case. We first consider a discretized version of
the fractional Influence Maximization Problem, where each vertex can be assigned a
weight that is a multiple of some discretization parameter ε = 1N . Then, we consider
the final influenced set by choosing a weighted seed set S, where the weight of each
element is a multiple of ε. We show the fractional Influence Maximization objection is
a submodular function of S for any N ≥ 1 (Theorem 4). We further extend this result
to the continuous case (Theorem 5). We note that this result does not follow simply by
relating the fractional objective function to the integral one and interpolating or other
similar methods; instead, we need to use a non-trivial reduction to the generalization
of the influence maximization problem given by Mossel and Roch [95]. Not only does
this result show that our problem admits a greedy solution with good approximation
guarantee, it furthermore gives us hope that we can readily adapt the large body of work
on efficient heuristics for the integral case to our problem and achieve good results.
In addition to showing the submodularity of the objective persists from the inte-
gral case to the fractional case, we show that the hardness of the integral case persists
as well. In the case of fixed thresholds, we show that all of the hardness results of
[75] extend readily to the fractional case. In particular, we show that for the fractional
version of linear influence model, even an n1−ε approximation algorithm is NP-hard
to achieve. We first prove NP-hardness of the problem by a reduction from the inde-
pendent set problem (Theorem 8) and then strengthen the result to prove inapproxima-
bility (Corollary 9). In addition, when thresholds are assumed to be independent and
uniformly distributed in [0, 1], we show that it is NP-Hard to achieve any better than
1We note this is neither of the two most common continuous extensions of submodularity, namely the
multinear and Lovász extensions.
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1− 1/e approximation in the Triggering model introduced by Kempe et al. [75]. This
holds even for the simple case where triggering sets are deterministic and have constant
sizes, and shows that even for this simple case the greedy approximation is tight, just
as in the integral case. An important aspect of all of these reductions is that they use
very simple DAGs, with only two layers of vertices.
Our last set of results focus on the special case where the network is a DAG. Here,
we focus on the linear influence model with uniform thresholds. In this case, we see
that we can easily compute the expected influence from any single node via dynamic
programming; this closely resembles a previous result for the integral case [25]. In
the fractional case, this gives us a sort of linearity result. Namely, if we are careful to
avoid interference between the influences we place on nodes, we can conclude that the
objective is essentially linear in the seed set. While the conditions on this theorem seem
strong at first glance, it has a very powerful implication: all of the hardness results we
presented involved choosing optimal seed sets from among the sources in a DAG, and
this theorem says that with uniform thresholds the greedy algorithm finds the optimal
such seed set.
3.3 Related Work
Several works in economics, sociology and political science have studied and modeled
behaviors arising from information and influence cascades in social networks. Some of
the earlist models were proposed by Granovetter [56] and Schelling [118]. Since then
many such models have been studied and proposed in literature [17, 114, 130].
The advent of social networking platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Flickr
has provided researchers with unprecendented data about social interactions, albeit in a
virtual setting. The question of monetization of this data is critically important for the
entities that provide these platforms and the entities that want to leverage this data to
engineer effective marketing campaigns. The above two factors have generated huge
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interest in algorithmic aspects of these systems.
A question of central importance is to recognize “important individuals” in a social
netowrk. Domingos and Richardson [45, 112] were the first to propose heuristics for
selection of customers on a network for marketing. Both these works focus on evaluat-
ing customers based on their intrinsic and network value. The network value is assumed
to be generated by a customer influencing other customers in her social network to buy
the product. In a seminal paper, Kempe et al. [75] give an approximation algorithm for
selection of influential nodes under the linear threshold (LT) model. Mossel and Roch
[95] generalized the results of Kempe et al. [75] to cases where the activation functions
are monotone and submodular. Gunnec and Raghavan [58] were the first to discuss
fractional incentives (they refer to these as partial incentives/inducements) in the con-
text of a product design problem. They consider a fractional version of the target set
selection problem (i.e., fixed thresholds, fractional incentives, a linear influence model,
with the goal of minimizing the fractional incentives paid out so that all nodes in the
graph are influenced). They provide an integer programming model, and show that
when the neighbors of a node have equal influence on it, the problem is polynomially
solvable via a greedy algorithm [57, 58, 59].
Some recent works have directly tackled the question of revenue maximization
in social networks by leveraging differential pricing to monetize positive externali-
ties arising due to adoption of product by neighbors of a customer [4, 8, 46, 62].
Other works have focused on finding faster algorithms for the target set selection
problem ( [23, 24, 25, 82]). A very recent theoretical result in this direction is an
O( (m+n) log(n)ε3 ) algorithm giving an approximation guarantee of 1−
1
e − ε [18]. While
Leskovec et al. [82] do not compare their algorithm directly with the greedy algorithm
of Kempe et al. [75], the heuristics in other papers ( [23, 24, 25]) approach the perfor-
mance of the greedy algorithm quite closely. For example, in one of the papers [24], the
proposed heuristic achieves an influence spread of approximately 95% of the influence
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spread achieved by the greedy algorithm. An intersting fact on the flip side is that none
of the heuristics beat the greedy algorithm (which itself is a heuristic) for even a single
dataset.
3.4 Model
Integral Influence Model We begin by describing the model used for propagation
of influence in social networks used in [95]; it captures the model described in [75]
as a special case. Unlike the latter, the edges in this model are given only implicitly.
Here, the graph is given by a vertex set V and an explicit description of how nodes
influence each other. Specifically, for each vertex v ∈ V , we are given a function
fv : 2
V → [0, 1] specifying the amount of influence each subset S ⊆ V exerts on v.
We denote the set of all influence functions by F = {fv}v∈V .
Given a graph specified by (V,F), we want to understand how influence propagates
in this graph. The spread of influence is (again) modeled by a process that runs in
stages. In addition to the influence function fv , each vertex v has a threshold θv ∈ [0, 1]
representing how resistant it is to being influenced. If the currently activated set of
vertices is S ⊆ V at a given stage, then each v ∈ V \ S becomes activated in the next
stage if and only if fv(S) ≥ θv . Our goal is to compare the total influence different sets
have on the graph as a whole; we measure this by comparing the results of allowing
the spreading process to run to completion given any pair of sets to use at the initial
activated sets. To represent the fact that some (sets of) vertices may be more important
than others, we define a weight function w : 2V → R+ on subsets of V . We then can
define the value of a set S formally as follows. Given an initial activated set S0, let
SΘ1 , S
Θ
2 , . . . , S
Θ
n be the activated sets after 1, 2, . . . , n = |V | stages of our spreading
process, when Θ = (θv)v∈V is our vector of thresholds. Then we want to understand
the value of w(SΘn ) when we set S0 = S. Note this may depend strongly on Θ; to that
end, we assume that each threshold is independently distributed as θv ∼ U [0, 1]. Then,
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we are interested in understanding the structure of the function σ : 2V → R+ given by
σ(S) = E
Θ
[ w(SΘn ) | S0 = S ].
Fractional Influence Model One shortcoming of the model described above is that
it completely separates the effects of directly applied influence from other agents in the
network. In particular, note that every agent in the social network is either explicitly
activated by the optimizer (and influence from other agents is irrelevant), or is activated
by influence from other agents with no (direct) involvement from the optimizer. It
seems natural to suppose, however, that it is possible for agents to become activated by
a mixture of direct influence from the designer and influence from other agents. For
example, if we have chosen to activate a set S of agents, and know that this set strongly
influences some other agent, we should be able to apply some intermediate level of
influence with the assurance that this additional agent will become active eventually.
To this end, we propose the following modification of the model. Rather than selecting
a set S of nodes to activate, the optimizer specifies a vector x ∈ [0, 1]n indexed by
V, where xv indicates the amount of direct influence we apply to v. We assume that
this direct influence is additive with influence from other nodes in the network, and so
a set S causes v to be activated if and only if fv(S) + xv ≥ θv . Here, we assume
that no nodes are initially activated, that is S0 = ∅. Note, however, that even without
contributions from other nodes, our directly-applied influence can cause activations.
For example, it is easy to see that
SΘ1 = {v ∈ V : xv ≥ θv}.
An important point, however, is that our process is not simply a matter of selecting an
initial activated set at random with marginal probabilities x, since for any node v not
initially activated, our direct influence xv makes it easier for other nodes in the network
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to activate it in later rounds. Lastly, we observe that this model captures the originally
discussed model as a special case, since selecting sets to initially activate corresponds
exactly with choosing x ∈ {0, 1}n, just with a single-round delay in the process. To
this end, hereafter we refer to the original model as the integral influence model, and
this new model as the fractional influence model. As before, we want to understand the
structure of the expected value of the final influenced set as a function of how we apply
influence to nodes in a graph. We extend our function to σ : [0, 1]n → R+ by
σ(x) = E
Θ
[ w(SΘn ) | we apply direct influences x ].
Linear Influence Model This is a special case of the fractional influence model. In
the linear variant of the problem, our influence functions are computed as follows. We





(v) to denote the sets of nodes with edges to and edges from v, respectively. Then,





In our model, we assume that
∑
u∈δ− (v) wuv ≤ 1 for every vertex v ∈ V .
non-Stochastic Thresholds In all these models discussed above, we make the
stochastic assumption that the thresholds of nodes are independently distributed as
θv ∼ U [0, 1]. One natural question is whether the same results hold when we are
facing arbitrary thresholds. We answer this question negatively by providing hardness
results in Section 3.8 when the thresholds are given as part of the instance.
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3.5 Reduction
In order to state the main result of [95], we need to define the following properties for
set functions. Given a set N and a function f : 2N → R, we say that:
• f is normalized if f(∅) = 0;
• f is monotone if f(S) ≤ f(T ) for any S ⊆ T ⊆ N ; and
• f is submodular if f(S∪{x})−f(S) ≥ f(T ∪{x})−f(T ) for any S ⊆ T ⊆ N
and x ∈ N \ T .
We say that a collection of functions satisfies the above properties if every function in
the collection does. With the above definitions in hand, we are now ready to state the
following result of [95].
Theorem 3. Let I = (V,F , w) be an instance of our problem. If both w and F are
normalized, monotone, and submodular, then σ is as well.
We want to extend Theorem 3 to the fractional influence model. We show that, for
arbitrarily fine discretizations of [0, 1], any instance of our problem considered on the
discretized space can be reduced to an instance of the original problem. Fix N ∈ Z+,
and let δ = 1/N > 0 be our discretization parameter. Let ∆ = {0, δ, 2δ, . . . , 1}. We
consider the function σ restricted to the domain ∆n. Lastly, let δv be the vector with δ
in the component corresponding to v, and 0 in all other components. Then we can state
our desired properties for σ as follows:
• we say σ is normalized if σ(0) = 0;
• we say σ is monotone if x ≤ y implies σ(x) ≤ σ(y); and
• we say σ is submodular if for any x ≤ y, and any v ∈ V , either yv = 1 or
σ(x + δv)− σ(x) ≥ σ(y + δv)− σ(y),
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where all comparisons and additions between vectors above are componentwise. We
get the following extension of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. Let I = (V,F , w) be an instance of our problem. If both w and F are
normalized, monotone, and submodular, then for any discretization ∆n of [0, 1]n (as
defined above), σ is normalized, monotone, and submodular on ∆n.
Proof. We prove this by reducing the (discretized) fractional problem for I to an in-
stance of the integral influence problem and then applying Theorem 3. We begin by
modifying I to produce a new instance Î = (V̂ , F̂ , ŵ). Then, we show that F̂ and ŵ
will retain the properties of normalization, monotonicity, and submodularity. Lastly,
we showing a mapping from (discretized) fractional activations for I to integral acti-
vations for Î such that objective values are preserved, and our desired fractional set
function properties for σ correspond exactly to their integral counterparts for the ob-
jective function σ̂ for Î. The result then follows immediately from Theorem 3.
We begin by constructing the instance Î. The key idea is that we can simulate
fractional activation with integral activation by adding a set of dummy activator nodes
for each original node; each activator node applies an incremental amount of pressure
on its associated original node. Then, for each original node we just need to add the
influence from activator node to that from other original nodes, and truncate the sum
to one. Fortunately, both of the aforementioned operations preserve the desired prop-
erties. Lastly, in order to avoid the activator nodes interfering with objective values,
we simply need to give them weight zero. With this intuition in mind, we now define
Î = (V̂ , F̂ , ŵ) formally.
First, we construct V̂ . For each node v ∈ V , create a set Av = {v1, v2, . . . , v1/δ}
of activator nodes for v. Our node set in the new instance is







We now proceed to define the functions f̂v̂ for each v̂ ∈ V̂ . If v̂ is an activator node for
some v ∈ V , we simply set f̂v̂ ≡ 0; otherwise, v̂ ∈ V and we set
f̂v̂(S) = min (fv̂(S ∩ V ) + δ|S ∩Av̂|, 1)
for each S ⊆ V̂ . Lastly, we set
ŵ(S) = w(S ∩ V )
for all S ⊆ V̂ . Together, these make up our modified instance Î.
We now show that since w and F are normalized, monotone, and submodular, ŵ
and F̂ will be as well. We begin with ŵ, since it is the simpler of the two. Now, ŵ is
clearly normalized since ŵ(∅) = w(∅). Similarly, for any S ⊆ T ⊆ V̂ , we have that
S ∩ V ⊆ T ∩ V , and so
ŵ(S) = w(S ∩ V ) ≤ w(T ∩ V ) = ŵ(T ),
by the submodularity of w. Lastly, let û ∈ V̂ \ T . If û ∈ V , then
ŵ(S ∪ {û})− ŵ(S) = w((S ∩ V ) ∪ {û})− ŵ(S ∩ V )
≥ w((T ∩ V ) ∪ {û})− ŵ(T ∩ V )
= ŵ(T ∪ {û})− ŵ(T ),
since w is submodular. On the other hand, if û /∈ V , we immediately get that
ŵ(S ∪ {û})− ŵ(S) = 0 = ŵ(T ∪ {û})− ŵ(T ).
Thus, we can see that ŵ is normalized, monotone, and submodular.
Next, we show that F̂ is normalized, monotone, and submodular. For v̂ ∈ V̂ \V , it
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follows trivially since F̂ is identically 0. In the case that V̂ ∈ V , it is less immediate,
and we consider each of the properties below.
• f̂v̂ normalized. This follows by computing that
f̂v̂(∅) = min (fv̂(V ∩ ∅) + δ|Av̂ ∩ ∅|, 1)
= min (fv̂(∅) + δ|∅|, 1) = 0,
since fv̂ is normalized.
• f̂v̂ monotone. Let S ⊆ T ⊆ V̂ . Then we have both S ∩ V ⊆ T ∩ V and
S ∩Av̂ ⊆ T ∩Av̂ . Thus, we can see that
fv̂(V ∩ S) ≤ fv̂(V ∩ T )
|Av̂ ∩ S| ≤ |Av̂ ∩ T |,
where the former follows by the monotonicity of fv̂ . Combining these, we get
that
fv̂(V ∩ S) + δ|Av̂ ∩ S| ≤ fv̂(V ∩ T ) + δ|Av̂ ∩ T |.
Thus, we may conclude that f̂v̂(S) ≤ f̂v̂(T ), since it follows from the above
inequality that
fv̂(V ∩ S) + δ|Av̂ ∩ S| > min (fv̂(V ∩ T ) + δ|Av̂ ∩ T |, 1)
implies
min (fv̂(V ∩ S) + δ|Av̂ ∩ S|, 1) = 1
= min (fv̂(V ∩ T ) + δ|Av̂ ∩ T |, 1) .
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• f̂v̂ submodular. Let S ⊆ T ⊆ V̂ , and û ∈ V̂ \ T . Now, we have three cases,
depending on the choice of û. If û ∈ V , we have that û /∈ Av̂ , and so
(fv̂(S ∪ {û})− δ|(S ∪ {û}) ∩Av̂|)− (fv̂(S)− δ|S ∩Av̂|)
= fv̂(S ∪ {û})− fv̂(S);
and
(fv̂(T ∪ {û})− δ|(T ∪ {û}) ∩Av̂|)− (fv̂(T )− δ|T ∩Av̂|)
= fv̂(T ∪ {û})− fv̂(T ).
Thus, the submodularity of fv̂ implies the former is greater than or equal to the
latter. On the other hand, if û ∈ Av̂ , then û /∈ V , and we can see that
(fv̂(S ∪ {û})− δ|(S ∪ {û}) ∩Av̂|) = δ =
= (fv̂(T ∪ {û})− δ|(T ∪ {û}) ∩Av̂|) .
Lastly, if û /∈ V ∪Av̂ , we can immediately see that
(fv̂(S ∪ {û})− δ|(S ∪ {û}) ∩Av̂|) = 0 =
= (fv̂(T ∪ {û})− δ|(T ∪ {û}) ∩Av̂|) .
Thus, in every case, we may conclude that
(fv̂(S ∪ {û})− δ|(S ∪ {û}) ∩Av̂|) ≥
≥ (fv̂(T ∪ {û})− δ|(T ∪ {û}) ∩Av̂|) ,
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and hence (by the same reasoning as for monotonicity) we may conclude that
f̂v̂(S ∪ {û})− f̂v̂(S) ≥ f̂v̂(T ∪ {û})− f̂v̂(T ).
Thus, we can see that F̂ is normalized, monotone, and submodular on V̂ , exactly as
desired.
As such, we can apply Theorem 3 to our function and get that for our modified in-
stance Î = (V̂ , F̂ , ŵ), the corresponding function σ̂ must normalized, monotone, and
submodular. All that remains is to demonstrate our claimed mapping from (discretized)
fractional activations for I to integral activations for Î.
We do so as follows. For each v ∈ V and each d ∈ ∆, let Adv = {v1, v2, . . . , vd}.





where xv is the component of x corresponding to the node v.
We first show that under this definition we have that σ(x) = σ̂(Sx). In fact, as we
will see the sets influenced will be the same not just in expectation, but for every set
of thresholds Θ for the vertices V . Note that in the modified setting Î we also have
thresholds for each vertex in V̂ \V ; however, since we chose f̂v̂ ≡ 0 for all v̂ ∈ V̂ \V ,
and thresholds are independent draws from U [0, 1], we can see that with probability 1
we have f̂v̂(S) < θv̂ for all S and all v̂ ∈ V̂ \ V . Thus, in the following discussion
we do not bother to fix these thresholds, as their precise values have no effect on the
spread of influence.
Fix some vector Θ of thresholds for the vertices in V . Let SΘ1 , . . . , S
Θ
n and
ŜΘ1 , . . . , Ŝ
Θ
n be the influenced sets in each round in the setting I with influence vector
x and in the setting Î with influence set Sx, respectively. We show by induction that
for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n, ŜΘi ∩V = SΘi . By the definition of ŵ, this immediately implies
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that w(SΘn ) = ŵ(Ŝ
Θ
n ), and the claim follows. We prove our claim by induction. For
i = 0, the equality follows simply by our definitions of the processes, since S0 = ∅
and Ŝ0 = Sx. Now, assuming the claim holds for i− 1, we need to show that it holds
for i. By our definition of the processes, we know that
SΘi = S
Θ
i−1 ∪ {v ∈ V \ SΘi−1 : fv(SΘi−1) + xv ≥ θv};
similarly, we have that
ŜΘi = Ŝ
Θ
i−1 ∪ {v̂ ∈ V̂ \ ŜΘi−1 : f̂v̂(ŜΘi−1) ≥ θv̂}.
Recall, however, that for all v̂ ∈ V̂ \ V , we have that f̂v̂ ≡ 0, and it follows that
ŜΘi \ V = Sx for all i. Thus, we can rewrite the second equality above as
ŜΘi = Ŝ
Θ
i−1 ∪ {v ∈ V \ ŜΘi−1 : f̂v(ŜΘi−1) ≥ θv}.
Consider an arbitrary v ∈ V \ SΘi−1 = V \ ŜΘi−1. Now, we know that v ∈ ŜΘi if and
only if
θv ≤ f̂v(ŜΘi−1) = min(fv(ŜΘi−1 ∩ V ) + δ|ŜΘi−1 ∩Av|, 1)
Recall, however, that ŜΘi−1 ∩ V = SΘi−1 by assumption. Furthermore, we can compute
that
|ŜΘi−1 ∩Av| = |Sx ∩Av| = |Axvv | = |{v1, . . . , vxv}| = xv/δ.
Thus, since we know that θv ≤ 1 always, we can conclude that v ∈ ŜΘi ∩V if and only
if
θv ≤ fv(SΘi−1) + xv,
which is precisely the condition for including v in SΘi . Thus, we can conclude that
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ŜΘi ∩ V = SΘi .
We have now shown that for all vectors of thresholds Θ for vertices in V , with
probability 1 we have that ŜΘi ∩ V = SΘi for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. In particular, note that
ŜΘn ∩ V = SΘn , and so ŵ(ŜΘn ) = w(SΘn ). Thus, we may conclude that σ̂(Sx) = σ(x).
Lastly, we need to show that for our given mapping from (discretized) fractional
activation vectors x to set Sx, we have that the desired properties for σ are satisfied if
the corresponding properties are satisfied for σ̂. So we assume that σ̂ is normalized,
monotone, and submodular (as, in fact, it must be by the above argument and Theo-
rem 3), and show that σ is as well. First, note that x = 0 implies Sx = ∅, and so
σ(x) = σ̂(∅) = 0. Second, let x,y ∈ ∆n such that x ≤ y componentwise. Then we
can see that Sx ⊆ Sy and so
σ(x) = σ̂(Sx) ≤ σ̂(Sy) = σ(y).
Finally, pick some v ∈ V such that yv < 1. Recall our definition of f̂v̂; by inspection,
we can see that we have f̂v̂(S) = f̂v̂(T ) any time both S∩V = T ∩V and |S ∩Av| =
|T ∩Av|, for any S, T ∈ V̂ . Thus, we can see that Sx+δi = Sx ∪ {vxv+1} and
Sy = Sy ∪ {vyv+1}. So we have
σ(x + δi)− σ(x) = σ̂(Sx ∪ {vxv+1})− σ̂(Sx)
= σ̂(Sx ∪ {vyv+1})− σ̂(Sx)
≥ σ̂(Sy ∪ {vyv+1})− σ̂(Sy)
= σ(y + δi)− σ(y).
Thus, σ has exactly the claimed properties on ∆n, and the theorem follows.
In fact, we can use the same technique as achieve the following extension to fully
continuous versions of our properties. We define the following properties for σ on the
57
continuous domain [0, 1]n:
• we say σ is normalized if σ(0) = 0;
• we say σ is monotone if x ≤ y implies σ(x) ≤ σ(y); and
• we say σ is submodular if for any x ≤ y, any v ∈ V , and for any ε > 0 such
that yv + ε ≤ 1, we have that σ(x + εv)− σ(x) ≥ σ(y + εv)− σ(y),
where εv is the vector with a value of ε in the coordinate corresponding to v and a value
of 0 in all other coordinates. As before, all comparisons and additions between vectors
above are componentwise. The same techniques immediately give us the following
theorem.
Theorem 5. Let I = (V,F , w) be an instance of our problem. If both w and F are
normalized, monotone, and submodular, then σ is normalized, monotone, and submod-
ular on [0, 1]n.
Proof. We use the exact same technique as in the proof of Theorem 4. The only differ-
ence is how we define the activator nodes in our modified instance Î. Here, rather than
trying to model the entire domain, we simply focus on the points we want to verify our
properties on. To that end, fix some x ≤ y, as well as an ε > 0 and some v ∈ V . We
will only define three activator nodes here: ax, ax−ys, and aε. The first two contributes
amounts of xv′ and (yv′−xv′) ≥ 0, respectively, to the modified influence function for
vertex v′ ∈ V . The last contributes an amount of ε to the influence function for vertex
v, and makes no contribution to any other influence functions. As before, all influence
functions get capped at one. Our modified weight function is defined exactly as before,
and it is easy to see that exactly the same argument will imply that the modified weight
and influence functions will be normalized, monotone, and submodular, allowing us to
apply Theorem 3.
Thus, all that remains is to relate the function values between the original and
modified instances. Note, however, that here it is even simpler than in the discretized
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case. If σ̂ is the objective for σ, it clear to see that:
σ(0) = σ̂(∅)
σ(x) = σ̂({ax})
σ(y) = σ̂({ax, ay−x})
σ(x + εV ) = σ̂({ax, aε})
σ(y + εv) = σ̂({ax, ay−x, aε})
The above equalities make it clear that the desired qualities for σ will follow immedi-
ately from their discrete counterparts for σ̂.
Theorem 6. Let I = (V,F , w) be an instance of our problem. Then for any discretiza-
tion ∆n of [0, 1]n (as defined above), if σ is normalized, monotone, and submodular













Let x̄∗ be the result of rounding x∗ up componentwise to the nearest element of ∆n.
Formally, we define x̄∗ by x̄∗v = min{d ∈ ∆ : d ≥ x∗}. Note that by monotonicity, we
must have that σ(x̄∗) ≥ σ(x∗); we also have that ‖x̄∗‖1 ≤ ‖x∗‖1 +δn. Now, consider
constructing x̄∗ greedily by adding δ to a single coordinate in each step. Formally, set
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x0 = 0, and for each i = 1, 2, . . . , ‖x̄∗‖1/δ set
xi = xi−1 + δv for some v ∈ argmax
v: xi−1v <1
(σ(xi−1 + δv) = σ(x
i−1)),
where (as before) δv is a vector with δ in the component corresponding to v and 0 in
all other components. Note that the submodularity of σ implies that σ(xi) − σ(xi−1)









σ(x̄∗) ≥ (1− δn)σ(x̄∗).
We observe that ‖xK/δ‖1 = K, and xK/δ ∈ ∆n, and so the desired theorem follows.
3.6 DAGs
In this section, we focus on the case of linear influences, and argue that some aspects
of the problem become simpler on DAGs. Similar to the fractional influence model,
our goal is to pick an influence vector x ∈ [0, 1]|V | indexed by V to maximize
σ(x) = E
Θ
[ |SΘn | | we apply direct influences x ],
where SΘ1 , . . . , S
Θ
n is the sequence of sets of nodes activated under thresholds Θ and
direct influence x. We sometimes abuse notation and use σ(S) to denote obj applied
to the characteristic vector of the set S ∈ 2V .
Given a DAG G = (V,E) and a fractional influence vector x ∈ [0, 1]|V | indexed
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by V , we define the sets
I(x) = {v ∈ V : xv > 0}, and
S(x) = {v ∈ V : xv +
∑
u∈δ− (v) wuv > 1},
as the sets of nodes influenced by x and (over-)saturated by x. Note that S(x) ⊆ I(x).
We get the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Given a DAG G and influence vector x, if G contains no path from an




Proof. We prove this by induction on the number of vertices. In the case that V con-
tains only a single vertex, the claim is trivial. Otherwise, let G = (V,E) and x satisfy
our assumptions, with |V | = n > 1, and assume out claim holds for any DAG with
(n−1) or fewer nodes. Let s ∈ V be a source vertex (i.e. have in-degree 0) inG. Now,
if s /∈ I(x), we know that s is never activated. Let σ̂ and x̂ be σ onG restricted to V \s
and x restricted to V \ s, respectively, and observe that we may apply our induction
hypothesis to σ̂(x̂) since removing s from G cannot cause any of the requirements for
our theorem to become violated. Thus, we can see that







since xs = 0.
Now, assume that s ∈ I(x). Recall that by our conditions on G, therefore, we
know that G contains no path from s to any elements of S(x). One critical implication
of this is that none of the nodes in δ
+
(s) have paths to elements of S(x) either, and so
we made apply influence to them without violating the assumptions of our inductive
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hypothesis, as long as we are careful not to add so much weight that they become
saturated.
In order to prove our claim, we focus on G restricted to V \ {s}, call it Ĝ. Let
σ̂ be σ over Ĝ, and consider the following two influence vectors for Ĝ. Define x̂ to
simply be the restriction of x to Ĝ; define ŷ by yv = wsv if v ∈ δ
+
(s) and 0 otherwise.
Letting Î and ˆSat be I and S, respectively, restricted to Ĝ, we can see that
Î(x̂), Î(ŷ), Î(x̂ + ŷ) ⊆ I(x) ∪ δ
+
(s), and
Ŝ(x̂), Ŝ(ŷ), Ŝ(x̂ + ŷ) ⊆ S(x).
 (3.1)
The observation that gives the above is that, compared to x, the only vertices with
increased influence applied to them are the elements of δ
+
(s), and the amounts of
these increases are precisely balanced by the removal of s (and its outgoing edges)












As previously noted G contains no paths from an element of δ
+
(s) to any element
of S(x); this combined with (3.1) allows us to conclude that we may apply our induc-
tion hypothesis to Ĝ with any of x̂, ŷ, or x̂ + ŷ. We proceed by showing that for any
vector Θ of thresholds for G (and its restriction to Ĝ), we have that the set activated
under x in G always corresponds closely to one of the sets activated by x̂ or (x̂ + ŷ)
in Ĝ. To that end, fix any vector Θ. We consider the cases where xs ≥ θs and xs < θs
separately.
We begin with the case where xs < θs, since it is the simpler of the two. Let




0 , . . . , Ŝ
Θ
n denote the sets activated in G under x and in Ĝ under x̂,
respectively, in stages 0, . . . , n. Note that since s is a source, and xs < θs, we know
that s /∈ SΘi for all i. However, this means that every node in V \ {s} has both the
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same direct influence applied to it under x and x̂, and the same amount of influence
applied by any activated set in both G and Ĝ. So we can immediately see that since
SΘ0 = ∅ = ŜΘ0 , by induction we will have that SΘi = ŜΘi for all i, and in particular for
i = n.
The case where xs ≥ θs requires more care. Let SΘ0 , . . . , SΘn and ŜΘ0 , . . . , ŜΘn
denote the sets activated in G under x and in Ĝ under x̂ + ŷ, respectively, in stages
0, . . . , n. Note that our assumption implies that s will be activated by our direct in-
fluence in the first round, and so we have s ∈ ŜΘi for all i ≥ 1. Fix some v ∈ V ,
v 6= s, and let fv(S) and f̂v(S) denote the total influence – both direct and cascading
– applied to in G and Ĝ, respectively, when the current active set is S. Then, we can
see that for any S ⊆ V \ {s} we have that












wuv = fv(S ∪ {s}). (3.2)
Furthermore, note that both fv and f̂v are always monotone nondecreasing. While
we cannot show that SΘi = Ŝ
Θ
i for all i in this case, we will instead show that S
Θ
i \
{s} ⊆ ŜΘi ⊆ SΘi+1 \ {s} for all i = 0, . . . , n − 1. Recall that the propagation of
influence converges by n steps. That is, if we continued the process for an additional
step to produce activated sets SΘn+1 and Ŝ
Θ







n . However, our claim would extend to this extra stage as well, and so we
conclude that we must have that SΘn = Ŝ
Θ
n ∪{s}. We prove our claim inductively. First,
observe that it holds trivially for i = 0, since we have SΘ0 = Ŝ
Θ
0 = ∅, and previously
observed that s ∈ SΘ1 . Now, the claim holds for some i. Note, however, that by (3.2)
and monotonicity we must have that for all v ∈ V , v 6= s
fv(S
Θ
i ) = f̂v(S
Θ
i \ {s}) ≤ f̂v(ŜΘi )
≤ f̂v(SΘi+1 \ {s}) = fv(SΘi+1).
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But from the above, we can see that Si+1 \ {s} ⊆ ŜΘi+1 ⊆ SΘi+2 \ {s} since such a
v in included in each of the above sets if and only if fv(SΘi ), f̂v(Ŝ
Θ
i ), or fv(S
Θ
i+1),
respectively, exceeds θv .
Thus, by observing that θs is an independent draw from U [0, 1], we can see that
taking expectations over Θ and conditioning on which of θs and xs is larger, gives us
that





xvσ(1v) + xs(1 + σ̂(ŷ)).
We complete our proof by observing that, in fact, σ(1s) is precisely equal to 1 +
σ̂(ŷ). We can see this by once again coupling the activated sets under any vector Θ




0 , . . . , Ŝ
Θ
n denote the sets activated
in G under 1s and in Ĝ under ŷ, respectively, in stages 0, . . . , n. Arguments identical
to those made above allow us to conclude that for all i, we have that SΘi+1 = Ŝ
Θ
i ∪
{s}. Thus, by again noting that influence cascades converge after n steps we see that
SΘn = Ŝ
Θ
n ∪ {s}, and taking expectations with respect to Θ gives precisely the desired
equality.






(Xv + Yv) subject to








Xv ∈ {0, 1} ∀v
Yv ∈ [0, 1] ∀v
3.7 Examples
Example 4. Consider solving our problem on a directed graph consisting of a single
(one-directional) cycle with n vertices. Assume that every edge has weight 1 −K/n,
and that thresholds on nodes are drawn from U [0, 1]. We consider the optimal integral
and fractional influence to apply.
In the fractional case, consider applying influence of exactly K/n to every node.
Note that for any node, the amount of influence we apply directly plus the weight on
its sole incoming edge sum to 1. Thus, any time a node’s predecessor on the cycle is
becomes activated, the node will becomes activated as well. Inductively, we can then
see that any time at least one node is activated in the cycle, every node will eventually
become activated. This means that the expected number of activated nodes under this
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strategy is precisely
n · Pr[At least one node activates]
= n(1− Pr[No nodes activate])
= n(1− Pr[Every node’s threshold is above K/n])
= n(1− (1−K/n)n).
In the integral case, however, we cannot spread our influence as evenly. Note that
each node we activate has some chance to activate the nodes following it in the cycle;
however, any cascade must stop once we reach the next node we directly activated. If
we have an interval of length ` between directly activated nodes (including the initial
node we activate directly in the length), we can see that the expected number of nodes
activated in the interval is
∑̀
i=1




Pr[Nodes 2, 3, . . . , i have thresholds below 1−K/n]





While this tells us the expected value for a single interval, we want to know the expected
value summed over all intervals. Observing from the sum form that the benefit of
adding another node to an interval is strictly decreasing in the length of the interval,
we can see that we should always make the lengths of the intervals as close to equal
as possible. Noting that the lengths of the intervals always sum to n, then, we can see
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= n(1− (1−K/n))n/K .





In this section, we present NP-Hardness and inapproximability results in the linear
influence model. We assume that thresholds are not chosen from a distribution, and
they are fixed and given as part of the input. We note that this is the main assumption
that makes our problem intractable, and to achieve reasonable algorithms, one has to
make some stochastic (distributional) assumptions on the thresholds. In Section 3.4, we
introduced the linear influence model as a special case of fractional influence model,
but it makes sense to define it as a special case of integral influence model as well.
In the fractional linear influence model, we are allowed to apply any influence vector
x ∈ [0, 1]n on nodes. By restricting the influence vector x to be in {0, 1}n (a binary
vector), we achieve the integral version of linear influence model. Our hardness results
in Theorem 8, and Corollary 9 work for both fractional and integral versions of linear
influence model. We start by proving that the linear influence model is NP-Hard with
a reduction from independent set problem in Theorem 8. We strengthen this hardness
result in Corollary 9 by showing that an n1−ε approximation algorithm for the linear
influence problem yields an exact algorithm for it as well for any constant ε > 0, and
therefore even an n1−ε approximation algorithm is NP-Hard to achieve. At the end,
we show the that it is NP-Hard to achieve any better than 1 − 1/e approximation in
the Triggering model which is introduced in [75]. We will elaborate on the Triggering
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Model and this hardness result at the end of this section.
Theorem 8. If we allow arbitrary, fixed thresholds, it is NP-Hard to compute for a
given instance of the integral linear influence problem (G, k, T ) (graph G, budget
k, and a target goal T ) whether or not there exists a set S of k vertices in G such
that σ(S) ≥ T . Furthermore, the same holds in the factional version of the problem
(instead of a set S of size k, we should look for a influence vector with `1 norm equal
to k in the fractional case).
Proof. We show hardness by reducing from Independent Set. Given a problem instance
(G, k) of IS, we construct a two-layer DAG as follows. Let G = (V,E) denote the
vertices and (undirected) edges ofG. The first layer L1 consists of one vertex for every
vertex v ∈ V ; we abuse notation and refer to the vertex in L1 corresponding to v ∈ V
as v as well. The second layer contains vertices based on the edges in E. For each
unordered pair of vertices {u, v} in V , we add vertices to the second layer L2 based on
whether {u, v} is an edge in G: if {u, v} ∈ E, then we add a single vertex to L2 with
(directed) edges from each of u, v ∈ L1 to it; if {u, v} /∈ E, then we add two vertices
to L2, and add (directed) edges going from u ∈ L1 to the first of these and from v ∈ L1
to the second of these. We set all activation thresholds and all edge weights in our new
DAG to 1/2. We claim that there exists a set S ⊆ L1 ∪ L2 satisfying |S| ≤ k and
σ(S) ≥ kn if and only if G has an independent set of size k.
First, we note that in our constructed DAG, sets S ⊆ L1 always dominate sets
containing elements outside of L1, in the sense that for any T ⊆ L1 ∪ L2 there always
exists a set S ⊆ L1 such that |S| ≤ |T | and σ(S) ≥ σ(T ). Consider an arbitrary
such T . Now, consider any vertex v ∈ T ∩ L2. By construction, there exists some
u ∈ L1 such that (u, v) is an edge in our DAG. Note that |T \ {v} ∪ {u}| ≤ |T | and
σ(T \ {v} ∪ {u}) ≥ σ(T ). Thus, if we repeatedly replace T with T \ {v} ∪ {u} for
each such v, we eventually with have the desired set S.
With the above observation in hand, we can be assured that there exists set S of k
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vertices in our constructed DAG such that σ(S) ≥ nk if and only if there exists such an
S ⊆ L1. Recall how we constructed the second layer of our DAG: each vertex v ∈ L1
has precisely (n − 1) neighbors; and two vertices u, v ∈ L1 share a neighbor if and
only if they are neighbors in the original graph G, in which case they have exactly one
shared neighbor. Thus, we can see that for any set of vertices S ⊆ L1, we have that
σ(S) = n|S| − |{{u, v} ∈ E : u, v ∈ S}|.
Thus, we can see that for any set S ⊆ L1, we have σ(S) ≥ n|S| if and only if
{u, v} /∈ E for any u, v ∈ S, i.e. S is an independent set in G. The main claim
follows.
Furthermore, recall that in our constructed DAG, every edge weight and threshold
was exactly equal to 1/2. It is not hard to see, therefore, that in the fractional case
it is never optimal to place an amount of influence on a vertex other than 0 or 1/2.
It follows, therefore, that there is a 1 − 1 correspondence between optimal optimal
solutions in the integral case with budget k and in the fractional case with budget k/2.
Thus, as claimed, the hardness extends to the fractional case.
Corollary 9. If we allow arbitrary, fixed thresholds, it is NP-Hard to approximate the
linear influence problem to within a factor of n1−ε for any ε > 0. Furthermore, the
same holds for the fractional version of our problem.
Proof. We show that given an instance (G, k) of Target Set Selection, and a target T ,
we can construct a new instance (G′, k), such that if we can approximate the optimal
solution for the new instance (G′, k) to within a factor of n1−ε, then we can tell whether
the original instance (G, k) had a solution with objective value at least T . The claim
then follows by applying Theorem 8.
Fix some δ > 0. Let n be the number of vertices in G. Note that we must have
that 0 < k < T ≤ n, since if any one of these inequalities fails to hold, the question
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of whether or not (G, k) has a solution with objective value at least T can be answered
trivially. Let N = d(2n2)1/δe; we construct G′ from G by adding N identical new
vertices to it. Let v be one of our new vertices. For every vertex u that was present in
G, we add an edge from u to v in G′, with weight 1/n. We set the threshold of v to be
precisely T/n.
Consider what the optimal objective value in (G, k) implies about the optimal ob-
jective value in (G′, k). If there exists some solution to the former providing objective
value at least T , then we can see that the same solution will activate every one of the
new vertices in G′ as well, and so produce an objective value of at least T + N . On
the other hand, assume every solution to G has objective value strictly less than T .
Note that in the case of fixed thresholds, the activation process is deterministic, and
so we may conclude that every solution has objective value at most T − 1. Now, this
means that no matter what choices we make in G′ about the vertices inherited from
G, every one of the new vertices will require at least 1/n additional influence to be-
come activated. Thus, no solution for (G′, k) can achieve objective value greater than
(T − 1) + kn, in either the integral or fractional case. By our choice of N , however,
we can then conclude that the optimal solution for (G′, k) has value at least
T +N > N ≥ (2n2)1/δ > (T − 1 + kn)1/δ,
the value of the optimal solution for (G′, k) in the latter case raised to the power of
1/δ. Thus, for any fixed ε > 0, we can choose an appropriate δ > 0 such the new
instance (G′, k) has increased in size only polynomially from (G, k), but applying an
n1−ε approximation to (G′, k) will allow us to distinguish whether or not (G, k) had a
solution with objective value at least T , exactly as desired.
Before stating Theorem 10, we should define the triggering model introduced in
[75]. In this model, each node v independently chooses a random triggering set Tv
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according to some distribution over subsets of its neighbors. To start the process, we
target a set A for initial activation. After this initial iteration, an inactive node v be-
comes active in step t if it has a neighor in its chosen triggering set Tv that is active at
time t− 1. For our purposes, the distributions of triggering sets have support size one
(deterministic triggering sets). We also show that our hardness result even holds when
the size of these sets is two.
Theorem 10. It is NP-Hard to approximate linear influence problem to within any
factor better than 1−1/e, even in the Triggering model where triggering sets have size
at most 2.
Proof. We prove this by reducing from the Max Coverage problem, which is NP-Hard
to approximate within any factor better than 1− 1/e. Let (S, k) be an instance of Max
Coverage, where S = {S1, . . . , Sm} and Sj ⊆ [n] for each j = 1, . . . ,m. We begin
by showing a reduction to an instance of Target Set Selection in the Triggering model;
later, we argue that we can do so while ensuring that triggering sets have size at most
2.
We construct a two layer DAG instance of Target Set Selection as follows. First,
fix a large integer N ; we will pick the exact value of N later. The first layer L1 will
contain m vertices, each corresponding to one of the sets in S . The second layer L2
contains nN vertices, N of which correspond to each i ∈ [n]. We add directed edges
from the vertex in L1 corresponding to Sj to all N vertices in L2 corresponding to i
for each i ∈ Sj . We set all thresholds and weights in the DAG to 1. Note that this
corresponds exactly to the triggering model, where each vertex in the first layer has an
empty triggering set and each vertex in the second layer has a triggering set consisting
of exactly the nodes in L1 corresponding to Sj that contain it. This completes the
description of the reduction.
Now, we consider the maximal influence we can achieve by selecting k vertices in
our constructed DAG. First, we note that we may assume without loss of generality
71
that we only consider choosing vertices from L1. This is because we can only improve
the number of activated sets by replacing any vertex from L2 with a vertex that has an
edge to it; if we have already selected all such vertices, then we can simply replacing it
with an arbitrary vertex from L1 and be no worse off. Note, however, that if we select
some set W ⊆ L1 of vertices to activate, we will have that
σ(W ) = |W |+N |∪j∈WSj |.
LetW ∗ ∈ argmaxW⊂L1:|W |≤k σ(W ). Now, if we have an α-approximation algorithm
for Target Set Selection, we can find some W ⊆ L1 such that |W | ≤ k and σ(W ) ≥
ασ(W ∗). But this means that
|W |+N |∪j∈WSj | ≥ α (|W ∗|+N |∪j∈W∗Sj |) ,
which implies that
|∪j∈WSj | ≥ α|∪j∈W∗Sj | −m/N. (3.3)
Thus, for any ε > 0, by picking N = dm/εe we can use our α-approximation algo-
rithm for Target Set Selection to produce an α-approximation for Max Coverage with
an additive loss of ε. Since the objective value for our problem is integral, we may
therefore conclude it is NP-Hard to approximate Target Set Selection within a factor of
1− 1/e.
In the above reduction, our targeting sets could be as large as m. We know show
that we can, in fact, ensure that no targeting set has size greater than 2. In particular,
the key insight is that activation effectively functions as an OR-gate over the targeting
set. We can easily replace an OR-gate with fan-in of f by a tree of at most log(f)
OR-gates, each with fan-in 2. It is easy to see that if we add such trees of OR-gates
72
before L2, we increase the loss term in Equation (3.3) to at most m log(m)/N . We
can easily offset this by increasing N appropriately, and so retain our conclusion even
when targeting sets have size at most 2.
Example 5. The following example shows that when thresholds are fixed, the optimal
objective values in the fractional and integral cases can differ by as much as a factor of
n, where n is the number of vertices in the graph. The instance we consider is a DAG
consisting of a single, directed path of n vertices. Each edge in the path has weight
1/(n + 1), and every vertex on the path has threshold 2/(n + 1). Note that since
thresholds are strictly greater than edge weights, and every vertex, being on a simple
path, has in degree at most one, it is impossible for a vertex to be activated without
some direct influence being applied to it.
Consider our problem on the above graph with budget 1. In the integral case, we
cannot activate more than a single vertex – as previously observed, no vertex can be
activated without direct application of influence, and with a budget of 1 we can only
affect on vertex directly. On the other hand, in the fractional case the following strategy
guarantees that all vertices are activated. Apply 2/(n + 1) influence to the earliest
vertex, and 1/(n+1) influence to the remaining (n−1) vertices. Now, this is sufficient
to activate the earliest vertex directly; furthermore, every other vertex has sufficient
direct influence that it will activate as long as the vertex before it on the path does.
Thus, a simple induction proves the claim, and we can see that the optimal integral and
fractional solutions differ in objective value by a factor of n.
3.9 Experimental Results
Datasets. We use the following real-world networks for evaluating our claims. The
statistical information regarding these real-world networks are in Table 3.1.
• NetHEPT: This is an academic collaboration network. NetHEPT is based on
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Networks # of nodes # of edges Ave. deg. Directed
NetHEPT 15233 58891 7.73 No
NetPHY 37154 231584 12.46 No
Facebook 4039 88234 21.84 No
Amazon 262111 1234877 4.71 Yes
Table 3.1: real-world networks
“High Energy Physics - Theory" section of the e-print arXiv2 with papers from
1991 to 2003. In this network, nodes represent authors and edges represent
co-authorship relations. This network is available at http://research.
microsoft.com/en-us/people/weic/graphdata.zip.
• NetPHY: This is another academic collaboration network. NetPHY is taken
from the full “Physics" section of the e-print arXiv. In this network, nodes
represent authors and edges represent co-authorship relations. Graph is avail-
able at http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/people/weic/
graphdata.zip.
• Facebook: This network represents friend list (circle) from Facebook. The data
is available on http://snap.stanford.edu/data/egonets-Facebook.
html.
• Amazon: This network is produced by crawling Amazon website based on
the following observation: customers who bought product i also bought product
j. In this network, nodes represent products and there is a direct edge from
node i to node j if product i is frequently co-purchased with product j. This
network is based on Amazon data in March 2003. The data is available at http:
//snap.stanford.edu/data/amazon0302.html.
Algorithms. We compare the following algorithms in this study. The first three
algorithms are for the integral influence model, and the last three algorithms work for
2http://www.arXiv.org
74
the fractional influence model. Note that we need efficient algorithms which are fast
enough so we can run them on a real-world network.
• DegreeInt: A simple greedy algorithm which selects nodes with the largest
degrees. This method has been used in [23, 75] as well.
• DiscountInt: This is a variant of DegreeInt. This algorithm selects node uwith
the highest degree in each step. Moreover, after adding node u to the seed set,
the algorithm decreases the degrees of neighbors of u by one. This method was
also evaluated in [23].
• RandomInt: This algorithm just randomly adds B nodes to the seed set, i.e.,
by spending 1 on each of them. We use this algorithm as a baseline in our
comparisons which is also used in [23, 24, 75]
• DegreeFrac: This algorithm selects each node fractionally proportional to its
degree. In particular, this algorithm spends min{Bd
−
i
m , 1} on node i where B is
the budget, d−i is the out-degree of node i, and m is the total number of edges
3.
• DiscountFrac: A heuristic for the fractional case according to Algorithm 1. Let
Γ−v (A) be the total sum of the weight of edges from node v to set A, and Γ
+
v (A)
be the total sum of the weight of edges from set A to node v. This algorithm
starts with an empty seed set S, and in each step it adds node v 6∈ S with the
maximum Γ−v (V − S) to seed set S by spending max{0, 1 − Γ+v (S)} on node
v. Note that in each step the total influence from the current seed set S to node v
is Γ+v (S), and it is enough to spend 1− Γ+v (S) for adding node v to the current
seed set S. Note that no node would pay a positive amount, and the algorithm
spends max{0, 1− Γ+v (S)} on node v.
• UniformFrac: This algorithm distributes the budget equally among all nodes.
We use this algorithm as another baseline in our comparisons.
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Algorithm 1 DiscountFrac
Input: Graph G = (V,E) and budget B
Output: Influencing vector x
1: S ← 0
2: b← B
3: x← 0
4: while b > 0 do
5: u← argmaxv∈V−S{Γ−v (V − S)}
6: xu ← min{b,max{0, 1− Γ+u (S)}}
7: b← b− xu
8: S ← S ∪ {u}
9: end while
10: return x
All these heuristic algorithms are fast and are designed for running on large real-
world networks. In particular, algorithms DegreeInt and DegreeFrac only need the
degree nodes. The running time of algorithms DiscountInt and DiscountFrac are
O(n log n + m) using a heap. Algorithm DiscountInt was proposed as an efficient
algorithm for the integral influence model in [23].At last we note that algorithms Ran-
domInt and UniformFrac are linear-time algorithms. It also has been shown that the
performance of DiscountInt almost matches the performance of the greedy algorithm
which maximizes a submodular function [23]. Hence, it seems DiscountInt is an ap-
propriate candidate for evaluating the power of the integral influence model.
Results. We have implemented all algorithms in C++ and run all experiments on
a server with two 6-core/12-thread 3.46 GHz Intex Xeon X5690 CPUs, with 48 GB 1.3
GHz RAM. We run all of the aforementioned algorithms for finding the activation vec-
tor/set, and compute the performance of each algorithm by running 10000 simulations
and taking the average of the number of adopters.
We first examine the performance of a fractional activation vector in the weighted
cascade model. In the weighted cascade model the weight of the edge from u to v is
1
d−v
, where d−v is the in-degree of node v. Note that in the weighted cascade model the
3If the graph is undirected we should use 2m instead of m
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model was proposed by Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos [75], and it has been used in the
literature, e.g., see [23, 24, 25]. We run all algorithms on aforementioned real-world
networks, and compare their performance with various budget in Figure 3.1.
(a) Facebook (b) NetHEPT
(c) NetPHY (d) Amazon
Figure 3.1: Performance of different algorithms on Facebook, NetHEPT, NetPHY,
and Amazon. The weights of edges are defined based on the weighted cascade model.
We then compare the performance of various algorithms when the weight of edges
are determined by TRIVALENCY model. In the TRIVALENCY model the weight of
each edge is chosen uniformly at random from the set {0.001, 0.01, 0.1}, where 0.001,
0.01, and 0.1 represent low, medium, and high influences. Note that in this model
the total sum of the weights of incoming edges of each node may be greater than
1. This model and its variants have been used in [23, 24, 75]. We run all proposed
algorithms on real-world networks when their weights are defined by TRIVALENCY
model. Results are shown in Figure 3.2.
Discussion. In most of the plots, algorithms for the fractional influence model do
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(a) Facebook (b) NetHEPT
(c) NetPHY (d) Amazon
Figure 3.2: Performance of different algorithms on Facebook, NetHEPT, NetPHY,
and Amazon. The weights of edges are defined based on the TRIVALENCY model.
substantially better than algorithms for the integral influence model. Overall, for most
datasets, DiscountFrac is the best algorithm, with the only exception being the
Facebook dataset. As a simple metric of the power of the fractional model versus the
integral model, we consider the pointwise performance gain of fractional model algo-
rithms versus the integral model algorithms. i.e., for a given budget, we compute the
ratio of expected number of adopters for the fractional model with the most adopters
and the expected number of adopters for the integral model algorithm with the most
adopters. Depending on the dataset, we get a mean pointwise performace gain be-
tween 3.4% (Facebook dataset, TRIVALENCY model) and 142.7 % (Amazon dataset,
weighted cascade model) with the mean being 31.5% and the median being 15.7 %
over all the datasets and both models (weighted cascade and TRIVALENCY). Among
the heuristics presented for the integral model, DiscountInt is probably the best. If
we compare just it to its fractional adaptation, DiscountFrac ,we get a similar pic-
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ture: the range of average performace gain is between 9.1 % (Facebook, TRIVALENT
model) and 397.6 % (Amazon, weighted cascade model) with a mean of 64.1 % and a
median of 15.6 %.
In summary, the experimental results clearly demonstrate that the fractional model






In this chapter we study selling a utility with a distribution network, e.g., natural gas,
water and electricity, in several markets when the clearing price of each market is
determined by its supply and demand. The distribution network fragments the market
into different regional markets with their own prices. Therefore, the relations between
suppliers and submarkets form a complex network [36, 37, 49, 53, 69, 98, 131]. For
example, a market with access to only one supplier suffers a monopolistic price, while
a market having access to multiple suppliers enjoys a lower price as a result of the price
competition.
Antoine Augustin Cournot introduced the first model for studying the duopoly com-
petition in 1838. He proposed a model where two individuals own different springs of
water, and sell it independently. Each individual decides on the amount of water to
supply, and then the aggregate water supply determines the market price through an
inverse demand function. Cournot characterizes the unique equilibrium outcome of
0This is a joint work with M. Abolhassani, M. H. Bateni, M. T. Hajiaghayi and H. Mahini. A version of
this work appeared in WINE ’15 [1].
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the market when both suppliers have the same marginal costs of production, and the
inverse demand function is linear. He argued that in the unique equilibrium outcome,
the market price is above the marginal cost.
Joseph Bertrand 1883 criticized the Cournot model, where the strategy of each
player is the quantity to supply, and in turn suggested to consider prices, rather than
quantities, as strategies. In the Bertrand model each firm chooses a price for a homoge-
neous good, and the firm announcing the lowest price gets all the market share. Since
the firm with the lowest price receives all the demand, each firm has incentive to price
below the current market price unless the market price matches its cost. Therefore,
in an equilibrium outcome of the Bertrand model, assuming all marginal costs are the
same and there are at least two competitors in the market, the market price will be equal
to the marginal cost.
The Cournot and Bertrand models are two basic tools for investigating the competi-
tive market price, and have attracted much interest for modeling real markets; see, e.g.,
[36, 37, 53, 131]. While these are two extreme models for analyzing the price com-
petition, it is hard to say which one is essentially better than the other. In particular,
the predictive power of each strongly depends on the nature of the market, and varies
from application to application. For example, the Bertrand model explains the situation
where firms literally set prices, e.g., the cellphone market, the laptop market, and the
TV market. On the other hand, Cournot’s approach would be suitable for modeling
markets like those of crude oil, natural gas, and electricity, where firms decide about
quantities rather than prices.
There are several attempts to find equilibrium outcomes of the Cournot or Bertrand
competitions in the oligopolistic setting, where a small number of firms compete in
only one market; see, e.g., [60, 64, 80, 105, 121, 132]. Nevertheless, it is not entirely
clear what equilibrium outcomes of these games are when firms compete over more
than one market. In this chapter, we investigate the problem of finding equilibrium out-
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comes of the Cournot competition in a network setting where there are several markets
for a homogeneous good and each market is accessible to a subset of firms.
4.1.1 Example
We start with the following warm-up example. This is a basic example for the Cournot
competition in the network setting. It consists of three scenarios. We assume firm
i ∈ {A,B} produces quantity qij of the good in market j ∈ {1, 2}. Let q be the vector
of all quantities.
Scenario 1 Consider the Cournot competition in an oligopolistic setting with two firms
and one market (see Figure 4.1). Let p(q) = 1− qA1 − qB1 be the market price
(the inverse demand function), and ci(q) = 12q
2
i1 be the cost of production for
firm i ∈ {A,B}. The profit of a firm is what it gets by selling all the quantities of
good it produces in all markets minus its cost of production. Therefore, the profit
of firm i denoted by πi(q) is qi1(1−qA1−qB1)− 12q
2
i1. In a Nash equilibrium of
the game, each firm maximizes its profit assuming its opponent does not change
its strategy. Hence, the unique Nash equilibrium of the game can be found by
solving the set of equations ∂πA∂qA1 =
∂πB
∂qB1
= 0. So qA1 = qB1 = 14 is the unique
Nash equilibrium where p(q) = 12 , and πA(q) = πB(q) = 0.9375.
Scenario 2 We construct the second scenario by splitting the market in the previous
scenario into two identical markets such that both firms have access to both mar-
kets (see Figure 4.1). Since the demand is divided between two identical markets,
the price for market j would be pj(q) = 1−2qAj−2qBj , i.e., the clearance price
of each market is the same as the clearance price of the market in Scenario 1,
when the supply is half of the supply of the market in Scenario 1. In this scenario,

















































Figure 4.1: This figure represents the three scenarios of our example. Vector q =
( 14 ,
1









is the unique equilibrium of the second scenario. Finally, Vector q = (0.18, 0.1, 0.16)
is the unique equilibrium in the third scenario.






8 ) is the unique equilibrium of the game where
p1(q) = p2(q) =
1
2 , and πA(q) = πB(q) = 0.09375. Since we artificially split
the market into two identical markets, this equilibrium is, not surprisingly, the
same as the equilibrium in the previous scenario.
Scenario 3 Consider the previous scenario, and suppose firm 2 has no access to the
first market (see Figure 4.1). Let the demand functions and the cost functions be
the same as the previous scenario. The profits of firms 1 and 2 can be written as
follows:













= ∂πB∂qB2 = 0. One can verify that vector q =
(qA1, qA2, qB2) = (0.18, 0.1, 0.16) is the unique equilibrium outcome of the
game where p1(q) = 0.64, p2(q) = 0.48, πA(q) = 0.124, and πB(q) = 0.064.
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The following are a few observations worth mentioning.
• Firm A has more power in this scenario due to having a captive market1.
• The equilibrium price of market 1 is higher than the equilibrium price in
the previous scenarios.
• The position of firm B affects its profit. Since it has no access to market 1,
it is not as powerful as firm A.
• The equilibrium price of market 2 is smaller than the equilibrium price in
the previous scenarios.
4.1.2 Related Work
There are several papers that investigate the Cournot competition in an oligopolistic
setting (see, e.g., [60, 64, 80, 121, 132]). In spite of these works, little is known about
the Cournot competition in a network. Ilkılıç [66] studies the Cournot competition in a
network setting, and considers a network of firms and markets where each firm chooses
a quantity to supply in each accessible market. He studies the competition when the
inverse demand functions are linear and the cost functions are quadratic (functions of
the total production). In this study, we consider the same model when the cost func-
tions and the demand functions may have quite general forms. We show the game with
linear inverse demand functions is a potential game and therefore has a unique equilib-
rium outcome. Furthermore, we present two polynomial-time algorithms for finding an
equilibrium outcome for a wide range of cost functions and demand functions. While
we investigate the Cournot competition in networks, there is a recent paper which con-
siders the Bertrand competition in network setting [13], albeit in a much more restricted
case of only two firms competing in each market.
The final price of each market in the Cournot competition is a market clearing
price; i.e, the final price is set such that the market becomes clear. Finding a market
1A captive market is one in which consumers have limited options and the seller has a monopoly power.
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clearance equilibrium is a well-established problem, and there are several papers which
propose polynomial-time algorithms for computing equilibriums of markets in which
the price of each good is defined as the price in which the market clears. Examples
of such markets include Arrow-Debreu market and its special case Fisher market (see
related work on these markets [40, 41, 42, 47, 54, 68, 104]). Devanur and Vazirani [41]
design an approximation scheme which computes the market clearing prices for the
Arrow-Debreu market, and Ghiyasvand and Orlin [54] improve the running time of the
algorithm. The first polynomial-time algorithm for finding an Arrow-Debreu market
equilibrium is proposed by Jain [68] for a special case with linear utilities. The Fisher
market, a special case of the Arrow-Debreu market, attracted a lot of attention as well.
Eisenberg and Gale [47] present the first polynomial-time algorithm by transferring the
problem to a concave cost maximization problem. Devanur et al. [42] design the first
combinatorial algorithm which runs in polynomial time and finds the market clearance
equilibrium when the utility functions are linear. This result is later improved by Orlin
[104].
For the sake of completeness, we refer to recent works in the computer science lit-
erature [51, 67], which investigate the Cournot competition in an oligopolistic setting.
Immorlica et al. [67] study a coalition formation game in a Cournot oligopoly. In this
setting, firms form coalitions, and the utility of each coalition, which is equally divided
between its members, is determined by the equilibrium of a Cournot competition be-
tween coalitions. They prove the price of anarchy, which is the ratio between the social
welfare of the worse stable partition and the social optimum, is Θ(n2/5) where n is the
number of firms. Fiat et al. [51] consider a Cournot competition where agents may de-
cide to be non-myopic. In particular, they define two principal strategies to maximize
revenue and profit (revenue minus cost) respectively. Note that in the classic Cournot
competition all agents want to maximize their profit. However, in their study each
agent first chooses its principal strategy and then acts accordingly. The authors prove
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Table 4.1: Summary of Results
Cost functions Inverse demand func-
tions
Running time Technique
Convex Linear O(E3) Convex optimization, for-






Reduction to a nonlinear
complementarity problem
Convex, separable Concave O(n log2Qmax) Supermodular optimiza-
tion, nested binary search
this game has a pure Nash equilibrium and the best response dynamics will converge
to an equilibrium. They also show the equilibrium price in this game is lower than the
equilibrium price in the standard Cournot competition.
4.1.3 Results and techniques
We consider the problem of Cournot competition on a network of markets and firms for
different classes of cost and inverse demand functions. Adding these two dimensions
to the classical Cournot competition which only involves a single market and basic
cost and inverse demand functions yields an engaging but complicated problem which
needs advanced techniques for analyzing. For simplicity of notation we model the
competition by a bipartite graph rather than a hypergraph: vertices on one side denote
the firms, and vertices on the other side denote the markets. An edge between a firm
and a market demonstrates willingness of the firm to compete in that specific market.
The complexity of finding the equilibrium, in addition to the number of markets and
firms, depends on the classes that inverse demand and production cost functions belong
to.
We summarize our results in Table 4.1.
In the above table, E denotes the number of edges of the bipartite graph, n de-
2Marginal revenue function is the vector function which maps production quantities for an edge to
marginal revenue along that edge.
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notes the number of firms, and Qmax denotes the maximum possible total quantity in
the oligopoly network at any equilibrium. In our results we assume the inverse de-
mand functions are nonincreasing functions of total production in the market. This is
the basic assumption in the classical Cournot Competition model: As the price in the
market increases, it is reasonable to believe that the buyers drop out of the market and
demand for the product decreases. The classical Cournot Competition model as well
as many previous works on Cournot Competition model assumes linearity of the in-
verse demand function [66, 67]. In fact there is little work on generalizing the inverse
demand function in this model. The second and third row of the above table shows we
have developed efficient algorithms for more general inverse demand functions satis-
fying concavity rather than linearity. This can be accounted as a big achievement. The
assumption of monotonicity of the inverse demand function is a standard assumption
in Economics [6, 7, 93]. We assume cost functions to be convex which is the case in
many works related to both Cournot Competition and Bertrand Network [81, 135]. In a
previous work [66], the author considered Cournot Competition on a network of firms
and markets; however, assumed that inverse demand functions are linear and all the
cost functions are quadratic function of the total production by the firm in all markets
which is quite restrictive. Most of the results in other related works in Cournot Com-
petition and Bertrand Network require linearity of the cost functions [13, 67]. A brief
summary of our results presented in three sections is given below.
Linear Inverse Demand Functions
In case inverse demand functions are linear and production costs are convex, we present
a fast and efficient algorithm to obtain the equilibrium. This approach works by show-
ing that Network Cournot Competition belongs to a class of games called ordinal po-
tential games. In such games, the collective strategy of the independent players is to
maximize a single potential function. The potential function is carefully designed in
87
such a way that changes made by one player reflects in the same way in the poten-
tial function as in their own utility function. We design a potential function for the
game, which depends on the network structure, and show how it captures this property.
Moreover, in the case where the cost functions are convex, we prove concavity of this
designed potential function (Theorem 16) concluding convex optimization methods can
be employed to find the optimum and hence, the equilibrium of the original Cournot
competition. We also discuss uniqueness of equilibria in case the cost functions are
strictly concave. Our result in this section is specifically interesting since we find the
unique equilibrium of the game. We prove the following theorems in Section 4.3.
Theorem 11. The Network Cournot Competition with linear inverse demand functions
forms an ordinal potential game.
Theorem 12. Our designed potential function for the Network Cournot Competition
with linear inverse demand functions is concave provided that the cost functions are
convex. Furthermore, the potential function is strictly concave if the cost functions
are strictly convex, and hence the equilibria for the game is unique. In addition, a
polynomial-time algorithm finds the optimum of the potential function which describes
the market clearance prices.
The general case
Since the above approach does not work for nonlinear inverse demand functions, we
design another interesting but more involved algorithm to capture more general forms
of inverse demand functions. We show that an equilibrium of the game can be com-
puted in polynomial time if the production cost functions are convex and the revenue
function is monotone. Moreover, we show under strict monotonicity of the revenue
function, the solution is unqiue, and therefore our results in this section is structural;
i.e. we find the one and only equilibria. For convergence guarantee we also need
Lipschitz condition on derivatives of inverse demand and cost functions. We start the
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section by modeling our problem as a complementarity problem. Then we prove how
holding the aforementioned conditions for cost and revenue functions yields satisfying
Scaled Lipschitz Condition (SLC) and semidefiniteness for matrices of derivatives of
the profit function. SLC is a standard condition widely used in convergence analysis for
scalar and vector optimization [142]. Finally , we present our algorithm, and show how
meeting these new conditions by inverse demand and cost functions helps us to guar-
antee polynomial running time of our algorithm. We also give examples of classes of
inverse demand functions satisfying the above conditions. These include many families
of inverse demand functions including quadratic functions, cubic functions and entropy
functions. The following theorem is the main result of Section 4.4 which summarizes
the performance of our algorithm.
Theorem 13. A solution to the Network Cournot Competition can be found in polyno-
mial number of iterations under the following conditions:
1. The cost functions are (strongly) convex.
2. The marginal revenue function is (strongly3) monotone.
3. Ther first derivative of cost functions and inverse demand functions and the
second derivative of inverse demand functions are Lipschitz continuous.
Furthermore, the solution is unique assuming only the first condition. Therefore,
our algorithm finds the unique equilibrium of NCC.
Cournot oligopoly
Another reasonable model for considering cost functions of the firms is the case where
the cost of production in a market depends only on the quantity produced by the firm
in that specific market (and not on quantities produced by this firm in other markets).
3For at least one of the first two conditions, strong version of condition should be satisfied, i.e., either
cost functions should be strongly convex or the marginal revenue function should be strongly monotone.
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In other words, the firms have completely independent sections for producing different
goods in various markets, and there is no correlation between cost of production in
separate markets. Interestingly, in this case the competitions are separable; i.e. equi-
librium for Network Cournot Competition can be found by finding the quantities at
equilibrium for each market individually. This motivates us for considering Cournot
game where the firms compete over a single market. We present a new algorithm for
computing equilibrium quantities produced by firms in a Cournot oligopoly, i.e., when
the firms compete over a single market. Cournot Oligopoly is a well-known model
in Economics, and computation of its Cournot Equilibrium has been subject to a lot
of attention. It has been considered in many works including [21, 78, 91, 103, 127]
to name a few. The earlier attempts for calculating equilibrium for a general class of
inverse demand and cost functions are mainly based on solving a Linear Complemen-
tarity Problem or a Variational Inequality. These settings can be then turned into convex
optimization problems of size O(n) where n is the number of firms. This means the
runtime of the earlier works cannot be better thanO(n3) which is the best performance
for convex optimization [20]. We give a novel combinatorial algorithm for this impor-
tant problem when the quantities produced are integral. We limit our search to integral
quantities for two reasons. First, in real-world all commodities and products are traded
in integral units. Second, this algorithm can easily be adapted to compute approximate
Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the continuous case and since the quantities at equilib-
rium may not be rational numbers, this is the best we can hope for. Our algorithm runs
in time O(n log2(Qmax)) where Qmax is an upper bound on total quantity produced
at equilibrium. Our approach relies on the fact that profit functions are supermodular
when the inverse demand function is nonincreasing and the cost functions are convex.
We leverage the supermodularity of inverse demand functions and Topkis’ Monotonic-
ity Theorem [128] to design a nested binary search algorithm. The following is the
main result of Section 4.5.
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Theorem 14. A polynomial-time algorithm successfully computes the quantities pro-
duced by each firm at an equilibrium of the Cournot oligopoly if the inverse demand
function is non-increasing, and the cost functions are convex. In addition, the algo-
rithm runs in O(n log2(Qmax)) where Qmax is the maximum possible total quantity in
the oligopoly network at any equilibrium.
4.2 Notations
Suppose we have a set of n firms denoted by F and a set of m markets denoted by
M. A single good is produced in each of these markets. Each firm might or might
not be able to supply a particular market. A bipartite graph is used to demonstrate
these relations. In this graph, the markets are denoted by the numbers 1, 2, . . . ,m on
one side, and the firms are denoted by the numbers 1, 2, . . . , n on the other side. For
simplicity, throughout the chapter we use the notation i ∈ M meaning the market
i, and j ∈ F meaning firm j. For firm j ∈ F and market i ∈ M there exists an
edge between the corresponding vertices in the bipartite graph if and only if firm j is
able to produce the good in market i. This edge will be denoted (i, j). The set of
edges of the graph is denoted by E , and the number of edges in the graph is shown
by E. For each market i ∈ M, the set of vertices NM(i) is the set of firms that this
market is connected to in the graph. Similarly, NF (j) denotes the set of neighbors of
firms j among markets. The edges in E are sorted and numbered 1, . . . , E, first based
on the number of their corresponding market and then based on the number of their
corresponding firm. More formally, edge (i, j) ∈ E is ranked above edge (l, k) ∈ E
if i < l or i = l and j < k. The quantity of the good that firm j produces in market
i is denoted by qij . The vector q is an E × 1 vector that contains all the quantities
produced over the edges of the graph in the same order that the edges are numbered.
The demand for good i, denoted Di, is the sum of the total quantity of this good
produced by all firms, i.e., Di =
∑
j∈NM(i) qij . The price of good i, denoted by the
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function Pi(Di), is only a decreasing function of total demand for this good and not the
individual quantities produced by each firm in this market. For a firm j, the vector ~sj
denotes the strategy of firm j, which is the vector of all quantites produced by this firm
in the markets NF (j). Firm j ∈ F has a cost function related to its strategy denoted
by cj(~sj). The profit that firm j makes is equal to the total money that it obtains by
selling its production minus its cost of production. More formally, the profit of firm j,




Pi(Di)qij − cj(~sj). (4.1)
4.3 Cournot competition and potential games
In this section, we design an efficient algorithm for the case where the price functions
are linear. More specifically, we design an innovative potential function that captures
the changes of all the utility functions simultaneously, and therefore, show how finding
the quantities at the equilibrium would be equivalent to finding the set of quantities
that maximizes this function. We use the notion of potential games as introduced
in Monderer and Shapley [94]. In that paper, the authors introduce ordinal potential
games as the set of games for which there exists a potential function P ∗ such that the
pure strategy equilibrium set of the game coincides with the pure strategy equilibrium
set of a game where every party’s utility function is P ∗.
In this section, we design a function for the Network Cournot Competition and
show how this function is a potenial function for the problem if the price functions
are linear. Interestingly, this holds for any cost function meaning Network Cournot
Competition with arbitrary cost functions is an ordinal potential game as long as the
price functions are linear. Furthermore, we show when the cost functions are convex,
our designed potential function is concave, and hence any convex optimization method
can find the equilibrium of such a Network Cournot Competition. In case cost functions
are strictly convex, the potential function is strictly concave. We restate a well known
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theorem in this section to conclude that the convex optimization in this case has a
unique solution, and therefore the equilibria that we find in this case is the one and
only equilibria of the game.
Definition 4. A game is said to be an ordinal potential game if the incentive of all
players to change their strategy can be expressed using a single global function called
the potential function. More formally, a game with n players and utility function ui for
player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is called ordinal potential with potential function P ∗ if for all
the strategy profiles q ∈ Rn and every strategy xi of player i the following holds:
ui(xi, q−i)− ui(qi, q−i) > 0 iff P ∗(xi, q−i)− P ∗(qi, q−i) > 0.
An equivalent definition of an ordinal potential game is a game for which a poten-
tial funciton P ∗ exists such that the following holds for all strategy profiles q ∈ Rn and







In other words, for each strategy profile q, any change in the strategy of player i has
the same impact on its utility function as on the game’s potential function.
The pure strategy equilibrium set of any ordinal potential game coincides with the
pure strategy equilibrium set of a game with the potential function P ∗ as all parties’
utility function.
Theorem 15. The Network Cournot Competition with linear price functions is an or-
dinal potential game.
Proof. Let Pi(Di) = αi − βiDi be the linear price function for market i ∈ M where
αi ≥ 0 and βi ≥ 0 are constants determined by the properties of market i. Note that
this function is decreasing with respect to Di. Here we want to introduce a potential
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function P ∗, and show that ∂πj∂qij =
∂P∗
∂qij












and taking partial derivative with respect to qij yields
∂πj
∂qij
= αi − βi
∑
k∈NF (j)


























whose partial derivative with respect to qij is
∂P ∗
∂qij
















Since this holds for each i ∈M and each j ∈ F , the Network Cournot Competition
is an ordinal potential game.
We can efficiently compute the equilibrium of the game if the potential function P ∗
is easy to optimize. Below we prove that this function is concave.
Theorem 16. The potential function P ∗ from the previous theorem is concave provided
that the cost functions of the firms are convex. Moreover, if the cost functions are strictly
convex then the potential function is strictly concave.
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Proof. The proof goes by decomposing P ∗ into pieces that are concave. We first define









and prove that it is convex.
Recall that q is an E × 1 vector of all the quantities of good produced over the
existing edges of the graph. We can write f = qTMq where M is an E × E matrix
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
.
To show that f is convex, it suffices to prove that M is positive semidefinite, by
finding a matrix R such that M = RTR. Consider the following (E + 1)×E matrix:
R =

c c · · · c
a 0 · · · 0





0 0 · · · a

,
where a, c are set below. Let Ri be the i-th column of R. We have Ri · Ri = a2 + c2
and Ri ·Rj = c2 for i 6= j.
Setting c = 2−
1
4 and a =
√
1− c yields M = RTR, showing that M is positive
semidefinite, hence the convexity of f .
The following expression for a fixed market i ∈ M, sum of three concave func-
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Summing over all markets proves concavity of P ∗. Note that if a function is the
sum of a concave function and a strictly concave function, then it is strictly concave
itself. Therefore, since f is concave, we can conclude strictly concavity of P ∗ under
the assumption that the cost functions are strictly convex.
The following well-known theorem discusses the uniqueness of the solution to a
convex optimization problem.
Theorem 17. Let F : K → Rn be a strictly concave and continuous function for some
finite convex space K ∈ Rn. Then the following convex optimization problem has a
unique solution.
max f(x) s.t. x ∈ K. (4.2)
By Theorem 16, if the cost functions are strictly convex then the potential function
is strictly concave and hence, by Theorem 17 the equilibrium of the game is unique.























subject to qij ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E .
Note that in this optimization program we are trying to maximize P ∗ for a bipartite
graph with set of edges E , linear price functions characterized by the pair (αi, βi) for
each market i ∈M, and cost functions cj for each firm j ∈ F .
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Algorithm 2 Compute quantities at equilibrium for the Network Cournot Competition.
procedure COURNOT-POTENTIAL(E , cj , (αi, βi)) . Set of edges, cost
functions and price functions
Use a convex optimization algorithm to solve
ConvexP (E , (α1, . . . , αm), (β1, . . . , βm), (c1, . . . , cn)).
and return the vector q of equilibrium quantities.
end procedure
The above algorithm has a time complexity equal to the time complexity of a con-
vex optimization algorithm with E variables. The best such algorithm has a running
time O(E3)[20].
4.4 Finding equilibrium for cournot game with general
cost and inverse demand functions
In this section, we formulate an algorithm for a much more general class of price and
cost functions. Our algorithm is based on reduction of Network Cournot Competition
(NCC) to a polynomial time solvable class of Non-linear Complementarity Problem
(NLCP). First in Subsection 4.4.1, we introduce our marginal profit function as the
vector of partial derivatives of all firms with respect to the quantities that they pro-
duce. Then in Subsection 4.4.2, we show how this marginal profit function can help
us to reduce NCC to a general NLCP. We also discuss uniqueness of equilibrium in
this situation which yields the fact that solving NLCP would give us the one and only
equilibrium of this problem. Unfortunately, in its most general form, NLCP is com-
putationally intractable. However, for a large class of functions, these problems are
polynomial time solvable. Most of the rest of this section is dedicated to proving the
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fact that NCC is polytime solvable on vast and important array of price and cost func-
tions. In Subsection 4.4.3, we rigorously define the conditions under which NLCP is
polynomial time solvable. We present our algorithm in this subsection along with a
theorem which shows it converges in polynomial number of steps. To show the con-
ditions that we introduce for convergence of our algorithm in polynomial time are not
restrictive, we give a discussion in Subsection 4.4.4 on the functions satisfying these
conditions, and show they hold for a wide range of price functions.
Assumptions Throughout the rest of this section we assume that the price functions
are decreasing and concave and the cost functions are strongly convex (The notion of
strongly convex is to be defined later). We also assume that for each firm there is a
finite quantity at which extra production ceases to be profitable even if that is the only
firm operating in the market. Thus, all production quantities and consequently quanti-
ties supplied to markets by firms are finite. In addition, we assume Lipschitz continuity
and finiteness of the first and the second derivatives of price and cost functions. We
note that these Lipschitz continuity assumptions are very common for convergence
analysis in convex optimization [20] and finiteness assumptions are implied by Lips-
chitz continuity. In addition, they are not very restrictive as we don’t expect unbounded
fluctuation in costs and prices with change in supply. For sake of brevity, we use the
terms inverse demand function and price function interchangeably.
4.4.1 Marginal profit function
For the rest of this section, we assume that Pi and ci are twice differentiable functions












Recall that the price function of a market is only a function of the total production
in that market and not the individual quantities produced by individual firms. Thus
∂Pi(Di)
∂qij
= ∂Pi(Di)∂qik ∀j, k ∈ NM(i). Therefore, we replace these terms by P
′
i (Di).




Let vector F be the vector of all fij’s corresponding to the edges of the graph in
the same format that we defined the vector q. That is fij corresponding to (i, j) ∈ E
appears above flk corresponding to edge (l, k) ∈ E iff i < l or i = l and j < k. Note
that F is a function of q.
Moreover, we separate the part representing marginal revenue from the part repre-
senting marginal cost in function F . More formally, we split F into two functions R
and S such that F = R + S, and the element corresponding to the edge (i, j) ∈ E in




= −Pi(Di)− P ′(Di)qij ,





4.4.2 Non-linear complementarity problem
In this subsection we formally define the non-linear complementarity problem (NLCP),
and prove our problem is a NLCP.
Definition 5. Let F : Rn → Rn be a continuously differentiable function on Rn+.
The complementarity problem seeks a vector x ∈ Rn that satisfies the following con-
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straints:
x, F (x) ≥ 0,
xTF (x) = 0.
(4.6)
Theorem 18. The problem of finding the vector q at equilibrium in the Cournot game
is a complementarity problem.
Proof. Let q∗ be the vector of the quantities at equilibrium. All quantities must be non-
negative at all times; i.e., q∗ ≥ 0. It suffices to show F (q∗) ≥ 0 and q∗TF (q∗) = 0. At
equilibrium, no party benefits from changing its strategy, in particular, its production
quantities. For each edge (i, j) ∈ E , if the corresponding quantity q∗ij is positive, then
q∗ij is a local maxima for πj ; i.e., fij(q
∗) = − ∂πj∂qij
∣∣∣
q∗
= 0. On the other hand, if





cannot be positive, since, if it is, firm j would benefit by increas-
ing the quantity qij to a small amount ε. Therefore, ∂π∂qij
∣∣∣
q∗
is always nonpositive or
equivalently fij(q∗) ≥ 0, i.e., F (q∗) ≥ 0. Also, as we mentioned above, a nonzero
q∗ij is a local maximum for πj ; i.e., fij(q
∗) = − ∂π∂qij
∣∣∣
q∗
= 0. Hence, either q∗ij = 0
or fij(q∗) = 0; thus, q∗ijfij(q





∗) = q∗TF (q∗) =
0.
Definition 6. F : K → Rn is said to be strictly monotone at x∗ if
〈(F (x)− F (x∗))T , x− x∗〉 ≥ 0,∀x ∈ K. (4.7)
F is said to be strictly monotone if it is monotone at any x∗ ∈ K. Equivalently, F
is strictly monotone if the jacobian matrix is positive definite.
The following theorem is a well known theorem for Complementarity Problems.
Theorem 19. Let F : K → Rn be a continuous and strictly monotone function with a
point x ∈ K such that F (x) ≥ 0 (i.e. there exists a potential solution to the CP). Then
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the Complementarity Problem introduced in (4.6) characterized by function F has a
unique solution.
Hence, the Complementarity Problem characterized by function F introduced el-
ement by element in (4.4) has a unique solution under the assumption that the rev-
enue function is strongly monotone (special case of strictly monotone). Note that the
marginal profit function or F in our case is non-negative in at least one point. Other-
wise, no firm has any incentive to produce in any market and the equilibrium is when
all production quantities are equal to zero. In the next subsection, we aim to find this
unique equilibrium of the NCC problem.
4.4.3 Designing a polynomial-time algorithm
In this subsection, we introduce Algorithm 3 for finding equilibrium of NCC, and show
it converges in polynomial time by Theorem 27. This theorem requires the marginal
profit function to satisfy Scaled Lipschitz Condition(SLC) and monotonicity. We first
introduce SLC, and show how the marginal profit function satisfies SLC and monton-
icty by Lemmas 20 to 26. We argue the conditions that the cost and price functions
should have in order for the marginal profit function to satisfy SLC and monotonic-
ity in Lemma 26. Finally, in Theorem 27, we show convergence of our algorithm in
polynomial time.
Before introducing the next theorem, we explain what the Jacobians ∇R, ∇S, and
∇F are for the Cournot game. First note that these are E ×E matrices. Let (i, j) ∈ E
and (l, k) ∈ E be two edges of the graph. Let e1 denote the index of edge (i, j), and e2
denote the index of edge (l, k) in the graph as we discussed in the first section. Then the




name the corresponding elements in∇F and∇S similarly. We have∇F = ∇R+∇S
as F = R+ S.
Definition 7 (Scaled Lipschitz Condition (SLC)). A function G : D 7→ Rn, D ⊆ Rn
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is said to satisfy Scaled Lipschitz Condition (SLC) if there exists a scalar λ > 0 such
that ∀ h ∈ Rn,∀ x ∈ D, such that ‖X−1h‖ ≤ 1, we have:
‖X[G(x+ h)−G(x)−∇G(x)h]‖∞ ≤ λ|hT∇G(x)h|, (4.8)
where X is a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries equal to elements of the vector x
in the same order, i.e., Xii = xi for all i ∈M.
Satisfying SLC and monotonicity are essential for marginal profit function in The-
orem 27. In Lemma 26 we discuss the assumptions for cost and revenue function under
which these conditions hold for our marginal profit function. We use Lemmas 20 to 26
to show F satisfies SLC. More specifically, we demonstrate in Lemma 20, if we can
derive an upperbound for LHS of SLC for R and S, then we can derive an upperbound
for LHS of SLC for F = R + S too. Then in Lemma 21 and Lemma 22 we show
LHS of S and R in SLC definition can be upperbounded. Afterwards, we show mono-
tonicity of S in Lemma 25. In Lemma 26 we aim to prove F satifies SLC under some
assumptions for cost and revenue functions. We use the fact that LHS of SLC for F can
be upperbounded using Lemma 22 and Lemma 21 combined with Lemma 20. Then
we use the fact that RHS of SLC can be upperbounded using strong monotonicity of R
and Lemma 25. Using these two facts, we conclude F satisfies SLC in Lemma 26.
Lemma 20. Let F,R, S be three Rn → Rn functions such that F (q) = R(q) +
S(q), ∀q ∈ Rn. Let R and S satisfy the following inequalities for some C > 0 and
∀ h such that ‖X−1h‖ ≤ 1:
‖X[R(q + h)−R(q)−∇R(q)h]‖∞ ≤ C‖h‖2,
‖X[S(q + h)− S(q)−∇S(q)h]‖∞ ≤ C‖h‖2,
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where X is the diagonal matrix with Xii = qi. Then we have:
‖X[F (q + h)− F (q)−∇F (q)h]‖∞ ≤ 2C‖h‖2.
Proof. Definition of function F implies
‖X[F (q + h)− F (q)−∇F (q)h]‖∞ =‖X[R(q + h)−R(q)−∇R(q)h]
+X[S(q + h)− S(q)−∇S(q)h]‖∞
applying triangle inequality gives
‖X[F (q + h)− F (q)−∇F (q)h]‖∞ ≤‖X[R(q + h)−R(q)−∇R(q)h]‖∞
+ ‖X[S(q + h)− S(q)−∇S(q)h]‖∞
Combining with assumptions of the lemma, we have the required inequality.
The following lemmas give upper bounds for LHS of the SLC for S and R respec-
tively.
Lemma 21. AssumeX is the diagonal matrix withXii = qi. ∀ h such that ‖X−1h‖ ≤
1, there exists a constant C > 0 satisfying: ‖X[S(q + h) − S(q) − ∇S(q)h]‖∞ ≤
C‖h‖2.
Proof. Let mij = ∂ci∂qij . The element of vector X(S(q + h) − S(q) − h∇S) corre-
sponding to edge (i, j) is given by:
qij(mij(q + h) +mij(q)− h∇ci(q))
Let 2L3 be an upper bound of Lipschitz constants for derivates of ci’s. Then, from
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Theorem 23 and upper bound Q on production quantities, we have:
|qij(mij(q + h) +mij(q)− h∇ci(q))| ≤ QL3‖h‖2
Lemma 22. AssumeX is the diagonal matrix withXii = qi. ∀ h such that ‖X−1h‖ ≤
1, ∃C > 0 such that‖X[R(q + h)−R(q)−∇R(q)h]‖∞ ≤ C‖h‖2.
Proof. Before we proceed, we state the following theorem from analysis and Lemma
24.
Theorem 23. [20] Let f : Rn 7→ R be a continuously differentiable function with
Lipschitz gradient, i.e., for some scaler c > 0,
‖∇f(x)−∇f(y)‖ ≤ c‖x− y‖ ∀ x, y ∈ Rn.
Then, we have ∀ x, y ∈ Rn,
f(y) ≤ f(x) +∇f(x)T (x− y) + c
2
‖y − x‖2 (4.9)






Proof. Let Y =
∑








Since, s2 + t2 ≥ 2st ∀ s, t ∈ R, we have





j ) + ‖x‖2 = n‖x‖2
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Now we are ready to prove Lemma 22. First note thatR(q+h)−R(q)−∇R(q)h is
an E× 1 vector. Let Hi =
∑
j∈NM(i) hij . The element corresponding to edge (i, j) ∈
E in vectorR(q+h) isPi(Di+Hi)+P ′i (Di+Hi)(qij+hij). Similarly, the element cor-















i (Di). Therefore, the element corresponding to edge (i, j) ∈ E in vector
R(q + h)−R(q)−∇R(q)h is:






i (Di) + P
′′
i (Di)qij) + hijP
′
i (Di).
Besides, X is the diagonal matrix of size E × E with diagonal entries equal to
elements of q in the same order. Therefore, X[R(q + h) − R(q) − ∇R(q)h] is an
E × 1 vector where the element corresponding to edge (i, j) ∈ E is qij multiplied by
the element corresponding to edge (i, j) in vector R(q + h)−R(q)−∇R(q)h:
− qij
(
Pi(Di +Hi) + P
′






i (Di) + P
′′




[Pi(Di +Hi)− Pi(Di)−HiP ′i (Di)]




|Pi(Di +Hi)− Pi(Di)−HiP ′i (Di)|




Let P ′ and P ′′ be Lipschitz continuous functions with Lipschitz constants 2L1 and
2L2 respectively. To bound the last expression, we use Theorem 23 and Lemma 24
|Pi(Di +Hi)− Pi(Di)−HiP ′i (Di)| ≤ L1H2i ≤ L1E‖h‖2
|P ′i (Di +Hi)− P ′i (Di)−HiP ′′i (Di)| ≤ L2H2i ≤ L2E‖h‖2
|hijHiP ′′i (Di)| ≤ E‖h‖2P ′′i (Di)
Then, from finiteness of derivatives, we have:
|hijHiP ′′i (Di)| ≤ EM2‖h‖2
Thus, the LHS is bound from above by:
qijE‖h‖2(L1 + L2(qij + hij) +M2)
Let Q be an upper bound on maximum profitable quantity for any producer in any
market. Then the LHS is bound above by C‖h‖2, where:
C = QE(L1 + 2QL2 +M2) (4.10)
If R is assumed to be strongly monotone, we immediately have a lower bound on
RHS of the SLC for R. The following lemma gives a lower bound on RHS of the SLC
for S.
Lemma 25. If cost functions are (strongly) convex S is (strongly) monotone4,5,6,7.
4A matrix M ∈ Rn×n is strongly positive definite iff ∀ x ∈ Rn and some α > 0 xTMx ≥ α‖x‖2.
5A differentiable function f : D 7→ Rn is monotone iff its Jacobian ∇f is positive semidefinite over
its domain D.
6A differentiable function f : D 7→ Rn is strongly monotone iff its Jacobian ∇f is strongly positive
definite over its domain, D.
7A twice differentiable function f : D 7→ R is strongly convex iff its Hessian∇2f is strongly positive
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The following lemma combines the results of Lemma 21 and Lemma 22 using
Lemma 20 to derive an upper bound for LHS of the SLC for F . We bound RHS of the
SLC from below by using strong montonicity of R and Lemma 25.
Lemma 26. F satisfies SLC and is monotone if:
1. Cost functions are convex.
2. Marginal revenue function is monotone.
3. Cost functions are strongly convex or marginal revenue function is strongly
monotone.
Proof. From lemmas 22, 21 and 20, RHS of SLC for F is O(E‖h‖2). If cost func-
tions are strongly convex or marginal revenue function is strongly monotone, then from
Lemma 25 and definition of strong monotonicity, the LHS of SLC for F is Ω(‖h‖2).
Thus, F satisfies SLC. We note that F is a sum of two monotone functions and hence
is monotone.
We wrap up with the following theorem, which summarizes the main result of this
section. Lemma 26 guarantees that our problem satisfies the two conditions mentioned
in Zhao and Han 1999. Therefore, we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 27. Algorithm 3 converges to an equilibrium of Network Cournot Competi-




under the following assumptions:
1. The cost functions are strongly convex.
2. The marginal revenue function is strongly monotone.
3. The first derivative of cost functions and price functions and the second
derivative of price functions are Lipschitz continuous.
definite over its domain, D.
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This algorithm outputs an approximate solution (F (q∗), q∗) satisfying (q∗)TF (q∗)/n ≤
ε where µ0 = (q0)TF (q0)/n, and (F (q0), q0) is the initial feasible point 8.
Algorithm 3 Compute quantities at equilibrium for the Cournot game.
1: procedure NETWORK-COURNOT(Pi, cj , ε) . The price function Pi for
each market i ∈ M, the cost function cj for each firm j ∈ F , and ε as the desired
tolerance
2: Calculate vector F of length E as defined in (4.4).
3: Find the initial feasible9solution (F (x0), x0) for the complementarity problem.
This solution should satisfy x0 ≥ 0 and F (x0) ≥ 0.
4: Run Algorithm 3.1 from [142] to find the solution (F (x∗), x∗) to the CP char-
acterized by F .
5: return x∗ . The vector q of quantities produced by firms at equilibrium
6: end procedure
4.4.4 Price Functions for Monotone Marginal Revenue Function
This section will be incomplete without a discussion of price functions that satisfy the
convergence conditions for Algorithm 3. We will prove that a wide variety of price
functions preserve monotonicity of the marginal revenue function. To this end, we
prove the following lemma.
Lemma 28. ∇R(q) is a positive semidefinite matrix ∀ q ≥ 0, i.e., R is monotone,
provided that for all markets |P ′i (Di)| ≥
|P ′′i (Di)|Di
2 .
Proof. Let e1 be the index of the edge (i, j) and e2 be the index of edge (l, k). The





= −2P ′i (Di)− P ′′i (Di)qij if e1 = e2
∂rij
∂qik
= −P ′i (Di)− P ′′i (Di)qij if i = l, j 6= k
∂rij
∂qlk
= 0 if i 6= l, j 6= k.
8Initial feasible solution can be trivially found. E.g., it can be the same production quantity along each
edge, large enough to ensure losses for all firms. Such quantity can easily be found by binary search between
[0, Q].
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We note that since price functions are functions only of the total production in their







. Therefore, we have replaced the partial derivatives by P ′′i (Di).























































































Since Pi’s are decreasing functions, we have , P ′i (Di) ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ M. Thus, over
domain of Pi’s (Di ≥ 0), the above expression is non-negative if |P ′′i (Di)|Di ≤
2|P ′i (Di)| Hence, xT (∇R(Di))x ≥ 0 equivalently ∇R(Di) is positive semidefinite.
While the above condition may seem somewhat restrictive, they allow the problem
to be solved on a wide range of price functions. Intuitively, the condition implies
that linear and quadratic terms dominate higher order terms. We present the following
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corollaries as examples of classes of functions that satisfy the above condition.
Corollary 29. All decreasing concave quadratic price functions satisfy Lemma 28.
Corollary 30. All decreasing concave cubic price functions satisfy Lemma 28.
Corollary 31. Let ai ∈ Rn≥0 for i ∈ {1 . . . k} be arbitrary positive vectors. Let






i x). Then f
(and −f ) satisfies Lemma 28.
4.5 Algorithm for Cournot Oligopoly
In this section we present a new algorithm for computing equilibrium quantities pro-
duced by firms in a Cournot oligopoly, i.e., when the firms compete over a single mar-
ket. Cournot Oligopoly is a standard model in Economics and computation of Cournot
Equilibrium is an important problem in its own right. A considerable body of litera-
ture has been dedicated to this problem [21, 78, 91, 103, 127]. All of the earlier works
that compute Cournot equilibrium for a general class of price and cost functions rely on
solving a Linear Complementarity Problem or a Variational Inequality which in turn are
set up as convex optimization problems of size O(n) where n is the number of firms in
oligopoly. Thus, the runtime guarantee of the earlier works is O(n3) at best. We give a
novel combinatorial algorithm for this important problem when the quantities produced
are integral. Our algorithm runs in time n log2(Qmax) where Qmax is an upper bound
on total quantity produced at equilibrium. We note that, for two reasons, the restriction
to integral quantities is practically no restriction at all. Firstly, in real-world all com-
modities and products are traded in integral units. Secondly, this algorithm can easily
be adapted to compute approximate Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the continuous case
and since the quantities at equilibrium may not be rational numbers, this is the best we
can hope for.
As we have only a single market rather than a set of markets, we make a few
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changes to the notation. Let [n] = {1, . . . , n} be the set of firms competing over
the single market. Let q = (q1, q2, . . . , qn) be the set of all quantities produced by
the firms. Note that in this case, each firm is associated with only one quantity. Let
Q =
∑
i∈[n] qi be the sum of the total quantity of good produced in the market. In
this case, there is only a single inverse demand function P : Z 7→ R≥0, which maps
total supply, Q, to market price. We assume that price decreases as the total quantity
produced by the firms increases, i.e., P is a decreasing function of Q. For each firm
i ∈ [n], the function ci : Z 7→ R≥0 denotes the cost to this firm when it produces
quantity qi of the good in the market. The profit of firm i ∈ [n] as a function of qi andQ,
denoted πi(qi, Q), is P (Q)qi−ci(qi). Also let fi(qi, Q) = πi(qi+1, Q+1)−πi(qi, Q)
be the marginal profit for firm i ∈ [n] of producing one extra unit of product. Although
the quantities are nonnegative integers, for simplicity we assume the functions ci, P , πi
and fi are zero whenever any of their inputs are negative. Also, we refer to the forward
difference P (Q+ 1)− P (Q) by P ′(Q).
4.5.1 Polynomial time algorithm
We leverage the supermodularity of price functions and Topkis’ Monotonicity Theorem
[128] (Theorem 35) to design a nested binary search algorithm which finds the equi-
librium quantity vector q when the price function is a decreasing function of Q and the
cost functions of the firms are convex. Intuitively the algorithm works as follows. At
each point we guess Q′ to be the total quantity of good produced by all the firms. Then
we check how good this guess is by computing for each firm the set of quantites that it
can produce at equilibrium if we assume the total quantity is the fixed integer Q′. We
prove that the set of possible quantities for each firm at equilibrium, assuming a fixed
total production, is a consecutive set of integers. Let Ii = {qli, qli + 1, . . . , qui − 1, qui }
be the range of all possible quantities for firm i ∈ [n] assuming Q′ is the total quantity











′, we can conclude our guess was too high, and the search should contin-
ues among total quantities belowQ′. If neither case happens, then for each firm i ∈ [n],




i and firm i has no incentive to change
this quantity if the total quantity isQ′. This means that the set q′ = {q′1, . . . , q′n} forms
an equilibrium of the game and the search is over.
Algorithm 4 Compute quantities produced by firms in a Cournot oligopoly.
1: procedure COURNOT-OLIGOPOLY(P, ci) . The market price function P , the
cost functions ci for each firm i ∈ [n]
2: Let Qmin := 1
3: Let Q∗i be the optimal quantity that is produced by a firm when it is the only
firm in the market





5: while Qmin ≤ Qmax do
6: Q′ := bQmin+Qmax2 c
7: for all i ∈ [n] do






i + 1, Q
′ + 1)− πi(qli, Q′) ≤ 0
10: Binary search to find the maximum integer qui ≤ Q′ + 1 satisfying
11: fi(q
u
i − 1, Q′ − 1) = πi(qui , Q′)− πi(qui − 1, Q′ − 1) ≥ 0
12: Let Ii = {qli, . . . , qui } be the set of all integers between qli and qui .
13: end for
14: if Σi∈[n]qli > Q′ then
15: Qmin := Q
′ + 1
16: else if Σi∈[n]qui < Q′ then
17: Qmax := Q
′ − 1
18: else
19: Find a vector of quantities q = (q1, . . . , qn) such that qi ∈ Ii and∑






The pseudocode for the algorithm is provided in Algorithm 4, whose correctness
we prove next. The rest of this section is dedicated to proving Theorem 39. Here, we
present a brief outline of the proof. To help with the proof we define the functions Fi





2−c(qi). We note that
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the first difference of F (qi, Q) is the marginal profit for firm i for producing one more
quantity given that the total production quantity is Q and firm i is producing qi. Let
Gi(qi, Q) = Fi(qi, Q − 1). The first difference of Gi(qi, Q) is the marginal loss for
firm i for producing one less quantity given that the total production quantity is Q and
firm i is producing qi. Maximizers of these functions are closely related to equilibrium
quantities a firm can produce given that the total quantity in market is Q. We make this
connection precise and prove the validity of binary search in Lines 8-12 of Algorithm 4
in Lemma 32. In Lemma 33, we prove that Fi and Gi are supermodular functions of
qi and −Q. In lemmas 34 and 36, we use Topkis’ Monotonicity Theorem to prove the
monotonicity of maximizers of Fi and Gi. This, along with lemmas 37 and 38 leads
to the conclusion that the outer loop for finding total quatity at equilibrium is valid as
well and hence the algorithm is correct.
4.5.2 Proof of correctness
Throughout this section we assume that the price function is decreasing and concave
and the cost functions are convex.
Lemma 32. Let q∗i (Q) = {qli . . . qui } , where qli = min argmaxqi∈{0...Qmax}Fi(qi, Q)
and qui = max argmaxqi∈{0...Qmax}Gi(qi, Q). Then q
∗
i (Q) is the set of consecutive
integers Ii given by binary search in lines 8-12 of Algorithm 4. This is the set of
quantities firm i can produce at equilibrium given that the total quantity produced is
Q.
Proof. Again let P ′(Q) = P (Q + 1) − P (Q) be the forward difference of the price
function, and let c′i(qi) = ci(qi + 1) − ci(qi). From definition of profit function πi
and fi, we have fi(qi, Q) = P (Q + 1) + P ′(Q)qi − c′i(qi). Assume Q is fixed.
Suppose we have qi < q̃i. The marginal profit of firm at production quantity qi is
P (Q+ 1) + P ′(Q)qi − c′i(qi) whereas the marginal profit at production quantity q̃i is
P (Q+1)+P ′(Q)q̃i−c′i(q̃i). Thus, P (Q+1)+P ′(Q)qi > P (Q+1)+P ′(Q)q̃i since
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P ′(Q) is negative (from concavity of P ) and qi < q̃i. As the discrete cost functions
are convex, we have c′i(qi) < c
′
i(q̃i). This implies fi(qi, Q) > fi(q̃i, Q) when qi < q̃i.
Thus, for a fixed Q, fi(qi, Q) is a non-increasing function of qi. Similarly, we can see
that fi(qi, Q) is a non-increasing function of Q. From definitions of Fi and Gi, we
have:
Fi(qi + 1, Q)− Fi(qi, Q) = fi(qi, Q) (4.11)
Gi(qi + 1, Q)−Gi(qi, Q) = Fi(qi + 1, Q− 1)− Fi(qi, Q− 1) = fi(qi, Q− 1)
(4.12)
For a fixed Q, Let ql be the minimum maximizer of Fi(qi, Q). Then fi(ql− 1, Q) > 0.
Let qu be the maximum maximizer of Gi(qi, Q). Because fi is non-increasing, we
have fi(ql − 1, Q− 1) ≥ fi(ql − 1, Q) > 0. Thus, any number smaller than ql cannot
be a maximizer of Gi and we have ql ≤ qu. Let q ∈ {ql . . . qu}. Then, because q ≥ ql
we have fi(q,Q) ≤ 0 and from q ≤ qu, we have fi(q − 1, Q − 1) ≥ 0. Thus, q is an
equilibrium quantity when total production quantity is Q. If q < ql, then fi(q,Q) > 0
and if q > qu then fi(q − 1, Q − 1) > 0. Thus {ql . . . qu} is the set of equilibrium
quantities. In Line 9 of Algorithm 4, we are searching for the minimum maximizer of
Fi and in Line 11 we are searching for maximum maximizer of Gi. Binary search for
these quantities is valid because first differences for both functions (equations 4.11 and
4.12) are decreasing.
Lemma 33. Let F−i (qi,−Q) = Fi(qi, Q) and G
−






Proof. We use the following definition from submodular optimization in the lemma.
Definition 8. Given lattices (X1,≥) and (X2,≥), f : X1×X2 7→ R is supermodular
iff for any x1, y1 ∈ X1;x2, y2 ∈ X2 such that x1 ≥ y1 and x2 ≥ y2, the following
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holds:
f(x1, y2)− f(x1, x2) ≥ f(y1, y2)− f(y1, x2)





2 − ci(qi). Let −Q1 > −Q2.
Let q′i > qi. Then, we have:
Fi(qi, Q1)− Fi(qi, Q2) = (P (Q1 + 1)− P (Q2 + 1))qi +








i, Q1)− Fi(q′i, Q2) = (P (Q1 + 1)− P (Q2 + 1))q′i +






Since P and P ′ are a decreasing functions, we have P (Q1) ≥ P (Q2) and P ′(Q1) ≥
P ′(Q2). From this and the fact that q′i > qi, we have:
Fi(q
′
i, Q1)− Fi(q′i, Q2) ≥ Fi(qi, Q1)− Fi(qi, Q2)
Therefore F−i is a supermodular function. Since Gi(qi, Q) = Fi(qi, Q − 1), may a
similar argument we can conclude that G−i is supermodular.
Lemma 34. Let I = {qli, . . . , qui } = qFi (Q) = argmaxqi∈{1...Qmax}Fi(qi, Q) and
I ′ = {q′li , . . . , q
′u
i } = qFi (Q′) = argmaxqi∈{1...Qmax}Fi(qi, Q′). Let Q > Q′. Then
q
′l
i ≥ qli and q
′u
i ≥ qui .
Proof. We need the following definition and Topkis’ Monotonicity Theorem for prov-
ing the lemma.
Definition 9. Given a lattice (X,≥), we define Strong Set Ordering over A,B ⊆ X .
We say A ≥s B iff ∀a ∈ A,∀b ∈ B,max{a, b} ∈ A ∧min{a, b} ∈ B.
We note that the strong set ordering induces a natural ordering on sets of consecu-
tive integers. Let I1 = {l1, . . . , u1}. Let I2 = {l2, . . . , u2}. Then I1 ≥s I2 iff l1 ≥ l2
and u1 ≥ u2.
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Theorem 35 (Topkis’ Monotonicity Theorem[128]). For any lattices (X,≥) and
(T,≥), let f : X × T 7→ R be a supermodular function and let x∗(t) =
argmaxx∈Xf(x, t). If t ≥ t′, then x∗(t) ≥s x∗(t′), i.e., x∗(t) is non-decreasing
in t.
We note that in the theorem above, strong set ordering is used over x∗ because
argmax returns a set of values from lattice X .
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 34. From Lemma 33, F−i (qi,−Q) is a su-
permodular function. Thus, from Theorem 35, qFi (Q) = argmaxFi(qi, Q) is a
non-decreasing function of −Q, i.e., qFi is a non-increasing function of Q. Thus
Q > Q′ =⇒ I ′ ≥s I . As noted above, strong set ordering on a set of consecu-
tive integers implies that q
′l
i ≥ qli and q
′u
i ≥ qui .
Lemma 36. Let I = {qli, . . . , qui } = qGi (Q) = argmaxqi∈{1...Qmax}Gi(qi, Q) and
I ′ = {q′li , . . . , q
′u
i } = qGi (Q′) = argmaxqi∈{1...Qmax}Fi(qi, Q′). Let Q > Q′. Then
q
′l
i ≥ qli and q
′u
i ≥ qui .
Proof. From Lemma 33, G−i (qi,−Q) is a supermodular function. Thus, from Theo-
rem 35, qGi (Q) = argmaxFi(qi, Q) is a non-decreasing function of −Q, i.e., qGi is a
non-increasing function of Q. Thus Q > Q′ =⇒ I ′ ≥s I . As noted above, strong set
ordering on a set of consecutive integers implies that q
′l
i ≥ qli and q
′u
i ≥ qui .
Lemma 37. Let Q be total production quantity guessed by Algorithm 4 at a step of
outer binary search. Let I = (I1, . . . , In), where Ii = {qli, . . . , qui }, be the set of best





Q, there does not exist any equilibrium for which the total produced quantity is greater
than or equal to Q.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that such an equilibrium exists for total quantityQ′ >
Q. From Lemma 36, we have qGi (Q) ≥s qGi (Q′) = {q
′l
i . . . q
′u









i ≥ Q′. Thus, we have Q′ < Q
and this is a contradiction.
Lemma 38. Let Q be total production quantity guessed by Algorithm 4 at a step of
outer binary search. Let I = (I1, . . . , In), where Ii = {qli, . . . , qui }, be the set of best





Q, there does not exist any equilibrium for which the total produced quantity is less
than or equal to Q.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that such an equilibrium exists for total quantityQ′ <
Q. From Lemma 34, we have qFi (Q) ≤s qFi (Q′) = {q
′l
i . . . q
′u
i }. Thus, we have
qli ≤ q
′l
i . Since Q





′. Thus, we have Q′ > Q
and this is a contradiction.
Finally, the results of this section culiminate in the following theorem.
Theorem 39. Algorithm 4 successfully computes the vector q = (q1, q2, . . . , qn) of
quantities at one equilibrium of the Cournot oligopoly if the price function is decreas-
ing and concave and the cost function is convex. In addition, the algorithm runs in time
O(n log2(Qmax)) where Qmax is the maximum possible total quantity in the oligopoly
network at any equilibrium.
Proof. Lemma 32 guarantees that the inner binary search successfully finds the best
response range for all firms. Lemmas 37 and 38 ensure that the algorithm always
continues its search for the total quantity at equilibrium in the segment where all the
equilibria are. Thus, when the search is over, it must be at an equilibrium of the game
if one exists. If an equilibrium does not exist, then the algorithm will stop when it
has eliminated all quantities in {1 . . . Qmax} as possible total equilibrium production
quantities. Let Qmax be the maximum total quantity possible at any equilibrium of
the oligopoly network. Our algorithm performs a binary search over all possible quan-
tities in [1, Qmax], and at each step finds a range of quantities for each firm i ∈ [n]
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using another binary search. This means the algorithm runs in time O(n log2(Qmax)).
We can find an upper bound for Qmax, noting that Qmax is at most the sum of the









i (qi) is the optimal quantity to be produced by firm






The research reported in this chapter was motivated by a concrete application: how can
countries trying to rein in the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba1 (LeT for short) come up
with policies against them, especially if these policies need to be coordinated? In the
case of a five-player game we formulated for LeT (presented later), there were wide
variations of opinion amongst experts on what to do about LeT with respect to, for
instance, whether India should carry out covert action, carry out coercive diplomacy,
propose peace talks, or just keep the status quo. Likewise, the US has historically
had multiple opposing viewpoints on whether to continue financial (development and
military aid) to Pakistan, whether to carry out covert action against LeT, or do nothing.
0This is a joint work with J. P. Dickerson, M. T. Hajiaghayi and V. S. Subrahmanian. A version of this
work appeared in ACM-TIST [116].
1Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), translated variously from Urdu into “Army of the Pure” or “Army of the Pious”,
is a prominent south Asian terrorist organization responsible for attacks in India, Kashmir, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan, including the three days of attacks in 2008 in Mumbai, India, that resulted in the deaths of 166
innocent people [122, 124].
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Analyzing the benefits of these actions even in the case of a single actor (e.g., only
India or only the US) has proven challenging. The main contribution of this chapter is
a multi-player, game-theoretic framework in which this specific problem can be solved.
However, we wanted to come up with a general solution, one that is applicable to
many different settings. For instance, there are many applications where the “payoff
matrices”, usually one of the very first things needed in any game-theoretic framework,
cannot be specified with accuracy. When asked about payoffs, multiple experts might
express substantial disagreements. This is what happened with our LeT application.
Here are some applications where multiple payoff matrices have been considered in a
wide variety of settings.
1. Socio-Cultural Behavior Modeling. Woodley et al. 2008 propose a “Cultur-
ally Aware Response” (or CAR) framework in conjunction with the well-known
World Values Survey to assess the results of different types of interactions be-
tween culturally different groups. They use multiple payoff matrices in their
framework which vary based on the historical behaviors of different groups, e.g.,
one payoff matrix may indicate situations where a player responds in kind to
responses of other players, while another payoff matrix may reflect situations
where the player is largely non-violent.
2. Open Source Software Releases. Asundi et al. 2012 analyze the circumstances
that are optimal for companies to release software. They argue that by open-
sourcing a “crimped” version of their product, a company can hurt competitors,
while enabling sales of a more sophisticated pay version of their product. To
build their model, the authors utilize four different payoff matrices, correspond-
ing to different regions of the parameter space that defines their model.
3. International Climate Change Negotiations. Pittel and Rübbelke 2012 develop
a game-theoretic model of climate change negotiations building upon the well-
known chicken game and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The two games are
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combined into a 3×3 game and studied under different payoff scenarios.
4. Telecommunications. Karami and Glisic 2010 define asymmetric matrix games
(AMG) with which they model routing and network coding using conflict-free
scheduling mechanisms. In their framework, multiple payoff matrices are de-
fined, with one payoff matrix corresponding to each of a set of different partial
possible network topologies.
Other applications include international negotiations [79] where the precise payoffs
for the nations involved are viewed through different lenses by different experts. They
can also include applications where there are different views on the payoffs different
corporations get for taking different types of actions (e.g., raise wages for striking
workers vs. shut down a factory vs. take legal action). Even a seemingly simple
action such as “take legal action” can lead to a diversity of views about costs/payoffs
as different views may exist on, e.g., how long the litigation will take (and hence how
much it will cost). This chapter has two parts:
• Approximate Equilibria for Multi-Player Games with Vector Payoffs. Games
with multiple payoffs were introduced by Shapley 1959. Shapley called them
vector valued games and they have been extensively studied under various other
names such as multicriteria games and multi-objective games. Unfortunately,
for real-world applications such as the LeT application motivating this research,
the computational cost of these past methods is too high. In order to address
this, we introduce a novel combination of vector valued games and approximate
equilibria and define new types of approximate equilibria for games with multi-
ple players and multiple payoff matrices. We design algorithms for computing
such equilibria for zero-sum games and games of low rank. For the case of rank 1
games, we give a structural result and use it to design a simple algorithm for such
games. For general games we give an extension of Althöfer’s Approximation
Lemma 1994 for simultaneous games with multiple payoff functions (SGMs)
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Launch major attacks attack













Crackdown on LeT crack
Cut support to LeT cut
Increase support to LeT support
Do nothing none
India
Covert action against LeT covert
Coercive diplomacy against PakG coerce
Propose peace initiative to PakG peace
Do nothing none
U.S.
Covert action against LeT covert
Cut aid to PakG cut
Expand aid to PakG expand
Do nothing none
and use it to design a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (QPTAS)
when the number of players in a game is constant (which is the case for our LeT
game).
• Application of PREVE to Generate Policies to Reduce Terror Acts by LeT. Build-
ing on work by Dickerson et al. 2011, 2013, we then present a real-world appli-
cation in which there are five parties including four governmental entities and the
terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The goal was to understand whether there
were any pure (or mixed) equilibria in which the group’s terrorist acts could be
significantly reduced. The five players considered are: the US, India, the Pak-
istani military, the Pakistani civilian government, and the terrorist group LeT.
Table 5.1 shows the actions the players were allowed to take.
When it comes to the application of game-theoretic reasoning to international
strategic elements [117] with both state and non-state actors, the situation be-
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comes much more complex because identifying the payoffs for different players
is an enormous challenge and experts vary widely on what these payoffs are.
To address this application, we asked three internationally acknowledged world
experts to give us payoff matrices—and we received three payoff matrices with
substantial differences between them. Leveraging the theoretical constructs and
results described above, we built the PREVE (Policy Recommendation Engine
based on Vector Equilibria) software suite, and used it to identify approximate
equilibria in the multiple payoff game induced by the three expert payoff matri-
ces. We present key results produced by PREVE, and analyze their strengths and
weaknesses from a policy perspective.
This chapter begins with Section 5.2 introducing our LeT example briefly. As the
LeT example is quite complex, a small toy example is also introduced. This toy ex-
ample is used throughout the chapter in order to illustrate the various definitions and
algorithms we introduce. Section 5.3, our first formal section, consists of prelimi-
naries which cover basic game-theoretic concepts. Section 5.5 formally defines our
equilibrium concepts and presents bounds on computing them under various assump-
tions. Section 5.6 presents a QPTAS for the general case, when the number of players
is constant. Building on this QPTAS, it gives efficient algorithms for computing such
equilibria and experimentally validates them on simulated data. Section 5.7 gives a
brief description of the computational system we built, called PREVE, and applies it to
a real-world experimental five-player game used to model LeT. Section 5.7 also sum-
marizes results from computing equilibria from three payoff matrices (created by area
experts using open source data) and presents key policy results. Section 5.8 describes
related work on game-theoretic models of terrorist group behavior as well as past policy
recommendations on how the US and India should deal with LeT.
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5.2 Motivating Examples
In this section, we briefly describe the LeT application motivating this research. We
also introduce a toy example that will be used throughout the chapter to illustrate defi-
nitions, as the full LeT example can be too complex for that.
5.2.1 Reducing Terror Attacks by LeT
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is a terrorist group primarily funded by the Pakistani intelli-
gence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence [137]. Created in 1990, the group has
carried out numerous terrorist attacks, the most spectacular of which was the Novem-
ber 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai that targeted several sites including the iconic Taj
Mahal hotel, killing 166 innocent civilians (as well as nine terrorists, while a tenth ter-
rorist was captured). LeT has strong links to various other terrorist groups including
Al-Qaeda, Indian Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Jabhat-al-Nusra in Syria, groups
in Chechnya, Jemaa Islamiyah, as well as organized crime groups such as Dawood
Ibrahim’s D-Company. For instance, Al-Qaeda leader Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was
captured in an LeT safehouse in Pakistan. Given its technical sophistication and the
support of a sophisticated intelligence agency, LeT is viewed as a major threat by both
the US and India—both in terms of operations they might carry out themselves and in
terms of training and logistics support they might provide to other groups that carry out
such attacks.
In order to reduce terror attacks by LeT, we developed a five-player game. The
players considered are the United States (US), India, Pakistan’s government, Pakistan’s
military, and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). We recall that Table 5.1, presented earlier, gives
actions each player can take, and that—in addition to the actions below—each player
can take the action none, which corresponds to doing nothing. We describe the other
actions in depth here.
US Actions. The US can take three actions (and none).
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1. The first is covert action against LeT. While we do not suggest specific oper-
ations, this action could be implemented in many ways including covert actions
to undermine LeT’s leaders or covert actions to target LeT training camps. It is
clear that the US is capable of such covert action as evidenced by recent events
involving a CIA contractor called Raymond Davis who was arrested by the Pak-
istanis after a shootout in Lahore.
2. The US could also cut military and/or development support currently being
given to Pakistan. According to the Congressional Research Service, the US
provided $1.727 billion in economic aid to Pakistan in FY2010.2 In 2012, the
US asked Congress for permission to ship almost $3 billion to Pakistan with
over half being military aid.3 Cutting some of this aid is an option the US has
long considered, especially in view of US Admiral Mike Mullen’s assertions in
2011 about Pakistan’s ISI controlling the Haqqani terrorist network which in turn
attacked the US embassy in Kabul.4
3. The US could also expand financial support for Pakistan. Pakistan’s educa-
tional system and economy are both in shambles and some have argued that
additional development assistance would wean young people away from radical
elements.
India’s Actions. As with the US, we study three actions (and none) that India might
take. Similarly, there are many ways in which India could tactically implement these
actions.
1. Like the US, India can also take different forms of covert action against LeT
using methods similar to those listed above for the US.
2See “Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary,” by K. Alan Kronstadt of the Congressional Research





2. India can also use coercive diplomacy in which diplomatic moves are
used to coerce Pakistan. For instance, a credible threat can be used to warn Pak-
istan of the consequences of carrying out certain actions. For coercive diplomacy
to be effective, the threat must be made publicly and must be credible [117].
Credible threats could include withholding water by diverting the headwaters of
the Indus or by troop movements or simply by ramping up military spending
which would place pressure on other parts of the Pakistani economy.
3. A third option we consider is one where India proposes some kind of peace
initiative to Pakistan, e.g., granting some additional rights for back and forth
movement between India and Pakistan, unifying families in Kashmir who were
split up by the partition of Kashmir, and so forth.
Pakistan Military Actions. We study three possible actions for the Pakistani military,
all related to their support for LeT.
1. The Pakistani military could implement a crackdown on LeT by arresting LeT
members and/or closing down LeT’s training camps, shutting down the logistical
support for LeT operations in Jammu and Kashmir, and taking steps to interdict
LeT-allied organizations like Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Pakistani security has, at times,
cracked down on LeT, e.g., after the December 2001 parliament attack and the
November 2008 attacks in Mumbai.
2. The Pakistani military could cut support to LeT by, e.g., arresting military of-
ficers who are illicitly supporting LeT and stopping military training of LeT
personnel.
3. The Pakistani military could also expand support for LeT, e.g., by increasing
its logistical and materiel support as well as financial support.
Pakistan Government Actions. We consider just two possible actions (in addition to
none) by the civilian side of the Pakistani government (excluding the military side).
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1. The Pakistani government could prosecute and arrest LeT personnel, as they
have done periodically (though the leaders are usually released shortly there-
after).
2. The Pakistani government could choose to endorse LeT’s social services pro-
gram by routing government services through them. LeT runs many social ser-
vices in Pakistan ranging from ambulances to hospitals, schools, and disaster
relief programs.
Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Actions. In the case of LeT, we considered three actions (in addi-
tion to the none action).
1. LeT could launch a major attack. We already know from the November 2008
Mumbai siege that they have the capability and logistical support to execute such
attacks.
2. LeT could hold attacks (but not major ones), similar to those periodically car-
ried out by them in Kashmir where military and civilian personnel are frequently
targeted.
3. LeT could do something dramatic like eliminate its armed wing, give up its
weapons, and publicly renounce violence. Though extremely unlikely, this is
still worth listing as a possible action.
5.2.2 A Toy Example
We now introduce a small example that will be used to illustrate formal concepts and
definitions as they are introduced later in the chapter. Consider a very simple game con-
sisting of two players, a terrorist group T and a government G. Suppose the terrorist
group can carry out two actions (terror-attack and peace) and the government
can carry out two actions (CT-ops and peace). Here, CT-actions denotes some
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traditional counter-terror operations such as killing and arresting group members. Ex-
perts are divided on the values of these actions to each player and thus provide two
payoff matrices, PM 1 and PM 2.
CT-ops peace
terror-attack (−5,−5) (3,−10)
peace (−8, 6) (0, 0)
CT-ops peace
terror-attack (−5, 6) (3, 3)
peace (−5,−5) (−5, 2)
PM 1 PM 2
Much of our analysis is for games with payoffs in [0, 1]. Note that a scaled and
translated version of the above matrices that does not alter equilibria of the game can
be constructed. The modified payoff matrices (rounded to hundredths) are given below.
CT-ops peace
terror-attack (0.31, 0.31) (0.81, 0)
peace (0.12, 1) (0.62, 0.62)
CT-ops peace
terror-attack (0, 1) (0.73, 0.73)
peace (0, 0) (0, 0.64)
Scaled PM 1 Scaled PM 2
In each of these tables, the rows show terror group T ’s actions and the columns
show the government G’s actions. For example, the entry (3,−10) in PM 1 says that
the payoff to the terror group is 3 and the payoff to the government is −10 when the
terror group performs terror-attack and the government proposes peace.
We will use this simple motivating example to illustrate various concepts in this
chapter.
5.3 Technical Preliminaries: Approximate Equilibria
In this section, we first review common game-theoretic models and equilibrium con-
cepts (§5.3.1), then build on them to define approximate equilibria in games with mul-
tiple payoff functions (§5.4).
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5.3.1 Approximate Equilibria in Games with a Single Payoff Func-
tion
We consider simultaneous multiplayer games. Let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of
players and [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m} be the set of actions for each player. Let ∆m be the
simplex {(x1, x2, . . . , xm)|
∑
i∈[m] xi = 1, xi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [m]}.
For any player j, any σj ∈ ∆m is a probability distribution over the set of actions
[m]; thus, σj is called a strategy for player j. If σj = (x1, x2, . . . , xm), then xi is
the probability that player j will perform action i. When all but one of the xi’s in σj
are 0, σj is called a pure strategy; otherwise, it is called a mixed strategy. In mixed
strategies, a player probabilistically chooses which action to take. Note that we will
calculate these mixed strategies from the multiple payoff matrices provided by experts.
They are not inputs to our algorithms (and so experts do not have to provide them);
they are outputs generated by our system.
We use ∆ to denote the set Πnj=1∆m. Any σ ∈ ∆ is called a strategy profile for a
game a. If σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ ∆, then σj denotes the strategy of the player j. For
convenience, we can represent a strategy profile σ as (σj , σ−j), where σj represents
the strategy of player j and σ−j represents strategies for the rest of the players.
Example 6. Consider the toy example given in Section 5.2.2. An example pure strategy
for the government G is to play action CT-ops. Similarly, a pure strategy for the
terror group T is to play action terror-attack. An example of a mixed strategy
for G is to play action CT-ops and action peace with probabilities of 13 and
2
3 ,
respectively. Similarly, T could play action terror-attack and action peacewith
probabilities 12 and
1
2 , respectively. The above mixed stategies for G and T together
form a stategy profile for the game.
The payoff for a player j is a function uj : ∆ 7→ [0, 1]. In this section, we assume
(without loss of generality) that all payoffs are in the unit interval [0, 1]. We now define
a basic building block of game theory, the Nash equilibrium.
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Definition 10. A strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium iff:
uj(σ
j′, σ−j) ≤ uj(σ) ∀σj′ ∈ ∆m, j ∈ [n]
Thus, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to deviate
from his strategy, assuming all other players play their respective strategies. Classical
game theory assumes that players are rational. Hence, players can reason about one
another and identify the Nash equilibria that are possible and then typically play actions
consistent with one such Nash equilibrium. As Schelling 1980 observes, a good amount
of work may also be invested by players in “prepping” the game so that certain strategy
profiles are excluded from being equilibria.
Example 7. Consider the mixed strategy given in Example 6. G plays action CT-ops
and action peace with probabilities 13 and
2
3 , respectively. Similarly, T plays action
terror-attack and action peace with probabilities 12 and
1
2 , respectively. In
this case, as per the payoff matrix PM 1 (defined in Section 5.2.2), the payoff for G is
















6 . We note that the payoff for
a given strategy profile is the expected payoff given players draw actions independenty
at random according to their respective strategies. A Nash equilibrium for the same
game is forG to play CT-ops with probability 1 and for T to play terror-attack
with probability 1, resulting in a payoff of −5 for both players.
Since Nash equilibria are notoriously difficult to compute [27, 34], recent work has
focused on finding approximate Nash equilibria. We use a well-known notion of an
approximate Nash equilibria.
Definition 11. A strategy profile σ is an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium for some
0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 iff:
uj(σ
j′, σ−j) ≤ uj(σ) + ε,∀σj′ ∈ ∆m, j ∈ [n]. (5.1)
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A stricter notion of an approximate Nash equilibrium is the well-supported approx-
imate Nash equilibrium. Let S(σ), the support of a strategy σ ∈ ∆m, be the set
S(σ) = {i | σi > 0}. Intuitively, the support of σ is the set of actions that are exe-
cuted with nonzero probability. Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou 2006 define
a well-supported approximate Nash equilibrium as follows.
Definition 12. Suppose 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 is a real number. A strategy profile σ is a well-
supported ε-approximate Nash equilibrium iff:
uj(ei, σ
−j) ≤ uj(el, σ−j) + ε ∀σj′ ∈ ∆m, i ∈ [m],
l ∈ S(σj), j ∈ [n]
In other words, for a strategy to be a well-supported ε-approximate Nash equilib-
rium, every player’s incentive to deviate from his equilibrium strategy is very small
(less than a utility of ε).
Definition 11 and Definition 12 both define approximate Nash equilibria that are
additive in nature (due to the +ε term in the right side of the definition). A multiplica-
tive (relative) approximation can be defined as follows, due to [34].
Definition 13. A strategy profile σ is a well-supported relative ε-approximate Nash
equilibrium for 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 iff ∀j ∈ [n], i ∈ [m]:
(1− ε)uj(ei, σ−j) ≤ uj(el, σ−j),∀l ∈ S(σj) (5.2)
The following example illustrates these different notions of approximate equilibria.
Example 8. Consider the strategy profile from Example 6. G plays action CT-ops
and action peace with probabilities 13 and
2
3 , respectively. Similarly, T plays action
terror-attack and action peace with probabilities 12 and
1
2 , respectively. For T ,
this is an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with ε = 1.5 since the expected payoff for T
131
is −1.17 and deviation to action terror-attack leads to a payoff of 0.33. This is
a well-supported ε-approximate Nash equilibrium for T with ε = 3 because the payoff
for action peace, which is in the support of T ’s strategy, is −2.67 and deviation to
terror-attack leads to a payoff of 0.33—a gain of 3.00.
5.4 Approximate Equilibria in Games with Multiple
Payoff Functions
In this section, we merge together the ideas of (well-supported) approximate Nash
equilibria and Shapley’s vector payoffs in an effort to combine multiple conflicting
experts’ knowledge of payoffs.
Definition 14. A simultaneous game with multiple payoff functions (SGM) is a triple
G = (n,m,U) where [n] is a set of players, [m] is the set of actions for each player
in [n], and U = (U1, U2, . . . , Uf ) consists of f ordered sets of payoff functions Uk =
(uk1 , u
k
2 , . . . , u
k
n),∀k ∈ [f ].
Intuitively, an SGM G can be viewed as f different games specified over a set
of players, over the same strategy space, with payoff functions for players given by
Uk, k ∈ [f ]. We refer to these f individual simultaneous games as constituent games
of G. Throughout this chapter, we use the variable f to denote the number of payoff
matrices considered—which is also equal to the number of constituent games in a SGM
or a ZSGM (a zero-sum version of an SGM defined later in Section 5.5.1).
For instance, in our toy example, the game G consists of two different constituent
games, one corresponding to each of the two payoff matrices.
We now merge the idea of an approximate Nash equilibrium (Definition 11) with
that of Shapley’s vector payoffs.
Definition 15. A strategy profile σ is a multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium of an
SGM (n,m,U), iff it is an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium for each of its constituent
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games. Specifically, for all k ∈ [f ]:
ukj (σ
j′, σ−j) ≤ ukj (σ) + ε, ∀σj′ ∈ ∆m, j ∈ [n] (5.3)
Building on Definition 15, we also combine well-supported approximate Nash
equilibria (Definition 12) with vector payoffs.
Definition 16. A strategy profile σ is a well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash
equilibrium of an SGM (n,m,U), iff it is a well-supported ε-approximate Nash equi-
librium for each of its constituent games. That is, for all k ∈ [f ]:
ukj (ei, σ
−j) ≤ ukj (el, σ−j) + ε ∀σj′ ∈ ∆m, i ∈ [m],
l ∈ S(σj), j ∈ [n]
Finally, we can define the multiplicative version of Definition 16 as well.
Definition 17. A strategy profile σ is a well-supported multiple relative ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium of an SGM (n,m,U) iff it is a well-supported relative ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium for each of its constituent games. Thus, for all k ∈ [f ], j ∈ [n], i ∈
[m]:
(1− ε)ukj (ei, σ−j) ≤ ukj (el, σ−j), ∀l ∈ S(σj) (5.4)
We now provide an example of a well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equi-
librium in the context of our toy game.
Example 9. For the game defined in Section 5.2.2, consider the strategy profile where
T plays action terror-attack with probability 1 and G plays action CT-ops
with probability 1. For both the payoff matrices, PM 1 and PM 2, this is a Nash equi-
librium. Therefore, the given staregy profile is a well-supported multiple ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium with ε = 0. Consider another strategy profile, where G plays action
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CT-ops and action peacewith probabilities 13 and
2
3 , respectively. Similarly, T plays
action terror-attack and action peace with probabilities 12 and
1
2 , respectively.
This is a well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with ε = 5.5. This is
because in one of the payoff matrices, PM 1, the payoff G receives from action peace
in support is −5 and deviating to action CT-ops leads to a payoff of 0.5 leading to a
gain of ε = 5.5.
A well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium is “close” in payoff for
each player to a (Nash or approximate Nash) equilibrium in the constituent game corre-
sponding to each payoff matrix in the SGM. A well-supported multiple ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium closely approximates equilibrium situations irrespective of which of
the several experts’ payoff matrices is used—it is a robust.
For notational convenience, in the experimental section of this chapter, we will refer
to well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibria computed using only U ′ ⊆
U payoff functions as (ε, k)-equilibria, where |U ′| = k. Such equilibria computed
with the full set U are simply written as ε-equilibria.
5.5 Approximate Equilibria in Simultaneous Games
with Multiple Payoff Functions
We begin by analyzing two fairly constrained cases, zero-sum games (§5.5.1) and
rank 1 games (§5.5.2). We then relax these assumptions, providing results for low-
rank games (§5.5.3), which will later lead into results on general games where the
number of players is constant (§5.6.2).
5.5.1 Zero-sum Games with Multiple Payoffs
We begin by extending the well-known linear program (LP) for computation of an
exact Nash equilibrium in zero-sum games to the computation of an approximate Nash
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equilibrium, and subsequently use it to design an algorithm to compute multiple payoff
equilibria in such games. We will focus on the zero-sum equivalent of a simultaneous
game with multiple payoff functions, as defined by Definition 18.
Definition 18. A zero-sum simultaneous game with multiple payoff functions (for
two players) (ZSGM) is an SGM (2,m,U), with ordered set of payoff functions
U = (u1, u2, . . . , uf ) such that uk (−uk) is the payoff function for player 1 (player 2)
∀k ∈ [f ]. For convenience, we denote such games G = (m,U).
Note that ZSGMs are limited to just two players.
Let (m,U), where U = (u1, u2, .., uf ), be a ZSGM. Let P = (r1, r2, . . . , rf ),





σ1i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [m]∑
i∈[m]
σ2i = 1
σ2i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [m]∑
i∈[m]
σ1i u




k(ei, ej) ≤ rk + ε, ∀j ∈ [m], k ∈ [f ] (5.6)
Here, the first four equations are required because σ1 and σ2 are distributions over
actions of players 1 and 2 respectively. Equations (5.5) and (5.6) are required because
we want players to play strategies that are approximate best responses to each of the
constituent games of the ZSGM.
For f = 1, this LP applies to a zero-sum game with scalar payoff function u = u1.
For this special case, we call this LP, LP1(u, r, ε). Lemma 40 and Lemma 41 show
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that for the single payoff function case, the linear program LP1 computes approximate
Nash equilibria for zero-sum games. Thus, our framework neatly extends approximate
Nash equilibria to the case when there are vector-valued payoffs. The next result states
that any solution to the linear program given above yields a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 40. Any feasible solution to LP1(u, r, ε) is a 2ε-approximate Nash Equilib-
rium for a zero-sum game with u as payoff function for player 1.
The following result says that every ε-approximate Nash equilibrium is a solution
of the linear program LP given above.
Lemma 41. Any ε-approximate Nash equilibrium strategy profile (σ1, σ2) for zero-
sum game with payoff function u for player 1 such that payoff for player 1 is in [r −
ε, r + ε], ε ≥ 0 is a feasible solution to LP1(u, r, 2ε).
Lemma 42 and Lemma 43 below extend the above results (which apply when f =
1, i.e., when there is only one payoff function) to the case of zero-sum games with
multiple payoff functions. The first result, analogous to Lemma 40, states that solutions
of the above LP are multiple payoff ε-approximate equilibria.
Lemma 42. Any feasible solution to LPf (U,P, ε2 ) is a multiple payoff ε-approximate
equilibrium for the ZSGM (m,U).
The next result, analogous to Lemma 41 states that for every multiple payoff ε-
approximate equilibrium, there is a corresponding solution of the above LP.
Lemma 43. Let σ = (σ1, σ2) be a strategy profile that is a multiple payoff ε-
approximate equilibrium for the ZSGM (m,U). Let P = (r1, r2, . . . , rf ) be the
vector of payoffs for player 1 for each of the constituent games of the ZSGM. Let
P ′ = (r′1, r
′
2, . . . , r
′
f ) be a vector such that |ri − r′i| ≤ ε,∀i ∈ [f ]. Then σ is a
feasible solution to LPf (U,P, 2ε).
Thus,LP f (U,P, ε) precisely captures the entire set of multiple payoff ε-approximate
equilibria of our zero sum game.
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Algorithm 5 presents a method to compute the set of all approximate ε-equilibria
in the multiple payoff case. The algorithm uses an input k in order to regulate the
approximation error factor, ε.
Algorithm 5 Approximate Multiple Payoff ε-Equilibrium in Zero-sum Games
Input:k, set of payoff functions U = (u1, u2, . . . , uf )
Output:A set of LPs (see Theorem 44 for details)
S ← { 0k ,
1
k , . . . , 1}
Payoffs ←×fi=1 S . Cardinality: (k + 1)f
LP_Set ← ∅
for P ∈ Payoffs do
LP_Set ← LP_Set ∪ LPf (U,P, 1k )
end for
return LP_Set
The result below shows that Algorithm 5 computes certain types of multiple-payoff
approximate equilibria.
Theorem 44. Algorithm 5 runs in time O((k + 1)f (2mf + 2m + 2)) and outputs a
set of LPs. Let S be the union of feasible regions of all LPs in the set returned by the
algorithm. Then S satisfies the following conditions:
1. All strategy profiles in S are approximate multiple payoff ε-equilibria with ε = 2k .
2. All multiple payoff ε-equilibria with ε = 12k are in S.
5.5.2 Multiplayer Games of Rank 1
We now deal with the problem of finding equilibria in low-rank multiplayer games
with multiple payoffs. Our real-world LeT application is one example of a low rank
multiplayer game.
The definition of rank that we use is equivalent to one given by Kalyanaraman and
Umans 2007. As is evident from recent papers (e.g., [2, 71, 73, 87, 126]), games of
low rank have generated considerable interest.
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In this section, we first define multiplayer games of rank K. We then give a com-
plete characterization of Nash equilibria for these games when K = 1 and use this
characterization to compute well-supported relative ε-approximate Nash equilibria.
Definition 19. A multiplayer game of rank K is a game where the payoff function
for each player is specified by K n-tuples of vectors, each of length m. Let αj,k =
(α1,j,k, α2,j,k, . . . , αn,j,k) be the tuple specifying the payoff function for player j. Let
ρ = (ea1 , ea2 , .., ean) be a strategy profile with only pure strategies for each player,
where ai is the action for player i. Then, the payoff for player j is defined as:






For a strategy profile, σ = (σ1, σ2, .., σn), payoffs are defined as usual. Let A =
[m]× [m]× ..× [m]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
be the set of all possible combinations of actions of all players.


















We note that each payoff matrix is of rank at most K and it is input as a rank-K
decomposition. As can be seen from Equation 5.7, the payoff matrix for player j is a
sum of K terms and the kth term is the tensor product of vectors in tuple αj,k. This
is a complicated definition, so let us consider the case when K = 2. In this case, the
payoff matrix is implicitly specified by two vectors, each of length m (the number of
actions). Consider the strategy profile ρ = (ea1 , ea2 , .., ean). This strategy profile tells
us what actions each of the n players is taking. From Equation 5.9, in a rank K = 2
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The following example uses our toy example to illustrate rank K games.
Example 10. As an example, we give a rank-2 decomposition of payoff matrix
PM1 of player T given in Section 5.2.2. A rank-2 decomposition of the matrix is
α1,1,1 = {−1.76,−2.54}, α2,1,1 = {3.05,−0.55}, α1,1,2 = {−1.30, 0.90}, α2,1,2 =
{−0.28,−1.56}. It can be easily verified (up to rounding error) that for T , PM1 =
α1,1,1(α2,1,1)T + α1,1,2(α2,1,2)T . A similar decomposition of PM1 for G is given
by α1,2,1 = {−3.25, 0.99}, α2,2,1 = {1.92, 2.81}, α1,2,2 = {0.67, 2.18}, α2,2,2 =
{1.88,−1.28}. Therefore, the game specified by PM1 is a rank-2 game.
For the special case of rank 1 games, we drop the superscript k from vectors αi,j,k.
Nash Equilibria for Rank 1 Games
The following result presents a complete characterization of Nash equilibria for multi-
player games of rank 1.









Let the support of player j’s strategy be Sj = {l|αj,jl = max(αj,j)}. σ is a Nash equi-
librium iff:
u′−j(σ) > 0 =⇒ support(σj) ⊆ Sj
In the rest of this section, we assume that all players have a non-zero payoff at
equilibrium, since, for any general multiplayer game, if a player has a zero payoff at
equilibrium, which is the minimum possible payoff for the game, then her maximum
and minimum possible payoffs are both zero for any choice of action and the player is
free to take any action in her equilibrium strategy.
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ε-Approximate Multiple Payoff Equilibria for Rank 1 Games
We now give a characterization of well-supported relative ε-approximate Nash equilib-
ria. Here we solve the multiplicative approximation problem which is harder than the
additive approximation for normal form games [33].
Lemma 46. A strategy profile σ = 〈σ1, σ2, . . . , σn〉 is a well-supported relative ε-
approximate Nash equilibrium (with a non-zero payoff for all players) for a multiplayer
game of rank 1 with payoffs as specified in Section 5.5.2 iff:
αj,ji ≥ (1− ε)(maxα
j,j),∀j ∈ [n], i ∈ S(σj) (5.10)
We now prove the main result for this section and give an algorithm for the compu-
tation of well-supported multple relative ε-approximate Nash equilibria in multiplayer
games of rank 1. The following theorem is the main result for this section.
Theorem 47. Consider an SGM of rank 1 with f different payoff functions for
each player. For t ∈ [f ], let payoff function k for player j be specified by tuple
(α1,j,k, α2,j,k, . . . , αn,j,k). Then, a strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) is a well-
supported multiple relative ε-approximate Nash equilibrium, iff ∀j ∈ [n]:
αj,j,ki ≥ (maxα
j,j,k)(1− ε), i ∈ S(σj), k ∈ [f ] (5.11)
Algorithm 6 leverages this result to compute well-supported multiple relative ε-
approximate Nash equilibria for rank-1 games.
We use a variant of our toy example to explain Algorithm 6.
Example 11. As an example, consider a rank-1 game where Player 1 is T and Player
2 is G. Let a rank-1 PM1 for T be α1,1,1 = {1, 0.5}, α2,1,1 = {0.5, 1}. Let, a
similar PM1 for G be given by α1,2,1 = {1, 0.25}, α2,2,1 = {1, 0.25}. Let PM2
for T be given by α1,1,2 = {0.75, 1}, α2,1,1 = {0.75, 1}. Let PM2 for G be given by
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Algorithm 6 well-supported multple relative ε-approximate Nash equilibria in rank-1
games
Input:ε, payoff vectors αi,j,t
Output:Allowed actions in supports of a feasible strategy profile
for i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] do








return The support sets constructed in the for loop
end if
α1,2,2 = {0.75, 1}, α2,2,2 = {1, 0.75}. Let ε = 0.5. Then for PM1, all mixed strategies
for T are well-supported relative ε-approximate Nash equilibria. For G only action
CT-ops can be in the support. For PM2, all mixed strategies for both the players are
well-supported relative ε-approximate Nash equilibria. Therefore, a strategy profile
where T plays some mixed strategy and G plays action CT-ops is a well-supported
multiple relative ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with ε = 0.5.
5.5.3 Multiple Payoff Games of Low Rank
In this section we consider the general case of multiplayer games of low rank (Defini-
tion 19). We prove that a class of strategies called “uniform strategies” (which we will
define shortly) can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for these games
when the number of actions is small. We then leverage this result to design an algorithm
that computes the set of all multiple payoff equilibria for such games.
In this and the next section, we focus only on uniform strategies. Uniform strategies
provide a tradeoff between simplicity and optimality that may be valuable to the end
user. For example, in the LeT game we study later in the chapter, a policy prescription
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like “India should take covert action against LeT with probability 0.0071” may not be
very useful to the end user. A simpler policy prescription that is almost as good may
be a much better option. We now define a uniform strategy profile.
Definition 20. A strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) is a t-uniform strategy profile




| ` ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}}
Intuitively, a t-uniform strategy discretizes the [0, 1] real-valued interval into t seg-
ments and considers two probabilities within the same segment to effectively be the
same. Thus, as t gets bigger, we get finer granularity. Thus, our selection of t con-
trols the granularity of the probability distribution on actions in a strategy. A smaller t
leads to a coarse-grained, simple strategy whereas a larger t allows a more fine grained
strategy that may be closer to an optimal strategy.
Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games of Low Rank
In this subsection, we constructively prove that a uniform strategy profile can be used
to approximate a Nash equilibrium for multiplayer games of low rank. First, we state
the following lemmas to help with the main result.
Lemma 48. Let α be a vector of length m such that each element of α is in [0, 1]. Let
σ be vector of length m. Let σ′ be a vector such that |σi − σ′i| ≤ ε,∀i ∈ [m]. Then
|αTσ − αTσ′| ≤ mε.
Lemma 49. Let x1, . . . , xn be n reals such that 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ [n]. Let x′1, . . . , x′n








The main technical result of this subsection is that if a strategy profile is a well-
supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium, then there exists a t-uniform strat-
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egy profile that is also a well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with
a slightly higher value of ε. However, the simpler lemma below—dealing with the
single payoff case—provides the basis for the more complex theorem to follow.
Lemma 50. Let the strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2, .., σn) be a well-supported ε-
approximate Nash equilibrium for the given game of rank k. Then there exists a t-
uniform strategy profile σ′ that is a well-supported ε + 2(n−1)mkt -approximate Nash
equilibrium.
We now extend Lemma 50 to the multiple payoff case pertaining to well-supported
multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibria.
Theorem 51. Let the strategy profile σ be a well-supported multiple ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium with ε = τ for the given SGM, all of whose constituent games are
rank k games. Then, there exists a t-uniform strategy profile σ′ that is a well-supported
multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium, with ε = τ + 2(n−1)mkt .
5.6 Computing Multiple Payoff Approximate Equilib-
ria
Building on the theoretical results of the last section, we now provide an efficient algo-
rithm for computing well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibria in games
where the number of players is constant. First, we present a grid search algorithm for
computing equilibria (§5.6.1), and show that is efficient through a quasi-polynomial
time approximation scheme (QPTAS) (§5.6.2). This algorithm is validated on simu-
lated data in Section 5.10, and on real data in the next section (§5.7).
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5.6.1 Algorithm for Computation of Equilibria
We leverage Theorem 51 to present Algorithm 7 which searches over the space of
all uniform strategy profiles and outputs those that are well-supported multiple ε-
approximate Nash equilibria. Input parameters to the algorithm are t and payoff func-
tions for the constituent games. We assume that each payoff function is given as an
oracle, which, given the strategy profiles, returns a vector with payoffs for all play-
ers. The output of the algorithm is the set of all t-uniform strategy profiles which are
well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibria for the given SGM.
The algorithm first chooses a strategy profile and checks if it is an equilibrium
(e.g., by solving the linear programs presented earlier in the chapter). For each payoff
function in the list of f payoff functions, it then iteratively looks at pairs of players,
trying to set payoffs that are sufficiently close to each other in an attempt to find an
equilibrium. It iteratively adds any valid solutions found to the solution and returns
the solution at the end. Via Theorem 51, this coarse grid search is guaranteed to find a
“reasonable” overall equilibrium (with respect to the parameter t).
The following example illustrates Algorithm 7 on our running toy example.
Example 12. We note that a well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium
exists for the game with ε = 0. This is the common equilibrium for both payoff ma-
trices when T plays action terror-attack and G plays action CT-ops. Thus,
to guarantee ε = 0.2, we require t = 40 for this game. For illustrative purposes, to
avoid enumeration of all strategies required for ε = 0.2, we use the algorithm as fol-
lows. We enumerate all t-uniform strategies and report only those strategies that are
well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with ε = 0.2.
We note that strategy profiles given in rows 1 through 4 of the above table are
common Nash equilibria with ε = 0. All the other 3-uniform profiles have ε > 0.2.
Thus strategy profiles in the first 4 rows are all the 3-uniform well-supported multiple
ε-approximate Nash equilibria of the given game.
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T strategy G strategy ε for T ε for G Max ε
terror-attack peace CT-ops peace PM 1 PM 2 PM 1 PM 2
1 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 1.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.67 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.19 0.33 0.00 0.03 0.33
6 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.19 0.33 0.24 0.03 0.33
7 0.67 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.25 0.33 0.73 0.03 0.73
8 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.33 0.73 0.03 0.73
9 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.19 0.48 0.00 0.55 0.55
10 0.33 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.19 0.48 0.24 0.55 0.55
11 0.33 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.25 0.48 0.73 0.55 0.73
12 0.33 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.48 0.73 0.55 0.73
13 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.19 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.38
14 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.19 0.38 0.24 0.00 0.38
15 0.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.25 0.38 0.73 0.00 0.73
16 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.38 0.73 0.00 0.73
Though this algorithm can be expected to yield reasonable running times for games
of any rank, the guarantees shown in Theorem 51 only apply to low rank games. This
algorithm has the added advantage that we do not need to compute the tensor decom-
position of the game matrix. As we will show in Section 5.6.2, uniform strategies are
expected to provide good results on general games too.
5.6.2 A General Approximation Lemma for SGMs
We prove the existence of a QPTAS for SGMs when the number of players is constant.
For this we first state and prove an approximation lemma (an extension to SGMs of
Althöfer’s Approximation Lemma 1994). Our approximation lemma states that if a
well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium exists for an n-player game,
then there is a well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium for the game
using a t-uniform strategy with a slightly larger ε.
We note that the original version of Althöfer’s Approximation Lemma applies only
to two-player bimatrix games and its straightforward application leads to a QPTAS
for computing well-supported ε-approximate Nash equilibria for two-player games.
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However, our extension of the lemma to multiplayer games with multiple payoffs is
not straightforward. In the multiplayer setting, the variables we consider are mutually
overlapping products of independent random variables. Hence, to apply Hoeffding’s
bound 1963, we iteratively discretize strategies of players.
Lemma 52. Consider a game with players in set [n] and each player with actions in
set [m]. Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) be any well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash
equilibrium with ε = τ for the game. Then, for any j ∈ [n], there exists a well-
supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with ε = τ+δ in which the strategy
of player j is t-uniform for t = 2 log(2fmn)δ2 .
We now prove the main result of this section, Theorem 53. This result is stronger
than Theorem 51 for the general case (applied directly to the low rank case) due to its
logarithmic dependendence on m and f .
Theorem 53. Let the strategy profile σ be a well-supported multiple ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium with ε = τ for the given SGM. Then, there exists a t-uniform strategy
profile that is a well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium, with ε = τ+δ
where t = 2n
2 log(2fm(n−1))
δ2 .
Thus, in Algorithm 7, if we set t = 2n
2 log(2fm(n−1))
δ2 , we are sure to find a well-
supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with ε = τ + δ given that at least
one well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with ε = τ exists. The
runtime is then O(mnt). Thus, the same algorithm works for both general and low
rank case, albeit with different performance guarantees.
5.7 Policy Analysis Results
We developed the Policy Recommendation Engine based on Vector Equilibria (PREVE)
using the equilibrium concepts and algorithms described earlier. Using PREVE, we
were able to analyze the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) application described in Section 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Statistics on number of (ε, 2) equilibria found.
k ε #Eq. found #Eq. without LeT attacks
2 0 252 6
2 0.1 357 6
2 0.2 1696 9
2 0.3 13925 42
We first obtained payoff matrices from three experts in the politics of South Asia
and LeT in particular; to avoid bias, none had any background in game theory and none
had ethnic origins in the Indian subcontinent. Two were retired US State Department
employees with over 30 years of knowledge of negotiations in the region. The third was
the author of two well-known books on terrorism. The payoff matrices were created
completely independently using open source information as well as expertise of these
experts by following a set of instructions on what payoff values meant.
As described earlier, for notational convenience, we will refer to well-supported
multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibria computed using only U ′ ⊆ U payoff functions
as (ε, k)-equilibria, where |U ′| = k. Such equilibria computed with the full set U are
simply written as ε-equilibria.
Before presenting the policy implications of the results generated by PREVE, we
present a summary of the (ε, k)-equilibria we found in Table 5.2. We limit the equilibria
presented to those where LeT does not attack. No such (ε, 3)-equilibria were found for
ε ≤ 0.5, so we focus on the case when k = 2. In the case of mixed equilibria, we list
an equilibrium as having no LeT attacks when the probability of LeT attacking (action
attack) or holding its current set of attacks (action hold) is 25% or less.
We found no (0, 3)-equilibria where LeT did not perform violent actions, but we
did find the following:
1. There were 20 (0, 2)-equilibria in which experts #1 and #3 agreed, 218 (0, 2)-
equilibria with experts #2 and #3 agreeing, and 14 (0, 2)-equilibria in which
experts #1 and #2 agreed.
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Table 5.3: All (ε, k) equilibria with ε = 0, k = 2 in which LeT does not attack.
Equil. LeT PakG PakM India US
E10,1,3 eaw pros crack covert cut
E20,1,3 eaw pros crack 0.75: covert cut
0.25: coerce
E30,1,3 eaw none crack coerce cut
E40,1,3 none pros support covert cut
E50,2,3 eaw pros crack coerce cut
E60,2,3 none none crack covert cut
2. Of these 252 (0, 2)-equilibria, there were just six in which LeT did not carry out
attacks. There were no (0, 2)-equilibria involving experts #1 and #2 in which
LeT did not carry out attacks. Table 5.3 below summarizes the actions present
in these six situations. An equilibrium named Eε,j,j′ is used to denote an (ε, 2)
equilibrium in which the two experts who “agree” are j and j′.
In all six (0, 2)-equilibria listed above where LeT stands down, the US cuts aid
(development and military) to Pakistan, and India either carries out covert ac-
tion against LeT or engages in coercive diplomacy. Moreover, in most (0, 2)-
equilibria, the Pakistani military must crack down on LeT (though there is one
case where they may expand support) and additionally, the Pakistani government
must mostly prosecute LeT leaders (though there are two cases where they could
do absolutely nothing). When we look at experts #2 and #3, we see that there
are only two (0, 2)-equilibria in which LeT does not attack—in one India takes
covert action and the US cuts aid. In both scenarios, the Pakistani military cracks
down on LeT—in one the Pakistani government prosecutes LeT personnel and
does nothing in the other.
When we do the same with experts #1 and #3, we see that there are four (0, 2)-
equilibria in which LeT does not attack. In all four, India takes either covert
action or applies coercive diplomacy and the US cuts aid. In three cases, LeT
eliminates its armed wing, while in another it does nothing. In the other two, LeT
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Table 5.4: All (ε, k) equilibria with ε = 0.1, k = 2 which are not (0, 2)-equilibria, and
in which LeT does not attack.
Equil. LeT PakG PakM India US
E70.1,1,3 0.5: attack pros expand covert cut
0.5: none
E80.1,1,3 0.25: attack pros expand covert cut
0.75: none
E90.1,1,3 none pros expand covert cut
has a 50% (resp. 75%) chance of doing nothing and a 50% (resp. 25%) chance
of attacking. In three cases, the Pakistani government prosecutes LeT personnel
and does nothing in the fourth. In three of the cases, the Pakistani military cracks
down on LeT, and in the one remaining case, it actually expands support for LeT.
What these results may suggest is that India should expand covert action against
LeT with the US cutting financial aid to Pakistan at the same time if the goal is
to reduce violence by LeT.
3. We also looked at (0.1, 2)-equilibria (i.e., where ε = 0.1), which means that each
player may lose up to 10% of their best utility while being near an equilibrium
with 2 of the 3 experts in agreement. In this case, we see no (0.1, 2)-equilibria
involving experts #1 and #2 where LeT does not attack. But with experts #1 and
#3, and experts #2 and #3, we do see such equilibria. As all (0, 2)-equilibria con-
tinue to be (0.1, 2)-equilibria, we only show new (0.1, 2)-equilibria in Table 5.4.
With ε = 0.1, we only get three new equilibria as compared to Table 5.3. In
all of these, the US needs to cut aid to Pakistan and India needs to carry out
covert action against LeT. As in the previous table, this requires that the Pakistani
government prosecute LeT. Even with an expansion in Pakistani military support
for LeT, this provides hope that covert action on India’s part and cuts in US aid
to Pakistan will lead to reduced terrorist attacks by LeT.
We now consider (ε, 2)-equilibria, for ε ∈ {0.0, 0.1, 0.2}. Though we computed
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(ε, 2)-equilibria for ε = {0.3, 0.4, 0.5, . . .}, all of these equilibria involve players giv-
ing up 30% or more of their payoffs—something that we think is unlikely.
Of the 252 (0, 2)-equilibria, there were five equilibria in which the US cut aid, India
carried out either covert operations against LeT or coercive diplomacy against Pakistan,
and the Pakistani military cracked down on LeT. In every one of these situations, LeT
either eliminated its armed wing or did nothing, and the Pakistani government either
prosecuted LeT or did nothing. Moreover, there are 24 (0, 2)-equilibria in which the
US cuts aid and India carries out either covert action or coercive diplomacy—and in 5
of these 24 equilibria, LeT either eliminated its armed wing or did nothing. However,
the situation is more complex. In our data, we noticed that one expert’s payoffs were
significantly different from those of the other two. In fact, there were vastly more
equilibria between experts #2 and #3 than between experts #1 and #2 or between #1
and #3, suggesting expert #1 was a bit of an outlier. If we only consider experts #2
and #3, then the proportion of “good” equilibria where LeT stands down with the US
cutting aid to Pakistan and India either engages in covert action or coercive diplomacy
against Pakistan rises to 5 out of only 14. Of course, other inducements not considered
in this study can be used to get the Pakistani military to crack down on LeT.
We continued the same analysis of the 357 (0.1, 2)-equilibria. There were a 23
equilibria where the US cut aid and India acted covertly. Of these, 6 equilibria led
to LeT either disbanding its armed wing or doing nothing—good outcomes for peace.
If we ignored expert #1 (who continued to be an outlier when we considered (0.1, 2)-
equilibria), the number of “good” equilibria remained the same, with fewer (20) overall
equilibria. Again, when the Pakistani military cracked down on LeT, there was a 100%
chance of LeT either eliminating its armed wing or getting rid of terrorism altogether.
When we look at the 1696 (0.2, 2)-equilibria, we see a similar pattern. We had a
total of 51 (0.2, 2)-equilibria, of which LeT cut attacks in 9. There were only 51 of
these (0.2, 2)-equilibria in which the US cut aid and India took either covert action
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or engaged in coercive diplomacy. However, we note that when the Pakistani military
also cracks down on LeT (in addition to the US and Indian actions just described), the
majority (8 out of 9) of the remaining equilibria involve LeT eliminating its attacks.
5.8 Related Work
We group our survey of related work into three sections: first, the purely theoretical
aspects of computational game theory; second, the application of (computational and
traditional) game theory to counter-terrorism and modeling conflict; and third, dealing
with the purely social science study of Lashkar-e-Taiba.
5.8.1 Computational Game Theory
Games where each player has multiple payoffs have been studied before under many
names such as vector-valued games [119], multi-criteria games [89], games with mul-
tiple payoffs [140], and multiple objective games [141]. However, past work mainly
focuses on multiple payoffs as a way to model the situation where each player is trying
to optimize many non-tradable and non-monetizable criteria simultaneously. For such
games, Pareto equilibria [19] and its variants [89] have been the solutions of choice.
However, the situation we consider compares alternate realities subscribed to by each
expert. Hence, we are not interested in Pareto optimality.
As explained earlier, our motivation for this work is to analyze a simultaneous
game when experts disagree on payoffs for players. Different experts (with unknown
accuracy of prior knowledge) provide payoff functions for each player—and we expect
experts to differ on such payoff functions because of subjective judgment in such appli-
cations. Since our work requires computation of approximate Nash equilibria that are
common to all given payoffs, the problem is related to enumeration of Nash equilibria
in the multiplayer setting.
The computation of even a single Nash equilibrium for two-player games is a hard
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problem [27, 34]. Enumeration of all Nash equilibria for a multiplayer game is likely
to be an even harder problem [12]. There are also some hardness results known for
computation of approximate Nash equilibria. It has been proven that it is unlikely that
an FPTAS exists for the problem of finding Nash equilibria in a two-player game [27].
Multiplicative approximation of Nash equilibria is also PPAD-complete for a constant
approximation factor—even for two-player games [33].
Recently, there has been considerable progress in computation of approximate Nash
equilibria for two-player games. The best known approximation factor for a polynomial
time algorithm is 0.3393 [129]. However, most recent work focuses on computation of
a single Nash equilibrium for two-player games.
Theobald 2009 studies enumeration of Nash equilibria for two-player games of
rank 1; however, that algorithm is not known to run in polynomial time. Lipton,
Markakis and Mehta 2003 give the first QPTAS for computation of Nash equilibria
in two-player and multiplayer games. However, the exponent depends on the inverse
square of the approximation factor and on the square of the number of players and
hence the algorithm is not feasible in practice. In fact, it has been proven by Feder,
Nazarzaded and Saberi 2007 that, as far as brute force search over uniform strategy
profiles is concerned, the runtime for these algorithms is tight. However, the above two
results do indicate that, in general, a uniform grid search over the strategy space is a
good heuristic for finding approximate Nash equilibria.
A particularly pertinent paper is that of Kalyanaraman and Umans 2007, which
defines constant rank multiplayer games and gives a PTAS for finding approximate
Nash equilibria for such games. We prove a structural theorem and also give a poly-
nomial time algorithm for computation of Nash equilibria and well-supported multiple
ε-approximate Nash equilibria for the rank 1 case. We also prove that when players
have a small number of strategies to choose from, an assumption which holds for many
real-world games, then a uniform strategy does well in the constant rank case.
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Games we consider cannot be modeled as Bayesian games because Bayesian games
require knowledge about priors. We study the situation where experts differ in their
perception of payoffs and where we have no prior over the accuracy of each expert.
Our definitions of equilibria for multiple payoffs are closer in spirit to definition of
minimax-regret equilibrium given by Hyafil and Boutilier 2004.
5.8.2 Game Theory and the Study of Conflict
Though there has been extensive work on the use of game theory for political analysis,
almost none of it involves large multiplayer games, and almost none of it involves
the use of formal computational methods. The use of game theory to study conflict
was pioneered by Schelling 1980, who developed a social scientist’s view of how two-
player conflicts—including terrorism—could be studied via game theory. Later, Bueno
de Mesquita 2010 recounts how he used two-person games to predict various actions
including one of interest in this project, namely that current US President Obama would
not be able to stop Pakistani-based terrorism. Both these and similar efforts focus
on two-player games; in contrast, the theory of equilibria in multiplayer games with
multiple payoff matrices was not described by either of them. Lastly, this work uses
the LeT game proposed by Dickerson et al. 2011. In contrast to this work, which used
only one payoff matrix corresponding to the views of a single expert, we use a multiple
payoff matrix model in this work for which the relevant game theory and the resulting
implications for dealing with LeT had to be completely reconsidered.
Ozgul et al. 2007 have studied the problem of detecting terror cells in terror net-
works and proposed a variety of algorithms such as the GDM and OGDM methods.
Similarly, Lindelauf et al. 2009 have studied the structure of terrorist networks and how
they need to maintain sufficient connectivity in order to communicate while simultane-
ously maintaining sufficient disconnectivity in order to stay hidden. They model this
tension between communication and covertness via a game-theoretic model. This same
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intuition led to the concept of covertness centrality [106] in social networks where a
statistical (rather than game-theoretic) method is used to predict covert vertices in a
network.
Sandler and Enders 2004 use the ITERATE data set of terrorist events to discuss
how economic methods including both game theory and time series analysis can be
used to propose policies for counter-terrorism. In an earlier survey [48], the same au-
thors specify how game theory might be used to model target selection by terrorists.
Major 2002 uses a mix of game theory, search, and statistical methods to model terror-
ism risk. None of these works provide a formal game-theoretic model involving both
multiple players and multiple payoff matrices.
5.8.3 Research on and Analysis of Lashkar-e-Taiba
On the social science side, Clark 2010 was the first to study LeT from a military per-
spective. He argues that LeT has grown beyond the control of Pakistan and the Direc-
torate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and that it will continue to grow with help
from fringe elements in the Pakistani military establishment. He argues that India can
only insulate itself from LeT-backed attacks by diminishing the internal threat posed
by the Indian Mujahideen, an Indian group closely affiliated with LeT.
Tankel 2011 wrote a detailed analysis of LeT based on years of field work and
multiple visits to Pakistan to interview both LeT operatives as well as members of
Pakistan’s ISI. He provides a wonderful insight into LeT’s origins, ideology, and op-
erational structure, but does not include a policy analytics section specifically saying
how to deal with the menace posed by LeT. John’s excellent volume [70] on the same
topic provides another in-depth study of LeT but does not propose policies on how the
US and/or India can collectively help reduce LeT attacks.
Virtually all past work on counter-terrorism policy is qualitative (see work by
Mannes 2013 for an overview). A group of experts gather around a table, hypoth-
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esize about the impacts of different possible policies, and then decide which one to
use. It is only recently that quantitative methods for generating policies against terror
groups have started playing a role. Data mining approaches have been used to study the
Pakistani terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba [122] with considerable impact in the strategic
policy community in both the US and India, both of whom have attended talks on the
results. Subrahmanian et al. 2012 performs a data mining study of LeT involving 770
variables that are analyzed via data mining algorithms to learn the conditions under
which LeT executes various types of attacks. It goes on to consider the problem of
shaping the behavior of LeT by using abductive inference models. Another excellent
recent book on Pakistan in general by Bruce Riedel 2012, a former top CIA official
who advised the last five US presidents on relations with India and Pakistan, lays much
of the blame for terrorism out of Pakistan (including LeT terrorism) squarely at the
doorstep of the Pakistani intelligence agency but does not address LeT attacks in par-
ticular.
5.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, we showed how to merge vector payoffs [119] and well-supported ε-
approximate equilibria [34, 35] so as to handle the problem of efficient computation
of equilibria in multiplayer games where multiple experts provide different payoff ma-
trices, each capturing their own perception of reality. We present efficient algorithms
to find such equilibria—as well as a QPTAS—and experimental results showing they
work. The work is motivated by a real-world game we have built to formulate policies
against the terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) which carried out the 2008 Mumbai
attacks. We then presented PREVE, a set of algorithms based on multiplayer game
theory that extends a game developed earlier [43] to the case where there are multiple
payoff matrices that reflect differing opinions of different experts. As a consequence,
the resulting equilibria are much more robust to variations than the equilibria developed
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in [43] that are very sensitive to minor changes in the payoff matrix.
Pakistan is widely recognized as being one of the biggest threats to global security
today because of several factors: (i) its nuclear arsenal, (ii) the large milieu of violent
terrorist and extremist groups in the area with close ties to Pakistani intelligence, (iii)
tensions with India, and (iv) a collapsing economy. In this chapter, we have focused
primarily on Pakistan-India relations, which India views primarily through the lens of
terrorist acts in India that are backed by the Pakistani military and are usually opera-
tionally executed by LeT and/or its allies, like the Indian Mujahideen.
The PREVE theory, framework, and code have been developed in order to help poli-
cymakers with an interest in peace in South Asia determine the best ways for the parties
involved to move forward in order to reduce the threat of Lashkar-e-Taiba. Though we
applied PREVE only to LeT in this chapter, the theory is general and can be applied
to any set of actors with any set of actions as long as one or more payoff matrices are
available. In this work, area experts used open source data to create payoff matrices for
our five-player game.
From a public policy perspective, the results of this chapter may support three ideas.
1. The US must cut aid to Pakistan. There are no equilibria where LeT behaves
well where the US is providing aid to Pakistan. However, we do not have a
recommendation for exactly how much this cut should be—only that cuts need
to be made.
2. India must engage in additional covert action against LeT and its allies and/or
coercive diplomacy towards Pakistan. By cutting aid, the US would intuitively
increase political and economic pressure on the Pakistani establishment, leading
to a potential loss of support for the Pakistani military leadership amongst the
Pakistani people. By engaging in covert action, India would put operational
constraints on LeT, making attacks harder by “taking the fight to them” as the US
has done against Al-Qaeda. By taking steps towards coercive diplomacy, India
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would concurrently increase pressure on the Pakistani government and military,
complementing the US aid cuts proposed.
3. The key policy element is getting the Pakistani military to crack down on LeT,
in conjunction with US cuts on aid to Pakistan and covert action/coercive diplo-
macy by India. The key question is how to induce the Pakistani military to crack
down on LeT. An examination of the deep social, political, economic, and ji-
hadist links that the Pakistani military has could lead to better understanding of
the pressures that might induce them to crack down on extremist elements, many
of whom they currently support.
PREVE is a codebase, not an operational system. Top politicians and policymakers
are busy and are often more interested in white papers addressing their problem than
learning how to use software systems. In our case, PREVE has been used to generate
these results and then generate a report interpreting the results for policymakers. The
results of this study have been disclosed to top government officials in both the US and
Indian government. There is significant interest in continuing these studies.
5.10 Additional Experiments
In this section, we present experimental results for Algorithm 7 on simulated data.
First, we present results showing the algorithm’s running time and output on generated
games. Second, we explore the relationship between various traits of the game and the
percentage of strategies that are equilibria. The framework was implemented in about
700 lines of C++, and the experiments were run on a 4-CPU, 4-core Intel Xeon 3.4GHz
machine with 64GB of RAM running Ubuntu 12.04.
To test the scaling properties of Algorithm 7, we built a game generator and varied
the number of experts (each giving one set of payoff matrices), players, and actions per
player. We also varied the granularity factor t when generating t-uniform strategies.
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Figure 5.1: Runtime as the number of players increases (left) and number of actions
increases (right) for t-uniform factor t ∈ {1, . . . , 5}.
Figure 5.1 shows the runtime of Algorithm 7 on generated data as both the number
of players and number of actions increase, for varying granularity factors. As expected,
increasing the number of players (while holding the number of actions constant) hurts
runtime significantly more than increasing the number of actions (while holding the
number of players constant). Similarly, increasing the granularity factor t (shown on
the x-axis) exponentially increases the number of possible strategy profiles over which
the algorithm must iterate, resulting in large runtime increases. Future research would
increase the algorithm’s equilibrium-generation capabilities to games with many play-
ers and many actions.


















































Figure 5.2: Percentage of all sets of strategy profiles that are well-supported multiple
ε-approximate Nash equilibria as the number of experts increases (left) and t-uniform
factor increases (right), for ε ∈ {0.0, 0.05, . . . , 1.0}.
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Figure 5.2 quantifies the relationship between the ε-approximation threshold and
the percentage of strategy profiles that are well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash
equilibria. Intuitively, increasing the slack in the approximation factor ε yields a higher
percentage of strategy profiles being equilibria, while increasing the number of poten-
tial payoff matrices decreases this percentage of strategy profiles. The rate of increase
of this line is highly dependent on the distribution of payoffs to each individual player.
With random generation of payoffs, the increase is fairly steady; however, a more struc-
tured (e.g., real-world) payoff function would affect this trend. In Section 5.7, we
considered such a real-world game.
5.11 Proofs
In this section, we provide complete proofs for various theorems and lemmas in the
chapter.
5.11.1 Proofs for Section 5.5.1
Lemma 40



























σ1i (r + ε) (from (5.6))
= r + ε ∵
∑
i∈[m]









σ1i u(ei, ej) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
σ2j (r − ε) (from (5.5))
=r − ε ∵
∑
j∈[m]
σ2j = 1 (5.13)
From (5.12) and (5.5):
∑
i∈[m]
σ1i (−u(ei, ej)) ≤ −p+ 2ε, ∀j ∈ [m] (5.14)
Similarly, from (5.13) and (5.6):
∑
j∈[m]
σ2ju(ei, ej) ≤ p+ 2ε,∀i ∈ [m] (5.15)
Since p and −p are payoffs for given strategies and u and −u are the payoff functions
for players 1 and 2 respectively, the claim follows from (5.14), (5.15) and the definition
of approximate Nash Equilibrium (Definition 11).
Lemma 41








ju(ei, ej) be the payoff for player 1. Because its





















σ2ju(ei, ej) ≤r + τ,∀i ∈ [m] ∵ p ≥ r − ε, 2ε ≤ τ (5.17)
The other constraints in the LP are satisfied by any valid strategy profile. Thus, the
claim follows from (5.16), (5.17) and the fact that (σ1, σ2) is a strategy profile.
Lemma 42




[f ] because constraints for LP_MEAE(U,P, ε2 ) are a superset of constraints for
LP_EAE(ui, ri, ε2 ),∀i ∈ [f ]. Thus, from Lemma 40, the feasible solution is a strat-
egy profile that is an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium for all constituent games of the
ZSGM. The result then follows from Definition 15 of multiple ε-approximate Nash
equilibrium.
Lemma 43
Proof. From Lemma 41, any ε-approximate Nash equilibrium for zero-sum game with
payoff matrix ui such that payoff for player 1 is between ri − ε and ri + ε,∀i ∈
[f ] satisfies all constraints of LP_EAE(ui, ri, 2ε). Thus, the given equilibrium is
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feasible for LP_EAE(ui, ri, 2ε),∀i ∈ [f ]. Hence the given equilibrium satisfies
LP_MEAE(U,P, 2ε).
Theorem 44
Proof. All LPs in the returned set are of the form
LP_MEAE(U,P, 1k ). From Lemma 43, all strategy profiles that are feasible for these
LPs are multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with ε = 2k and hence the first con-
dition is satisfied. From Lemma 42, all feasible solutions are ε-approximate Nash equi-
libria with ε = 12k for the given game and hence the second condition is satisfied. For
computing the runtime of the algorithm, we observe that the for loop in the algorithm
runs (k + 1)f times and each time it outputs an LP of size 2mf + 2m + 2 which can
be appended to a data structure such as a list in constant time. Thus, the algorithm can
be implemented in time O((k + 1)f (2mf + 2m+ 2)).
5.11.2 Proofs for Section 5.5.2
Lemma 45


































This function is not a function of j’s strategy. When player j’s strategy is pure and its
support is just an action, say l ∈ [m], substituting value of σj as el in (5.19), we have:














A necessary and sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium is that only the best pure
responses can be in support of each player’s strategy Let σ = (σ1, σ2, .., σn) be a Nash
equilibrium for the above game. Let E be the set of all Nash equilibria for the given
game. Therefore, for any player, j, with a positive payoff and any action a in support
of σj , we have:
σ ∈ E ⇐⇒ uj(ea, σ−a) ≥ uj(el, σ−a), ∀l ∈ [m] (5.21)
⇐⇒ αj,ja u′−j(σ) ≥ αj,jl u
′
−j(σ) (Substituting from (5.20)) (5.22)
Assuming that u′−j > 0 (otherwise, j can play any action without affecting his payoff,
which remains 0), we have:
(5.22) ⇐⇒ αj,ja ≥ αj,jl ⇐⇒ a ∈ Sj (From defn. of Sj) (5.23)
Since the above is true ∀a ∈ support(σj) and ∀j ∈ [n], the claim follows.
Lemma 46
Proof. A necessary and sufficient condition for well-supported relative ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium is that only the approximate pure best responses can be in support
of each player’s strategy. Let W be the set of all well-supported relative ε-approximate
Nash equilibria (with non-zero payoffs for each player) for the given game. Therefore,
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for any player, j, with a positive payoff and any strategy i in support of σj , we have:
σ ∈W ⇐⇒ uj(i, σ−i) ≥ (1− ε)ul(l, σ−i),∀l ∈ [m]
⇐⇒ αj,ji u
′





⇐⇒ αj,ji ≥ (1− ε)α
j,j
l ,∀l ∈ [m]
αj,ji ≥ (1− ε)(maxα
j,j)
Thus, equation (5.10) above is the complete characterization of well-supported relative
ε-approximate Nash equilibria for the given game.
Theorem 47
Proof. Let σ be a strategy profile for the given game for which equation (5.11)
holds. From the definition of well-supported multiple relative ε-approximate Nash
equilibrium (Definition 17), a strategy profile is well-supported multiple relative ε-
approximate Nash equilibrium iff it is a well-supported ε-approximate Nash equilibri-
umfor each constituent game of the SGM. Since equation (5.11) holds for σ for all con-
stituent games, from Lemma 46, σ is well-supported multiple relative ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium for the given game. Thus, from Lemma 46, σ satisfies equation (5.10)
for all constituent games. Thus, σ satisfies equation (5.11).
5.11.3 Proofs for Section 5.5.3
Lemma 50
Proof. From definition of well-supported ε-approximate Nash equilibrium, for any ac-
tion a ∈ Support(σj):
uj(ea, σ−j) ≥ uj(el, σ−j)− ε, ∀l ∈ [m] (5.24)
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Now, we construct a t-uniform strategy profile, σ′, from σ as follows. Let σ′i =
dσite
t .
The above rounding procedure can make ||σ′||1 greater than 1. To counter this, select
any element in σ′ arbitrarily (without replacement) and round it down to bσitct . Repeat
this until ||σ′||1 6= 1. The above procedure is guaranteed to give a t-uniform strategy
profile σ′ such that:















From above, when player j plays action a with probability 1 and the rest of the players






































By taking the outermost summation and the common factor αj,j,ka out, we get:














































i,j,k)Tσ′. From Lemma 48 and Equation 5.25, we have










From above and Equation 5.28, we have:









∵ αj,j,ka ≤ 1 (5.29)
From above and Equation 5.24, we have, for every action a in support of σ′:
uj(ea, σ
′
−j) ≥ uj(el, σ′−j)−
2(n− 1)mk
t
− ε,∀l ∈ [m]




Proof. From Lemma 50, given a well-supported τ -approximate Nash equilibrium strat-
egy profile, we can always construct a t-uniform strategy profile that is a well-supported
τ + (n−1)mkt -approximate Nash equilibrium. From the definition of well-supported
multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium, σ is a well-supported τ -approximate Nash
equilibrium strategy profile for each of the constituent games. The construction of σ′
from σ, as described in the proof of Lemma 50, is independent of payoff functions for
constituent games and hence the lemma applies simultaneously to all the constituent
games of the SGM. Hence σ′ is a well-supported τ+ (n−1)mkt -approximate Nash equi-
librium for all the constituent games of the SGM. Thus, from the definition of well-
supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium, σ′ is a well-supported multiple
ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with ε = τ + (n−1)mkt and the claim follows.
5.11.4 Proofs for Section 5.6.2
Lemma 52
Proof. Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) be a Nash equilibrium. Construct a multiset M j by
sampling independently at random from the set of actions according to distribution σj .
Construct strategy ρj by assigning probability of lt to an action that appears l times
in Mj and ρ−j = σ−j . We prove that ρ is an τ + δ-well supported multiple payoff
approximate Nash equilibrium w.p.p.
Let M js ∈ [m] be a random variable that denotes the sth element of M j . Let
Ys = u
i
l(eMjs , ek, σ
−j,l) be a random variable that is equal to payoff for player l, when
player l plays action k and player j plays action M js in constituent game i. Let µ be
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uil(eMjs , ek, ρ
−j,l)
t







−j,l) (from (definition of uil))
=uil(ek, ρ
−l)
Where, the last equality follows from the fact that if an action occurs l times in M j ,
it gets a weight of lt is ρ
j . Also, from construction of ρ, it follows that E(ρjk) = σ
j
k.
From linearity of expectation it follows that E(uil(ek, ρ
−l)) = uil(ek, σ
−l). Thus, ∀i ∈
[f ], l ∈ [n] − {j}, k ∈ [m], uil(ek, ρ−l) is the mean of t i.i.d. random variables, each
with expectation uil(ek, σ
−l). Payoffs are in [0, 1] and the same bound applies to all




Let A(i, k, l) be the event |uil(ek, ρ−l) − uil(ek, σ−l)| ≥ δ2 . From Hoeffding in-
equality, we have:






i∈[f ],k∈[m],l∈[n]−{j}A(i, k, l). From union bound:




Thus, 2fmn exp (−tδ
2
2 ) = 1 =⇒ Pr[A
c] > 0. Therefore, t = 2 log(2fmn)δ2 ensures
that ∃ρ for which event Ac occurs. Let π be the strategy profile for which this happens.
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From definition of Ac and well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium,
we have, ∀i ∈ [f ],∀k ∈ [m],∀l ∈ [n]:
uil(ek, σ
−l) ≤ uil(eh, σ−l) + τ (from (Definition 16))
=⇒ uil(ek, π−l) ≤ uil(eh, π−l) + τ + δ (from (definition of Ac))
Thus π is well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with ε = τ+δ.
Theorem 53
Proof. Let t = 2n
2 log(2fm(n−1))
δ2 . Then by application of Lemma 52 for player 1, we
get a well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with ε = τ + δn with t-
uniform strategy of player 1. To the resulting strategy profile, we can apply Lemma 52
to the strategy for player 2 and get a strategy profile that is a well-supported multiple
ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with ε = τ + 2δn with t-uniform strategy of players 1
and 2. We can do this successively for all players and get a t-uniform strategy profile
which is a well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with ε = τ+δ
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Algorithm 7 well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium for constant
rank games
Input:t, payoff functions for the SGM
Output:t-uniform well-supported multiple ε-approximate Nash equilibrium strategy
profiles
S ← Set of all possible t-uniform strategies
E ← ∅
Σ←×ni=1 S . Cardinality: O(mkn)
for l ∈ [f ] do . f is the number of constituent games of the SGM
El ← ∅
for σ ∈ Σ do
isEquilibrium ← TRUE
for j ∈ [n] do




for i ∈ [m] do
payoff i ← ulj(ei, σ−j)
















Virtually almost all work in game theory starts with a payoff matrix. In his pioneering
study of conflict, Schelling [117] starts out with a payoff matrix for virtually every
scenario. Unfortunately, getting a payoff matrix poses an enormous challenge in many
real-world strategic games. In this chapter, we answer the following question: Given
a body of historical data about the interactions of multiple players, is there a way to
learn a payoff matrix? In order to answer this question, we make certain assumptions:
Time Discounting. We believe that players are more likely to be influenced by “recent”
history as opposed to events from a distant past. In order to model this, we developed
a notion of time-discounted regret.
No Correlated Equilibria, Short Histories. We do not assume correlated equilibria [52]
nor do we assume the existence of a signaling mechanism. When long histories are
available and some extra assumptions are made e.g. [52], game play can converge to
correlated equilibrium even without a signaling mechanism. However, our real-world
applications have short histories for which convergence cannot be assumed.
0This is a joint work with E. Serra, M. T. Hajiaghayi, S. Kraus and V. S. Subrahmanian.
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Bounded Rationality. Unlike past work on inverse reinforcement learning that assume
fully rational agents, we assume bounded rationality, i.e. players take actions whose
payoffs are within ε percent of the action with best response payoff.
No Knowledge of Outcomes. We assume that we only know the game history but noth-
ing about outcomes.
Best Response. We assume that all players have complete knowledge of the history of
past events and that in each time period, players choose an action that is an approximate
best response to the history (subject to the bounded rationality assumption).
We define constraints whose variables represent the payoffs for each player under
each joint action. Our constraints informally state that at each time point t in the past,
each player i chose to perform the action for which he had the maximal expected time-
discounted regret prior to time t. We also interpret these constraints as a myopic best
response to the state of the world. This leads to a set of constraints with many possible
solutions. We define three heuristics to estimate payoffs.
1. Centroid Solution (CS). In CS, the (approximate) centroid of the constraint
polytope is picked as the solution.
2. Soft Constraints Approach (SCA). In SCA, we allow the rationality con-
straints to be violated but penalize such violations in the objective function used.
3. SVM-based Method (SVMM). In SVMM, we propose a heuristic method to
map the payoff inference problem onto a support vector machine [32] and build
a separator that captures the payoff function we wish to learn.
We implemented CS, SCA, SVMM, as well as the recent ICEL algorithm (Inverse Cor-
relation Equilibrium Learning) for comparison [134]. We compared all 4 algorithms
w.r.t. solution quality and run-time. On synthetic data where we knew the ground truth
(because we generated player behavior using known payoff functions), we showed that
SVMM outperforms both CS and SCA w.r.t. both solution quality and run-time. We
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also compared CS,SCA, and SVMM on two real-world data sets: (i) the Minorities
at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset [10] the contains data on terror-
ist group behaviors and related government actions and (ii) a much more fine-grained
data set [122] about the behavior of the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).1 Again,
SVMM outperformed CS and SCA. We then ran experiments comparing SVMM with
ICEL. When we compare the ability of SVMM with that of ICEL to predict true be-
haviors from learned payoffs on the MAROB data, SVMM’s ability to predict behavior
from the learned payoffs was much better than that of ICEL (median Spearman Corre-
lation Coefficient of 0.7 for SVMM, compared to just 0.114 for ICEL).
6.2 Related Work
Inverse Reinforcement Learning [101] learns payoffs of a single-agent operating in a
given (usually Markovian) environment. [101] addresses the problem of learning a
reward function by observing behavior of MDPs. However, they and a series of sub-
sequent works [97, 143] assume a single rational agent in a given environment. Some
recent works have focused on Multi-agent Inverse Reinforcement Learning (MIRL)
[84, 96]. [96] examines a cooperative setting with an explicit centralized coordina-
tor. [84] studies the problem in a 2-person zero-sum stochastic games. [136] focuses
on learning payoffs for symmetric games. Waugh et al. [134] proposed an approach
to predict player behavior when no payoff matrix is available. A convex optimization
formulation finds a maximum entropy solution to find the predicted distribution over
joint actions. Finally, payoffs are computed by using the dual of the above optimization
convex problem.
Economists have studied payoff inference problems for various markets [31, 99,
1As no ground truth exists about payoffs for real-world players in the MAROB and LeT data sets, we
learned player payoffs from a training data set and then validated them on a separate validation data set by
making predictions based on learned payoffs. We emphasize the fact that this work is not about prediction
– but about learning payoffs in order to understand group behavior. The goal is to understand the payoff
structure for different players for different strategies so diplomats and counter-terrorism agencies can shape
policies towards the terrorist groups. We use predictions solely to validate learned payoffs.
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Table 6.1
PIE Waugh Ng-Russell Natarajan Lin Wiedenbeck
multi-player yes no yes 2-player yes
non-perfect rationality yes no no no yes
non-cooperative no (assumes NA no yes (zero-sum) yes
corr. eq.)
not symmetric yes NA yes yes no
demonstrated w/ yes no no no no
real data
scalable no (Non- yes (LP) yes (LP) no (QP) yes
smooth convex
program )
108, 123]. However, their focus is on modeling a particular market and then to use
various model fitting and regression to learn the best parameters. For instance, [123]
studies the effect of land use regulations on the mid-scale hotel market.
The assumption of equilibrium is common to most work on MIRL and other payoff
learning methods. However, decision theory bears out the fact that human players don’t
follow equilibrium strategies, even when the equilibrium is unique (which is rare!)
[117]. However, decision theory does highlight the importance of recency [100] and
regret in human decision making. Anticipated regret is considered an important deter-
minant of choice-behavior [29, 120, 139]. These aspects form the basis for PIE’s time
discounted regret minimization and myopic best response with exponentially decaying
state. Thus, PIE differs from existing work on payoff inference in that we assume my-
opic rationality and not global rationality (equilibrium). We also assume simple game
play dynamics inspired by relevant work from decision theory. In addition, we develop
a fast and practical data analytic approach compared to more theoretical approach taken
by most machine learning papers. We show this with experiments on two real-world
datasets and show superior performance compared to Waugh et al [134]. Table 6.1
compares our work with related work.
A major driver for our work is counter-terrorism applications. The development of
game-theoretic methods to analyze terrorist behavior and organization has been pio-
neered by Lindelauf [85, 86] and subsequently adopted by others [44, 92, 133].
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6.3 Preliminaries
Let [N ] = {1, . . . , N} be a set of players. We assume that each player i has an associ-
ated setAi of actions that it can take. LetA = A1 × · · · ×AN denote the set of all pos-
sible joint actions. Given a joint action a ∈ A, ai is the action of player i and a−i is the
joint action of all other players. Let ui be an unknown payoff function: ui : A → [0, 1].
ui(a) is the payoff of joint action a for player i. Let U = {u1, . . . , uN} be the set of
all (as yet unknown) payoff functions where ui is the payoff function for player i. Let
[T ] = {1, . . . , T} be a set of past time points.
Let m =
∑
i∈[n] |Ai| be the total number of actions for all players in the game. We
encode a joint action as an m-dimensional binary vector. Each action for a player is
indexed from
∑
j∈{1...,i−1} |Aj |+1 to
∑
j∈{1...i} |Aj | in a fixed but arbitrary order. In
other words, the first |A1| entries in the vector describe the actions for the first player,
the next |A2| entries describe the actions for the second player, and so forth. Let v be
an encoding for a ∈ A. If, in the joint action represented by a, player i plays action
ai ∈ Ai at time t, then, and only then is v[ai] = 1, otherwise v[ai] = 0.
Example 13. Suppose we have two players 1, 2 and suppose A1 = {a, b, c} and A2 =
{a, e} are the actions they can perform. Then the dimensionality of a joint action is 5
and an example of the vector representation of a joint action is:
pl-1 pl-1 pl-2 pl-2 pl-2
a b c a e
1 0 0 0 1
The first row is the player’s ID and the second row is the action name. Here, the
5-dimensional vector (1,0,0,0,1) tells us that in this joint action, player 1 performed
action a and player 2 performed action e.
A history is a sequence Hτ =< a1, . . . , aτ > where at is the vector of joint
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actions taken at time t ∈ [T ]. We represent the history of a game as a matrix, H , where
H[t, a] = 1 iff player i plays action a ∈ Ai at time t. Thus, Ht, the tth row of the
history matrix represents the joint action taken by all players at time t. Likewise, the
i’th column of H tells us that actions taken by player i at each time point.








Example 14. Suppose we have two players [N ] = {1, 2}; player 1 is a terror group
and player 2 is the government. Assume that the players’ actions are pe_g ( “polit-
ical engagement with the government") for player 1 and pe_tg (“political engage-
ment with the terror group") for player 2. Each of these variables has 3 possi-
ble levels (low, medium, high) of intensity. Therefore, player 1 has three actions,
pe_g(l), pe_g(m), pe_g(h), corresponding to the three levels of intensity of this ac-
tion, and similarly, player 2 has three actions pe_tg(l), pe_tg(m), pe_tg(h). Let in-
dices of the actions pe_g(l), pe_g(m), pe_g(h) be 1, 2 and 3 respectively for player 1,
and 4, 5 and 6 respectively for player 2. Suppose we have three years ([T ] = {1, 2, 3})
history below:
[T ] year player 1 player 2
1 2010 pe_g(l) pe_tg(m)
2 2011 pe_g(m) pe_tg(l)
3 2012 pe_g(h) pe_tg(m)
Then the history matrix, H representing the above game history is given by:

1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0

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6.4 Time Discounted Regret
In this section, we define the concept of time discounted regret. Classical regret is
defined with respect to a class Φ of modification functions. Each modification function
f ∈ Φ is a mapping f : A → A. Intuitively, a modification function suggests an
alternative choice f(a) for an action a - instead of taking action a, the player takes
action f(a). As there are many ways in which a player could modify his choice, we
consider a set Φ of modification functions. In the context of our running counter-
terrorism example, the different modification functions might correspond to all feasible












−i) − ui(at̂) is the difference in utility for player i had he elected








−i) − ui(at̂) reflects the total regret that player i had
w.r.t. his past actions, had he chosen to use modification function f instead of whatever
method he used to select his past actions. Had player i used the modification function
f ∈ Φ that maximizes this summation, then he would have gotten the maximal possible
benefit, and the fact that he (maybe) did not use it is what leads to this regret.
When determining what action to take, players in the real world are often more
influenced by recent actions than by actions in the distant past. Our notion of time-
discounted regret takes this into account by allowing a player to discount the past at
a rate α s.t. 0 < α ≤ 1. After each time point, the “importance” of a past event is














Because of the α parameter in the definition of TDR, for us, a history is a timed-
stamped collection of past joint actions. This is very different from [134] which only
uses the history to extract the distribution of joint actions and consider it to be a collec-
tion (without timestamps) of past joint actions. When α = 1, the definitions of regret
and time-discounted regret coincide.
Suppose Φc is the set of all functions from A to A that are constant functions, i.e.
if f is in Φc, there must exist an action a′ ∈ A such that for all a ∈ A, f(a) = a′. The










In other words, TDERi,Φc only considers constant functions when computing time-










Intuitively, TDERi(â, t) is the regret for player i due to the fact that she/he did not
use the strategy to always play the action â in the past. We assume that for a rational
player, the greater the regret w.r.t an action â in the past, the more likely it is that the
player will play the action â in the future.2
Example 15. Let’s reconsider Example 14 with α = 0.9. The time-discounted external
regret for player 1 w.r.t. action h in the year 2013 (t = 4) is:
TDER1(h, 4) =
0.81(u1(h,m)− u1(l,m)) + 0.90(u1(h, l)− u1(m, l)) + 1.00(u1(h,m)− u1(h,m))
0.81 + 0.9 + 1.0
Observe that the weights 0.81, 0.9 and 1.0 are the weights for years 2010, 2011 and
2012, respectively. 2
A player is ration if, for each time t, the player chooses the action that caused the
2In simple terms: if the player had great regret about not doing something in the past, especially the
recent past, then he is more likely to do it in the future, especially in the near future.
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maximum time-discounted external regret in the past. Thus, our rationality constraints
require that ∀t ∈ [T ] \ {1}, ∀i ∈ [N ], ∀â ∈ A \ {ati} the following condition holds:






−i)− ui(ati, at̂−i)) ≤ 0 (6.4)
Bounded Rationality. As only a few players in the real world are completely rational,
we introduce a parameter ε ∈ [0, 1] that is the degree of rationality. The closer ε is to 1,
the more rational the player is, while the closer ε is to 0, the more irrational the player
is. We replace Equation 6.3 (which assumes complete rationality) with the equation
below, which allows weaker notions of rationality:




αt−1−t̂(ε · ui(â, at̂−i)− ui(ati, at̂−i)) ≤ 0. (6.5)
As ε and the α’s are constants, this equation is linear. Each ui(−) term is a variable
in this constraint. Let LC be the set of all linear constraints generated by Equation 6.5
above. We demonstrate them in the next example.
Example 16. By considering only the last two years of the history in Example 14 we
observe that HT is
[T ] year player 1 player 2
1 2011 m l
2 2012 h m
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If α = 0.9 and ε = 0.8, the rationality constraints for both players are:
(0.8 u1(l, l)− u1(h, l)) ≤ 0 (0.8 u1(m, l)− u1(h, l)) ≤ 0
(0.8 u2(m, l)− u2(m,m)) ≤ 0 (0.8 u2(m,h)− u2(m,m)) ≤ 0
The result below states that LC is polynomial in size.
Proposition 1. The number of variables occurring in LC is polynomial in the number
of players N , the number of actions M and in the size of the history T .
Proof. The number of constraints for each player at time t ∈ [T ] is M − 1. Each
constraint has at most T variables. Thus, the total number of variables that can occur
in LC is at most (M − 1)NT .
One problem with LC is that it may have multiple solutions, some of which may
be trivial. An example of a trivial solution is when the utility function returns the same
value for each joint action for each player. For instance, the maximal entropy solution
of LC (the entropy function is applied to all variables of LC) assigns the same utility
to all combinations of players and joint actions.
Proposition 2. Suppose U = {u1, . . . , uN} is a maximal entropy solution for LC.
Then for all joint actions a, a′ and all players i, j, ui(a) = uj(a′).





We obtain the maximum value of this function when ∀i ∈ [N ], ∀a ∈ A we can deduce
that ui(a) = e−1. Since we know that when ε ∈ [0, 1],
t−1∑
t̂=1





our rationality constraints in Equation 6.5 are satisfied. For these reasons it follows that
the theorem holds. 2
Hence, given the assumptions in this chapter, maximal entropy is not a very effective
way of choosing a solution.
6.5 Non-Linear Time-Weighted History Payoffs
PIE was motivated by our ongoing counter-terrorism research. We have applied PIE
to a multi-player game involving the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (responsible for
the 2008 Mumbai attacks) and the governments of Pakistan and India. In such sce-
narios, a time-weighted history of players’ actions is a representation of state of the
world (which is a history of players’ actions) at the time the player decides to take a
new action. Time-weighted history captures the idea that recent actions may be more
relevant than older ones.
The payoffs in Equation 6.5 are linear. Suppose we assume that a payoff function
for player i at time t is any (linear or non-linear) function πi : Rm+1 7→ R of the time-
weighted history at time t. That is, πi(a,wt) takes an action a and a time weighted
history wt (which is a vector of dimensionality m as defined earlier in Section 6.3) as
input and returns a payoff value as output, specifying the payoff to player i of playing
a at time t, w.r.t. wt.
We assume that a player chooses an action at time t that has highest payoff with
respect to the state of the world at time t− 1. Let a be the action played by player i at
time t. The constraint below encodes the fact that a is player i’s best response.
πi(a,wt) ≥ πi(a′, wt) ∀a′ ∈ Ai, i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ] (6.6)
One such constraint needs to be written for each player i and each time t. Note
that these constraints may be non-linear as no constraints have been imposed to make
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πi linear. It is easy to see that Equation 6.6 generalizes Equation 6.5. Note that this
system of inequalities is feasible as assigning identical payoffs for all actions always
satisfies Equation 6.6. However, this is not a good solution. Hence, it is very important
to choose a “robust” solution to the above system. For real-world problems, we require
that the selected solution satisfies the following properties:
(P1) The family of functions to which our payoff functions πi belong should not have
arbitrary complexity, i.e., our hypothesis space should not allow arbitrary payoff
functions to avoid overfitting. On the other hand, we should allow somewhat
complicated non-linear payoff functions to avoid over-simplification.
(P2) While it is reasonable to assume that players react to game history and use actions
which would generate high payoffs, we cannot assume that each and every player
always adheres to this heuristic at all times. Therefore, our algorithm must admit
the possibility that some points in the history may violate Equation 6.6. However,
Equation 6.6 should hold for most of the game history.
(P3) Last but not the least, there must be a tractable algorithm to select a solution of
these constraints so that PIE can apply to real-world strategic games involving
many players and dozens of actions. While the current best approach [134] in
literature has been applied to games of upto 6 players with 3 actions for each
player, they don’t discuss runtime of their approach. As per our experiments, our
best approach is 1 to 2 orders of magnitude faster.
6.6 Solution Selection
In this section, we present three approaches to select a solution of the system of con-
straints.
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Centroid Based Solution (CS) The Centroid Based Solution uses LC (not Equa-
tion 6.6). The classical way to choose one solution of LC is to choose the maximum
entropy solution. However, as proved earlier in Proposition 2, this is not useful as the
maximum entropy solution assigns the same utility to all combinations of players and
joint actions. In order to avoid this, we choose a centroid based approach. The cen-
troid solution of LC is the mean position of all points satisfying LC. Unfortunately,
computing the centroid of a convex region is computationally very complex — even
approximating it is #P -hard [111]. We therefore approximate the centroid by using
Hit-and-Run (HAR) sampling [16]. In HAR sampling, we start with a randomly se-
lected solution of the constraints (point in the polytope). We then randomly identify a
direction and distance and head in that direction for the selected distance from the last
sampled point. If we are still within the polytope, this becomes our next sampled point.
If the new point is outside the polytope, we regenerate a distance and direction till a
valid point within the polytope is found. This process is iterated till the desired number
of sample points is generated. HAR sampling allows us to sample points from a convex
polytope uniformly at random in time polynomial in the number of dimensions (num-
ber of variables of LC). We approximate the centroid by taking the component-wise
mean of the sampled payoffs.
Proposition 3. The centroid approximation described above is also a solution of LC.
The proposition above follows as the centroid approximation is a convex combina-
tion of solutions of LC.
Soft Constraints Approach (SCA) In the Soft Constraints Approach, we again use
only LC (Equation 6.6 is not used) and allow the rationality constraints to be violated
by introducing a slack variable in each constraint in LC. These slack variables are
denoted si,a,t in the revised linear program RLP given below. We then find a solution
of RLC that minimizes the sum of the slack variables which, in a sense, minimizes
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−i)− ui(ati, at̂−i) + si,a,t) ≤ 0,∀i ∈ [N ], a ∈ A, t ∈ [T ] (6.7)
The slack variables in Equation 6.7 are inside the parentheses to normalize for the
history length and time decay of payoffs.
Payoff Inference using SVMM In this section, we present a novel approach that uses
Support Vector Machines (SVM) to find a “good” candidate solution to the system of
inequalities given in Equation 6.6. Here, we use a set CONS of constraints which
are generated by Equation 6.6 – we do not use Equation 6.5 in this approach. Each
constraint generated by Equation 6.6 has a left hand side and a right hand side. We
encode the right hand and the left hand sides of the inequalities in Equation 6.6 as
points in a space. If a point encodes the right hand side of an inequality, it is assigned
a label 1, otherwise, it is assigned a label 0. We then run the classification algorithm.
The decision function for the learned classifier is the desired payoff function. We now
describe this method in more detail.
Encoding points in game history. Let the number of actions of player i be ni =
|Ai|. Let a be an action of player i, whose index is equal to
∑
j∈{1...i−1} |Aj | + k.
Consider an m + 1-tuple (a, h), where a ∈ Ai and h is an m-dimensional point. Let
V : Rm+1 7→ R(m+1)ni be a map that takes this m + 1’th-tuple as input and outputs
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an (m+ 1) ∗ ni-dimensional vector. Map V is defined as follows:
V (a, h)[(k − 1) ∗ (m+ 1) + 1] = 1
V (a, h)[(k − 1) ∗ (m+ 1) + 1 + j] = h[j] ∀j ∈ {1 . . .m}
All other entries of V (a, h) are 0. Suppose player i plays action a at time t. Then
V (a,wt,i, wt−1,−i) is labeled 1. For all actions a′ 6= a, V (a′, wt,i, wt−1,−i) are labeled
0. The following example shows how this works.
Example 17 (SVMM Method). Consider a 3 player game with players {1, 2, 3} with
2 actions (namely, Action 1 and Action 2) for each player. A point in the history of
the game is represented by a 6-dimensional binary vector, e.g. the vector (1,0,0,1,1,0)
represents the fact that players 1, 2 and 3 played actions 1, 2 and 1 respectively. Let
the current state of the world be given by the vector wt = (w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6).
Assume that at any time, player 1 plays a myopic best response to this state of the
world. For simplicity, let payoffs be a linear function of state of the world. The payoff
for playing action 1 by player 1 is p1 = a1 +
∑
i∈{1..6} a1iwi. Similarly for action
2, p2 = a2 +
∑
i∈{1..6} a2iwi. Thus, the payoff function can be represented as a
14-dimensional vector p = (a1, a11, . . . , a16, a2, a21, . . . , a26). Further, assume that
player 1 actually chooses action 1 as her best response. Then:
p1 >= p2 (6.8)
Now, lets encode RHS as V (1, wt) = (1, w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and
the LHS as V (2, wt) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6). If we use SVM to
learn a separating hyperplane W for points V (1, wt) and V (2, wt) such that V (1, wt)
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is on the positive side and V (2, wt) is on the negative side, then we have:
WTV (1, wt) > 0W
TV (2, wt) < 0 (6.9)
Thus, we have WTV (1, s) > WTV (2, s) and thus W is a 14-dimensional vector
representing a feasible payoff function satisfying 6.9.
Going back to the general case, let E be the function that takes a given game history
as input and returns as output, the labeling and encoding of points as defined above.
We now describe the relationship between SVM classifier applied to points given by
mapping V and the system of inequalities given by Equation 6.6 with the help of the
following two propositions.
Proposition 4. The system of inequalities given in Equation 6.6 is feasible for a game
history H , i.e., we can find payoff functions such that all the inequalities are satisfied
if the SVM algorithm can find a separator for encoding E(H).
Proof. We note that for points on one side of decision surface, the value of decision
surface is less than 0 and for the other side it is greater than 0. Therefore, if points
encoded for the RHS are on the positive side and LHS on the negative side, Equations
6.6 are satisfied. Otherwise, we can flip sign of the decision function and achieve the
same result.
Proposition 5. If the SVM algorithm can find a separator that misclassifies n1 points
with labels 1 and n0 points with labels 0, then we can find payoff functions such that at
most n0 + n1 of the inequalities given by Equation 6.6 are not satisfied.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that points encoding the RHS of Equation
6.6 are assigned positive labels and points encoding the LHS are assigned negative
labels. A misclassified point LHS point can be assigned a decision value higher than
the RHS point can lead to at most one violated constraint. Similarly, a misclassified
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RHS point can lead to at most one violated constraint. Thus in all we can have at most
n0 + n1 violated constraints.
6.7 Implementation and Experiments
We implemented CBS, SCA, SVMM as well as the ICEL algorithm [134]. Sec-
tions 6.7.1 use synthetic data (with known payoff functions to evaluate these algo-
rithms’ accuracy). Section 6.8 uses the real-world MAROB data about 10 terrorist
groups [10] with actions by both the terrorist groups and the government of the country
involved. Section 6.8.1 uses a very fine-grained counter-terrorism data set with three
actors: the terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba [122] which carried out the Mumbai attacks
and the governments of Pakistan and India. The next two subsections compare the
three algorithms presented in this chapter in order to identify which one is best - both
from an accuracy and from a run-time perspective. Section 6.9 compares our best al-
gorithm with theICEL algorithm. Because of Proposition 2, we could not apply ICEL
to the synthetic data — and because the Lashkar-e-Taiba contained a host of environ-
mental variables, we could not apply ICEL to that either. We used the MAROB data to
compare ICEL and our SVMM metric.
6.7.1 Experiments on Synthetic Data
Generation of Synthetic Data
We wrote R code to generate random games with random linear payoffs functions and
a random state of the world at each time. A payoff function is represented as a vector of
coefficients of a linear function. Each of the payoff functions and the state of the world
at each time point is a uniformly randomly directed positive vector of norm 1. After
generating the payoffs and the state of the world at different times, an action history for
all players is generated assuming best response. We are not simulating a game. Instead,
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each time point is a “what if” scenario, where each player is presented with a state of
the world and they choose the best response as per their payoff functions. The code to
generatef random games varies the following inputs:
np Number of players
na Number of actions for each player
n Length of history for each game
noise Probability that action of a player will be chosen uniformly at random (instead of the best response heuristic)
seed The seed for random number generation (to ensure reproducibility of experiments)
The state of the world is thus an (na ∗ np)-dimensional vector. Payoff for each
action is a linear function of the state of the world and hence is represented as an
(na ∗ np)-dimensional vector of coefficients. Thus, each player has na such vectors.
3 We introduce noise into our experiments by allowing each player, at each time step,
to either play a random response independently at random with probability given by
parameter “noise”, or a best response to the current state of the world. To evaluate
quality of payoffs learned, for each player, we learn the np ∗ na2 length vector of
parameters of the player’s payoff function. We measure the quality of our three payoff
learning algorithms by comparing this vector with the actual payoff function vectors
using Pearson Correlation Coefficients (PCCs for short).
Performance of SVM based method
We use a linear soft margin SVM classifier using the R interface to libsvm [22]. The
hyperparameter for tuning this SVM is the cost of misclassification C. We tried values
of C ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100} and chose the best-forming SVM model. However, we
also report the overall results (encompassing all five values of C). The choice of C
turns out to be not critical to the performance of our algorithms. SVMM performs very
well with median PCC above 0.8 for games with 5 players and 5 actions for each player
and median PCC between 0.6 and 0.8 for most of the smaller games. In addition,
3For most experiments on synthetic data, we have na = np = 3. Thus, each payoff function is a 9
dimensional vector. As there are 3 payoff functions per player (one per action), we are trying to learn a total














Effection of dimension on SVM method




Figure 6.1: Effect of dimension of pay-
off function on performance of SVM
method for synthetic data


















Figure 6.2: Effect of noise on perfor-
mance of SVM method for synthetic
data
performance degrades slowly with noise. We now analyze SVMM’s performance in
more detail.
Effect of Dimension of Payoff Function (SVM) Figure 6.1 shows the effect of di-
mension of the payoff function on performance of SVMM.4 Here, the number of sam-
ple history points is 1000 and the noise parameter is set to 0. Surprisingly, the perfor-
mance improves with dimension of the payoff function.
Effect of Noise (SVM) Figure 6.2 shows the effect of noise on SVMM’s perfor-
mance. The number of samples is 1000 and the dimension of the payoff function is 9.
We note that performance degrades gracefully under noise. For zero noise, the median
PCC value is 0.73, whereas even with noise as high as 0.3 (i.e., with probability 0.3
a player chooses to play a random action instead of the best response), we still get a
4The figure was plotted using the standard "boxplot" function in R (http://www.r-
bloggers.com/boxplots-and-beyond-part-i/). The boxes denote the range of 25th and the 75th percentiles.
The line in the box is the median. The upper and lower lines outside the box is the "nominal" range of values


























Figure 6.3: Effect of history length on

















Effect of dimension on SCA




Figure 6.4: Effect of dimension of pay-
off function on performance of SCA for
synthetic data
median PCC of 0.66.
Effect of Length of History (n) (SVM) Figure 6.3 shows the effect of the length of
the history on SVMM’s performance. There is slight improvement in median PCC as
n increases from 200 to 1000.
Performance of SCA
In this section we go into details of performance of the SCA method and show that is
is inferior to SVMM.
Effect of Dimension of Payoff Function (SCA) Figure 6.4 shows the effect of di-
mension of the payoff function on SCA’s performance. The number of sample history
points is 1000 and the noise parameter is set to 0. Performance degrades with dimen-



































Figure 6.5: Effect of noise on perfor-
mance of SCA for synthetic data
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Figure 6.6: Effect of history length on
performance of SCA for synthetic data
Effect of Noise (SCA) Figure 6.5 shows the effect of noise on SCA’s performance.
The number of samples is 200 and dimension of the payoff function is 9. While perfor-
mance does not degrade significantly with noise, overall performance is poor (Overall
PCC median of 0.22).
Effect of History length (SCA) Figure 6.6 shows the effect of history length on
SCA’s performance. Here noise is 0 and dimension of the payoff function is 9. Some-
what counter-intuitively, performance degrades with history length. This could be be-
cause the number of slack variables increases linearly with the length of history. Thus,
the degrees of freedom of the model is potentially higher with a longer history and thus
a longer history can lead to overfitting.
Performance of Centroid Based Method
























Figure 6.7: Effect of epsilon on perfor-
mance of CBS for synthetic data
●













Effect of dimension on CBS




Figure 6.8: Effect of dimension of pay-
off function on performance of CBS for
synthetic data
Effect of ε (CBS) Figure 6.7 shows the effect of ε on CBS’s performance. Here,
the length of history is 200 and dimension of the payoff function is 9. The noise is 0.
Overall performance is better than SCA but much worse than the SVM based method
(PCC median of 0.45 for ε = 0.9).
Effect of Dimension of Payoff Function (CBS) Figure 6.8 shows the effect of di-
mension of the payoff function on performance of CBS. Here, the number of sample
history points is 1000 and the noise parameter is set to 0. Performance shows no dis-
cernible trend.
Effect of Noise Figure 6.9 shows the effect of noise on performance of CBS. Here,
the number of samples is 1000 and dimension of the payoff function is 9. Performance
degrades sharply with noise and even with 10% noise, is close to random.
Effect of Length of History (CBS) Figure 6.10 shows the effect of history length






















Figure 6.9: Effect of noise on perfor-























Figure 6.10: Effect of history length on
performance of CBS for synthetic data
Performance does not improve with n and shows no discernible trend.
6.7.2 Runtime Comparison of CBS, SCA, SVMM
Figure 6.11 shows the relative runtime performance of the three methods for varying
lengths of histories. SVMM is faster than the SCA by an order of magnitude and faster
than the CBS by 2-3 orders of magnitude. For this comparison na and np are 3. Actual
performance time of SVMM for varying values of n, na and np are given in Figure
6.12.
6.7.3 Discussion of the Results
Effect of Dimension of Payoff Function The effect of the dimension of the payoff
functions on the performance of the SVMM, SCA and CBS is depicted in Figures 6.1,
6.4 and 6.8 respectively. We see that SVMM’s performance improves with dimension.
This is counter-intuitive as performance of most classifiers degrades with dimension.

























































Figure 6.11: Comparison of runtimes of
various methods for synthetic data

































Figure 6.12: Runtime for the SVM
method
number of points increases with the payoff function’s dimension (for a fixed length
of history). Thus, while the complexity of the classifier increases with dimension of
data, we have more data to learn from and hence, performance improves with dimen-
sion. In case of SCA, we see that performance degrades with dimension. For SCA the
number of slack variables is the product of history length and dimension of the payoff
function. Thus, the increase in dimension leads to an increase in number of the slack
variables. We hypothesize that in SCA this increase in number of slack variables with
increase in dimension leads to performance degradation. CBS shows no discernible
trend with increasing dimension. First, we are only approximating the centroid. Sec-
ond, the centroid is very sensitive to individual constraints. Thus, CBS chooses an
approximation to a feasible representative solution that is very sensitive to individual
constraints. Therefore, it is not surprising that its performance is erratic.
Effect of Noise The effect of noise on the performance of the SVMM, SCA and CBS
is depicted in Figures 6.2, 6.5 and 6.9 respectively. SVMM’s performance degrades
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gracefully with noise. As oft margin SVMs evolved from hard margin SVMs to handle
misclassification, this graceful degradation is expected. SCA’s performance remains
more or less constant and very poor with and without noise. SCA accommodates noisy
points by allowing constraints to be violated by allowing negative slack variables and
hence some robustness to noise is expected. However, a total lack of trend is a bit
surprising. As noted earlier, centroid is very sensitive to individual constraints and
hence extreme sensitivity to noise, as depicted in Figure 6.9 is expected.
Effect of History Length The effect of history length on the performance of SVMM,
SCA and CBS is depicted in Figures 6.3, 6.6 and 6.10 respectively. SVMM’s perfor-
mance improves slightly when n increases. Thus, SVMM learns a better classifier
with more data. Surprisingly, for synthetic data, it seems that SVMM is able to learn
a very good classifier even with n = 200. SCA again shows the trend of degrading
performance with the increasing number of constraints. Performance of CBS is again
erratic.
Runtime The runtimes of the SVMM, SCA and CBS are compared in Figure 6.11.
CBS is easily the worst. SVMM runtime increases with length of the history (Fig-
ure 6.12 because the problem size varies linearly with the length of the history. The
corresponding increase with the number of actions is faster as the problem size varies
quadratically with the number of actions. SVMM’s runtime increases with the number
of players in general, however, when the number of players is 10 it suddenly drops. We
don’t have a good explanation for this behavior and it is left for future work.
We conclude by stating that of the three algorithms presented in this chapter, SVMM
achieves significantly larger accuracy than SCA and CBS, is more robust to noise, and
performs much better and faster than the other two methods. It gives excellent perfor-
mance on relatively large games (Median PCC above 0.8 for games with 5 players, 5
actions per player).
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6.8 Experiments on Marob Data Set
We ran tests on all 10 terror groups in the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior
(MAROB) [10] data set for which at least 20 rows of data are available. We aggregated
low level MAROB actions (both by the group and the government of the nation where
the group is based) into high level actions. The high level actions involved two actions
each for the group (political engagement with the government, militant activities) and
for the government (political engagement with the group and suppression of the group).
Each of these actions can be carried out at low, medium, high levels. Hence, each
player can take one of 9 actions, leading to 81 total joint actions. We ran experiments
with data about 10 group/nation pairs. To test validity of the payoffs learned, we made
predictions of actions of terror groups and governments and checked the accuracy of
these predictions. The mean number of actions for government player, denoted by G is
4.1 and the mean for terro organization, denoted TO is 5.6. The mean number of joint
actions (product of actions of G and TO) is 25.30. The history length of each game is
between 20 and 25.
Working on this data is problematic for two reasons: (i) we only have 20 data points
for each group/nation pair, (ii) we don’t know the ground truth. We evaluate the quality
of the learned payoffs as follows. We compute the Spearman Rank Correlation Coef-
ficient (SCC) correlation between predicted payoffs and the binary vector representing
actual actions performed during the time period. While the payoffs are reals in [0, 1],
we are correlating them with binary variables in {0, 1}, thus even in the best case, we
cannot expect the correlation to be 1, e.g. for 5 actions (about average for the games in
MAROB dataset), a point in history may be (1, 0, 0, 0, 0). It will be correctly predicted
by a payoff vector such as p = (1, p2, p3, p4, p5), pi < 1 ∀i ∈ {2..5}. Assuming that
pi 6= pj ∀i, j ∈ {1 . . . 5}, the expected SCC for this data (assuming pi’s uniformly
distributed over [0, 1)) is 0.71 which is quite good, given the paucity of data. Figure
































Figure 6.13: Best expected SCC






















Figure 6.14: Comparitive performance
of the three methods on MAROB data
set
Depending on the number of actions of a player, we normalize the SCC between pre-
dicted payoffs and the actual binary action vector to arrive at normalized SCC (NSCC).
Comparison of performance of the three methods (Marob) Figure 6.14 compares
CBS, SCA, and SVMM. On this dataset, SVMM uses the radial basis function as the
kernel and the model is selected based on leave-one-out cross validation. Here again,
SVMM performs well (median NSCC=0.7) and comfortably outscores SCA (median
NSCC=0.6) and CBS (median NSCC=0). While in for some part of the data set CBS
does do well with 75th percentile NSCC value close to 0.4, the average CBS performs
particularly poorly, with a median NSCC of close to 0 indicating near random perfor-
mance. SCA performs well but not as well as SVMM.
As in the case of synthetic data (Figure 6.9) CBS is very sensitive to noise. SVMM
and SCA perform well becausethey both allow some constraints to be violated. As
shown in Figures 6.4 and 6.6, SCA’s performance degrades with the number of con-
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straints. However, since all the histories of in the MAROB data set are short ( 20), SCA
performs quite well. SVMM performs even better than SCA. We hypothesis that this is
because SVMM accommodates non-linear payoff functions using kernel methods and
SCA allows only linear payoffs. We believe that real players’ payoffs functions are not
necessary linear.
6.8.1 LeT Experiments
We conducted extensive tests on the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) dataset[122] which con-
tains 252 rows (months) of data about 700+ variables.5 We choose 24 variables which
we considered relevant to our problem. These variables include six variables for var-
ious types of attacks carried out by LeT and eight for actions taken by the Pakistani
government and military. The other 10 variables such as existence of international
ban, existence of conflict within LeT, split in LeT etc. are treated as environmental
variables.6
The LeT dataset models a relatively big game. Players can take many actions si-
multaneously. If we encode each combination of actions as a separate action, we will
end up with 64 actions for LeT and 256 actions for Pakistani government. This leads to
a very high dimensional encoding for this dataset. As an illustration, for a the given his-
tory,H of this game, E(H) for Pakistani government would be 256∗(1+336) = 86272
dimensions (ignoring the environment variables). We now describe how we tackle the
dimensionality problem.
5It includes details about attacks carried out by LeT, communications campaigns and rallies organized
by LeT. It also includes actions by the state (Pakistan) and international actors (US, India, EU etc.) such as
arrests, tribunals, killings related to members of LeT.
6Environment variables can be seen to be actions of another player (similar to the “nature” player in
classical game theory), whose actions we cannot predict (or are not interested in predicting). Nevertheless,
these actions do have an effect on payoffs of other players.
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Independent Payoffs for Simultaneous Actions
One natural way to reduce dimensions of the embedding is to assume that payoffs
for simultaneous actions are independent and additive. However, different actions may
require different level of effort for the player and it is reasonable to assume that payoffs
are proportional to effort. For example, if attacking a security installation requires
double the effort of attacking civilian transport, then the payoffs for the two actions
are comparable only if the payoff from attacking the security installation is double the
payoff from attacking civilian transport. This is because capability and resources of
an organization are limited and thus, to maximize the payoff, effort should be spent on
actions that give maximum payoff for each unit of effort. Therefore, for this approach,
we need to assign effort-based weights to players’ actions. However, there is no reliable
way of knowing how much effort was needed for each action of the player. Therefore,
we reject this approach. Instead, we relax the constraints in Equation 6.6 by assuming
that regret for each action actually played at time t is greater than or equal to regret
for actions not played at time t. For example, assume that at time t a player played
actions (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) indicating that they took actions 2 and 4 out of possible actions
in {1, . . . , 6}. Then, we assume that regrets for actions 2 and 4 were higher than
regrets for other actions at time t. The other alternative could have been encoding each
of the possible combinations of actions as a separate action, which leads to 64 possible
distinct actions at each time step.
Evaluation of Quality of Learned Payoffs
We evaluate the quality of prediction in two ways. First, we compute the SCC of events
and payoffs for each time period from the test data. We compute correlation between
predicted payoffs for actions and the binary vector representing actual occurrence of
the events during the time period. We use this method to compare the performance of






















Figure 6.15: Predictive performance of















Figure 6.16: Performance of SVMM,
SCA and CBS on LeT dataset
using Area Under the RoC curve as our metric. We don’t use predictions to evaluate
CBS and SCA methods because these methods don’t extend naturally to prediction and
prediction is not our primary objective.
Comparison of the Methods
Figure 6.16 presents comparative performance of the three methods on the LeT dataset.
Again, SVMM performs well and clearly outperforms SCA and CBS. The NSCC for
SVMM for Player LeT in the dataset is 0.59. The NSCC for SVMM for Player Pakistan
is 0.80. The predictive performance of SVMM is good with area under single point
RoC curve of 0.74 and 0.85 for LeT and Pakistan respectively (Figure 6.15).
The performance of SVMM is much better than the other two methods. We think
that the reasons are three-fold. First, SVMM is robust to noise. Second, SVMM allows
for non-linear payoff functions. Third, SVMM performs better with more constraints












Figure 6.17: Comparative performance


























































Figure 6.18: Comparative runtimes for
ICEL and SVMM
6.9 Comparison with ICEL
We compare the performance of our best algorithm (SVMM) against the Inverse Cor-
related Equilibrium Learning (ICEL) algorithm of [134]. ICEL assumes that players
play a correlated equilibrium. Input to the ICEL algorithm is the game history and
corresponding outcomes, which depend on joint actions of the players. The output is
a joint distribution over the player’s actions. The learned distribution is a Correlated
Equilibrium for the corresponding inferred payoffs.
We evaluated the performance of ICEL against SVMM using NSCC metric on the
MAROB dataset. We could not evaluate ICEL on LeT dataset because it has environ-
ment variables in addition to player actions and ICEL is not applicable to games with
environmental variables. If the payoffs learned by ICEL correspond to a Correlated
Equilibrium actually played by the players, we can expect good rank correlation be-
tween chosen actions and payoffs. However, as can be seen from Figure 6.17, this is
not the case. The median NSCC is 0.1140 over all games (which suggests that ICEL is
only marginally better than random noise). NSCC is above 0.5 in only 3 out of 20 in-
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stances (10 games, 2 players per game). In comparison, SVMM performs much better
with median NSCC of 0.7.
We believe the poor performance of ICEL stems from two factors. First, we have
no knowledge of the outcomes, only of game history. We empirically observed that in
the absence of any information about the outcomes, the ICEL convex program simply
converges to distribution of actions actually played by the players (mean Kullback-
Leibler divergence between actual and learned distributions is 0.043, max 0.088). Thus,
in effect, the method corresponds to predicting that whatever happened in past will
happen in future with no notion of recency and dynamics. Secondly, in our real-world
data, the players may not play a correlated equilibrium and our proposed dynamics,
which are based on regret minimization and recency, may be a closer approximation of
reality.
The runtime comparison is shown in Figure 6.18. Here again, SVMM is 1-2 orders
of magnitude faster than ICEL. However, this is a bit of apples and oranges compar-
ison as the SVMM code is in R with a Libsvm backend and the ICEL code uses the
Python code provided by authors publicly at their website. We note that ability to use
highly optimized, stable and mature libraries provided by machine learning commu-
nity for classification tasks is one of the advantages of our approach over other extant
approaches.
6.10 Conclusion
In this work, we have developed, for the first-time, a method to infer payoffs for real-
world games, under much more reasonable assumptions than past work. Specifically,
unlike much past work, PIE is applicable to multi-player games, allows players to
not be fully rational, does not assume a coordination mechanism, does not assume
a symmetric game and is scalable, while other works are lacking in at least one of
these aspects. Moreover, we apply our theory to real-world strategic games with a
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real world dataset based on a widely influential previous study[122] that was briefed
to two national security advisors and heads of multiple security agencies around the
world. Such individuals seek understanding - and our goal in learning these payoffs
were to facilitate explaining the payoffs to such senior decision makers - rather than
prediction. Toward this end, we propose three heuristics that may be used to learn
payoffs of players in multi-player real-world games including one that builds upon
Support Vector Machines - a tested technique in data mining that has never been used
before for learning payoffs. Though the goal of this work is not prediction, we test our
methods in three ways. We use a synthetic data set and a well-known terrorism data
set[10] to see how well we can predict known payoff functions (synthetic data) and
actions ([10] data). Even though we have small amounts of data in both cases, they are
bigger than those in previous studies, and our best algorithm (SVMM) achieves good
correlations. Our third test looks at 10 years of data about the terror group Lashkar-
e-Taiba (responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks). We show that SVMM is both
faster and much more accurate than ICEL [134] one of the best prior algorithms in the
literature. Much work remains to be done. Even though PIE is more scalable than
past work, there is still a long way to go. And explaining learned payoff functions to





We conclude this work with a brief overview of potential future research directions
related to our work. In absence of symmetry introduced by assumption of uniform
thresholds, the problem is notoriously hard to approximate [39] and that too for case
of a simple diffusion model (Independent Cascade). To make this research relevant to
diffusion processes in real-world social networks, there is a need to extend our algo-
rithms to the case where more information about individual nodes can be incorporated
into the model. Ideally, these approaches also need to be extended to various diffusion
models. One work in this directions is the work on diffusion centrality [72]. However,
this work is without the clean theoretical guarantees provided by our algorithms. Thus,
modeling diffusion of influence in social networks using models that balance technical
tractability with real-world applications is still somewhat of an open problem.
Another productive direction of research can be unification of various strategic re-
source allocation problems being studied in a single framework. Network Cournot
Competition is a very flexible model for strategic resource allocation. Intuitively, there
are important similarities between the linear Arrow-Debreu market model, Fisher mar-
ket model and Network Cournot Competition market model. Thus, studying all these
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related problems under a single model is an exciting possibility.
With regards to Payoff Inference problem, we make certain assumptions about dy-
namics of the game. Incorporation different dynamics into this framework is a direc-
tion for future research. Another interesting possibility is incorporation and learning of
players belief about each other into the game play dynamics.
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